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Energy is critical to the functioning of the global economy and seriously impacts 
global security as well. What factors influence the extent to which countries will pursue 
nuclear energy in their overall mix of energy approaches? This dissertation explores this 
critical question by analyzing the nuclear energy policies o f the United States, Germany 
and Japan. Rather than citizen opposition or proximity to nuclear disasters, it seems that a 
country’s access to other resources through natural endowments or trading relationships 
offers the best explanation for nuclear energy pursuance.
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It was in 1818 that Mary Shelley first published the tale o f Dr. Frankenstein and 
his monster in Frankenstein; or Prometheus Unbound, a novel which tells o f m an’s need 
to use science for innovative creation and the ways in which those creations can be man’s 
undoing. A controversial novel published in the midst o f  the 19th century scientific 
enlightenment, thoughts of Dr. Frankenstein’s monster would again come to mind in July 
o f 1945 when the United States conducted the first test-detonation of the nuclear-powered 
atomic weapon that would later be used as a prototype for the bomb that was dropped on 
Nagasaki, Japan, in August of the same year. It would not be until 1954, nine years later, 
that nuclear power would be harnessed to create energy for a power grid at the former 
Soviet Union’s Obinisk Nuclear Power Plant. Since then, nuclear energy has proven to be 
a man-made power that theoretically has the potential to free humans from their 
dependence on fossil fuels for clean energy yet has remained controversial for many 
reasons.
To its favor, nuclear power is a sustainable energy source that cleanly produces 
electricity without releasing carbon emissions into the atmosphere and can increase 
energy security by reducing foreign dependence on other energy sources. Despite these 
positive attributes, fear still persist that the costs of nuclear technology outweigh the 
potential benefits. Past nuclear disasters have demonstrated the consequences of the 
potential instability o f nuclear energy production, such as the spread o f radiation leakages 
over large geographical distances and the contamination of water supplies. The storage of
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nuclear waste is also a controversial issue as well as health-related side effects in 
communities where nuclear reactors operate. The spread of nuclear technology to terrorist 
groups or unstable states for use as weaponry is also o f concern to the international 
community. Pro-nuclear supporters claim that tougher safety regulations and increased 
security measures can solve most of these problems associated with nuclear energy, and 
any risk incurred is worth the independence from dirty and expensive fossil fuels that 
nuclear energy could provide.
The arguments for and against nuclear energy are many and varied, and it would 
be a difficult task to credit one side as being any more correct than the other. Rather than 
pursue such a line o f inquiry, this project will instead attempt to methodically and 
objectively identify which variables seem to be most important in determining a 
country’s nuclear energy policy. In other words, this project seeks to offer an explanatory 
theory for contemporary decisions about pursuing or not pursuing nuclear energy in the 
United States (US), Germany and Japan. The impetus for this project began with the 
March 2011 nuclear incident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant and the varying 
responses different countries around the world had to this occurrence. While all 
expressed concern for the victims of what came to be known as the “triple disaster” 
related to the Tohoku Earthquake, the resulting tsunami, and the nuclear disaster, what I 
found most interesting was the way this event caused countries to react to nuclear 
technology within their own borders. The US, for example, continued its pursuance of 
nuclear energy and, in early 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) even 
approved the first new reactor construction project in early since 1978. In the months 
following March 2011, Germany gradually revealed an energy plan that would include
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completely abandoning nuclear energy by the year 2022 and a renewed focus on 
renewable energy alternatives based on wind and photovoltaic (solar) sources. Japan, a 
country still dealing with forced evacuations o f thousands of people from Fukushima 
Prefecture and attempts at radioactivity contamination and reactor decommission, chose 
to close all reactors in operation over the course o f 2011 and 2012 for safety reevaluation; 
however, the current energy plan for Japan’s future includes continued reliance o f nuclear 
energy.
And so the puzzle of post-Fukushima nuclear energy policy had begun to unfold. 
Why would German Chancellor Angela Merkel choose to abandon nuclear energy when 
she and her majority Christian Democratic Party (CDU) had run (and won) in 2009 on a 
pro-nuclear platform, even voting to extend the lives o f existing reactors another two 
decades? The majority Democratic Party o f Japan and 2011 Prime Minister Naoto Kan 
similarly vowed that Japan would move away from nuclear energy, but a 2012 landslide 
victory for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) reversed that course and current Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe assures citizens that nuclear energy is necessary for economic 
growth. As a counter-balance to these reactions, the US chose to increase its reliance on 
nuclear energy through the construction of new nuclear reactors. It was because of these 
varying reactions to Fukushima that these three countries were chosen as particularly 
suitable cases to study, but also because these three countries are so similar in many 
regards: all economically developed, wealthy, democratic, “Western” countries. By 
controlling for these similar variables, this project will attempt to explain the differences 
in their current nuclear energy policies by testing various hypotheses in each case to 
determine their impact on nuclear energy pursuance.
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The first hypothesis that will be tested is that countries where public opinion is 
more favorable toward nuclear energy are more likely to pursue nuclear energy. 
Conversely, countries where public opinion in opposition to nuclear energy is higher will 
be less likely to pursue nuclear energy. Public opinion will be measured by using polling 
data collected within each country that asks variations of questions related to approval of 
nuclear energy. In a perfect world, this polling data would be collected by the same 
independent source in each country at the same intervals o f  time over a number o f years 
by asking a similar sampling o f respondents the same question. Unfortunately, this type 
of data does not exist. Even so, reliable opinion polling information is nonetheless 
available in each country, and that information is what will be used here. The idea behind 
including public opinion as an independent variable is that, especially in strong 
democracies represented by these three case studies, society possesses some agency in 
influencing government decisions. Opinion polling alone may not reflect this, so a 
qualitative analysis o f actions related to shifts in public opinion, specifically, recent 
voting patterns and protest activity, are also included as a supplement to this variable.
The second set of hypotheses to be tested deal with nuclear accidents, specifically, 
Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986), and Fukushima (2011). This section will 
partially incorporate data from opinion polls conducted over time to explore whether past 
nuclear disasters have had any correlating impact on approval for nuclear energy. The 
hypothesis is simply that nuclear disasters, regardless of where they happen, negatively 
affect decisions to pursue nuclear energy. Each disaster is examined in each case study by 
examining levels of nuclear energy output, reactors approved over time to look for 
decreases o f each following Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima. I additionally
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discuss any changes to nuclear energy policy in the US, Germany and Japan following 
these disasters.
The final hypotheses focus on domestic resources and international and regional 
energy trading relationships. The hypothesis is that the greater a country’s endowment of 
natural resources (oil, coal and natural gas) the less likely it will be to pursue nuclear 
energy while countries that lack natural resource endowments will be more likely to 
pursue nuclear energy. Additionally, countries that have reliable and affordable trading 
options for energy resources are less likely to pursue nuclear energy while countries that 
lack reliable and affordable energy trading options are more likely to pursue nuclear 
energy. Here, “reliable” trading options are defined broadly as trading partners that 
possess stable supplies of energy resources and are likely to continue exporting this 
energy resource into the foreseeable future. “Affordable” is defined as a price that is 
comparable to prices other countries are paying for the same energy source without 
adding on additional expenses for lengthy transport or to construct additional 
infrastructure to receive imports. This variable attempts to capture countries’ likelihood 
to pursue nuclear energy in light of other possible energy options that may be available to 
them either because they have access to domestic resources or because they can easily 
and cheaply obtain them from other sources. This hypothesis will be tested by first 
looking at what other energy sources make up electrical energy generation, where those 
energy sources come from, and then qualitatively analyzing both the future availability of 
those resources and the current and projected future prices o f those sources. For 
example, if a country has an abundant source o f domestic natural gas, oil or coal, it will 
be more likely to use those sources rather than choose nuclear energy. Or, if a country has
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a friendly trading relationship with other countries that possess these natural resources 
and this trading relationship allows the country to buy them at reasonable prices, then that 
country will also be less likely to pursue nuclear energy.
By examining these variables in the US, Germany and Japan, this project will 
make three important contributions to the existing body of knowledge. First, it will 
update the existing literature on nuclear energy policy since the Fukushima disaster of 
2011. This course of questioning is not necessarily new, as will be demonstrated in the 
following section that contains a literature review. It is, however, one of the first studies 
to take up the topic of the future viability o f nuclear energy since Fukushima. Secondly, 
this is also one of the only studies to include an Asian country as a case study together 
with the US and a European country. Past studies have been much more likely to 
compare the US and Sweden, or the US and Germany, or to include France in a similar 
constellation o f cases. Any current or future project would be remiss to not include Japan 
as it presents an opportunity to study the direct impact o f a nuclear disaster on resolve to 
pursue nuclear energy. Since Japan is normally classified as a Western country in terms 
o f both democracy and economic development, it possesses the necessary control 
variables to methodologically justify inclusion in this study. Lastly, this project’s overall 
goal is both explain current nuclear energy pursuance as well as offer future predictions 
as to the future viability of nuclear energy as a power source.
The format of this project is as follows: the second chapter will offer a look at the 
existing literature on nuclear energy beginning around the time of its first use as an 
atomic weapon in World War II and subsequent development around the world as a 
civilian energy source. This familiarizes the reader with a general history o f nuclear
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development, the conclusions of existing comparative studies, and illustrates what this 
particular project has to offer within this body of work. The second, third and fourth 
chapters are case studies on nuclear energy in the United States, Germany and Japan, 
respectively. Each case study follows roughly the same format o f first offering a more 
detailed history of nuclear energy development in each country, followed by sections that 
engage the issue of public opinion, nuclear disasters, and access to other resources. Each 
individual case study finishes with conclusions drawn from that particular case study. 
The sixth chapter offers an integrative analysis that examines the three case studies taken 
together and draws broader conclusions about nuclear pursuance in the three cases and 
how those conclusions can be adapted to apply to other democratic, economically 
developed countries. The final, concluding chapters first develops an energy outlook for 
the United States, Germany and Japan. Lastly, the primary conclusions o f the study are 
“tested” in three countries (Russia, China and Ukraine) that do not possess the control 
variables of democracy and economic development to determine the conclusions’ 




This literature review will first offer a general overview o f the very early 
development of nuclear energy and the debate surrounding it since the 1940s. For 
clarity’s sake, the academic literature on the subject of nuclear energy is then divided into 
three phases, the first from the 1950s until the 1986 nuclear disaster at Chernobyl; the 
second from Chernobyl until the 2011 disaster at Fukushima; and the third from 
Fukushima looking forward. Finally, this literature review will focus on comparative 
literature that has been produced thus far, dating from 1977 to the present.
Background Literature
Nuclear fission refers to the process in which an atom divides into smaller parts, 
thereby releasing a very large amount of energy. This manner o f “splitting” is 
descriptively fitting, considering nuclear technology has been a mixed blessing since its 
first public use on the 6th of August, 1945. Nuclear technology has the potential to be 
both constructive and destructive, and the difference between the peaceful and harmful 
natures of the split atom has more to do with politics than with physics. It seems an 
almost cruel irony that an energy source once deemed “too cheap to meter” 1 also 
possesses the potential to be the most powerful and destructive weapon that humans have 
ever created. While the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed the world the dark 
side of nuclear technology, nuclear energy supporters worked diligently in the decades 
that followed to demonstrate that nuclear technology could be used for good, too. This
1 Quote credited to Lewis Strauss in a speech to the US Atomic Energy Commission, 1954.
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legacy of duality has followed nuclear energy throughout the decades, beginning truly in
the 1950s and continuing even today.
The 1950s and 1960s were known as “The Atomic Age,” or a time when
optimism for nuclear energy was at an all-time high. James Mahaffey notes that, in
retrospect at least, “the post-World War II years were wildly optimistic and forward-
looking, and it was an optimum time to explore new ideas for energy production”2. In
1953, American President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered his “Atoms for Peace”
address, assuring audiences that his country wanted to be “constructive, not destructive.”
Lewis Strauss, of the infamous “too cheap to meter,” claim, went on to say in the same
1954 speech to the Atomic Energy Commission that people were entering an age in
which their children
...will know of great famines in the world only as matters o f history; will 
travel effortlessly over the seas and under them and through the air with a 
minimum of danger and at great speeds, and will experience a lifespan 
far longer than ours, as disease yields and man comes to understand 
what causes him to age. This is the forecast of an age of peace.3
It would be difficult to find a speech that better illustrates the optimism of many
governments in the world during the 1950s, though many people still had to be convinced
that nuclear power should not necessarily be associated with mushroom clouds, craters,
and vaporization.
The majority o f the nuclear-focused scholarly literature that accompanied the 
years of the 1950s and 1960s can be grouped into two main subject areas: 1) debates on
2 James Mahaffey, Atomic Awakenings: A New Look at the History and Future o f  Nuclear Pow er  (New  
York: Pegasus Books, 2009), XV.
3 Mahaffey, Atomic Awakenings, XVI.
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the decision to use atomic bombs against Japan and nuclear weaponry in general4, and 2) 
speculation as to the future o f nuclear technology as a power source.5 Perhaps the most 
well-known of the works on nuclear proliferation is Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons and 
Foreign Policy (1957, 1st ed.) in which he argues that the limited use o f nuclear weapons 
need not necessarily escalate into a situation of mutually assured destruction. It was also 
during this atomic age that we begin to see the first signs o f states’ failure to separate 
nuclear weapons from nuclear energy in the discourse about nuclear energy. The titles of 
the books published during the 1950s and 1960s alone allude to the multiple dimensions 
of the nuclear debate at the time; for example, G. W endt’s 1956 book titled Nuclear 
Energy and Its Uses in Peace can be contrasted with John Bowie’s 1959 work Adapt or 
Perish: The Dilemma o f Nuclear Politics.
Despite the reassurances coming from the Atoms for Peace project, even 
combined with the air of excitement and optimism coming from the nuclear science 
community, there were still those who were skeptical o f the potential to turn such a 
dangerous technology into a peaceful means of energy generation without incurring some 
grave cost, whether political or physical. Bertrand Russell, British philosopher and 
winner of the 1950 Nobel Prize for literature, was one such prominent anti-nuclear 
activist. Together with Germany physicist Albert Einstein, the very scientist who had 
contributed to the creation of the atomic bomb in the 1940s, the two released the Russell- 
Einstein Manifesto in 1955 that called for governments in both the East and the West to
4 See: Shogo Nagaoka, Hiroshima Under Atomic Bomb Attack, 1951; Abraham Meyer, Changing Japanese 
Attitudes Toward Atomic Weapons (1954); Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy  (1956); 
Burr W. Lyson, Atomic Energy in War and Peace  (1951); John Bowie, Adapt or Perish: The Dilemma o f  
Nuclear Politics, (1959); Stephen King-Hall, Defense in the Nuclear Age  (1959); Pierre-Marie Gallois, The 
Balance o f  Terror: Strategy o f  the Nuclear Age  (1961).
5 See: G. Wendt, Nuclear Energy and Its Uses in Peace (1956); Donald James Hughes, On Nuclear 
Energy: Its Potential fo r  Peacetime Uses (1957); Werner Heisenberg, Philosophical Problem s o f  Nuclear 
Science (1952); Dewey Larson, The Case Against the Nuclear Atom  (1956).
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come to some agreement abolishing the possession and use o f nuclear weapons. 
“Remember your humanity, and forget the rest,” they say, lest we should all choose death 
because “ ...w e cannot forget our quarrels.”6 The Russell-Einstein Manifesto illustrates 
the fact that a suspicion of nuclear energy, at the very least, and an out-right rejection of 
nuclear technology in some instances was occurring in both Europe and the U.S. around 
the same time. It is Einstein who is often quotes as saying that he knew not with what 
weapons World War III would be fought, but he suspected World War IV would be 
fought with sticks and stones, an observation that clearly demonstrates his pessimism for 
the peaceful use of atomic technology. This duality surrounding the nuclear debate would 
continue into the 1970s and 1980s, but the events o f those decades would introduce a new 
sense of urgency for testing the viability of energy alternatives, including nuclear energy.
During the 1970s, multiple events coalesced that drastically increased the market 
price of oil. From 1947-1967, the price o f a barrel o f oil in United States dollars has risen 
less than 2 percent. In the 1970s, however, as the U.S. and then Great Britain began 
floating their currencies and their values depreciated, the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) began pricing a barrel of oil against gold. In the years after 
this “oil shock,” OPEC was slow to readjust their prices to reflect the depreciation of 
currencies around the world. To further complicate matters, in 1973, the Organization of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries instituted an embargo against Western Israeli 
supporters that would last until March of 1974. In 1979, political upheavals lowered 
Iranian production o f oil and the resulting increases in the price of oil were felt all around 
the world as gasoline was rationed, national speed limits were instituted. In Germany, for
6 Sandra Ionno Butcher, “The Origins o f  the Russell-Einstein Manifesto,” Pugwash H istory Series, (2005): 
1, accessed June 10, 2011, http://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htm.
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example, driving, flying or boating were pastimes all outlawed on Sunday. Japan also 
sought to decrease its oil consumption, but benefitted from the oil crisis as well through 
increased export of smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles. In the US, domestic production 
and exploration were increased. Perhaps most importantly, the need to find alternative 
forms of energy was finally real and present.
Naturally following these events, there was much scholarship in the 1970s and 
1980s that focused on nuclear energy policy. Though much scholarship had been 
produced in the past decades either espousing the virtues or vilifying the nature o f nuclear 
energy, the first wave of true literature on the politics o f nuclear energy and the creation 
of nuclear energy policy begins at the end of the 1970s and reflects the need policy­
makers felt for alternative energy exploration after the oil crises o f the past decade7. It 
was also during this time that we begin to see a move in the scholarship to separate the 
issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, and researchers began to focus on the 
safety and economic viability o f nuclear energy as an alternative. Following the 1979 
nuclear incident at Three Mile Island, the marketplace was flooded with books on nuclear 
power and alternative energy sources. Many were written very quickly to satisfy the 
public thirst for information on radiation, wastes, nuclear hazards transportation, and
Q
other related topics.
7 See: David M. Elliott, Pat Coyne, Mike George, The Politics o f  N uclear Power (1978); Duncan Lyall 
Bum, Nuclear Power and the Energy Crisis (1978); Kristen S. Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and  
Public Policy (1980); James Everett Katz, Nuclear Power in Developing Countries: An Analysis o f  
Decision-Making (1982); Stanley M. Nealey, Public Opinion and Nuclear Energy (1983); Eds. William R. 
Freudenberg and Eugene A. Rosa, Public Reactions to Nuclear Power: Are There Critical M asses?  (1984) 
Walter A. Rosenbaum, Energy Politics and Public Policy (1987).
8 See Jerry W. Mansfield, The Nuclear Power Debate: A Guide to the Literature (1984) for a full 
bibliography.
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Mansfield claims in his guide to the literature on nuclear energy that in the years 
leading up to 1984, more books were written against nuclear energy than in support o f  it.9 
Multiple factors could explain this divergence in the literature. One could speculate that 
those who are against a movement are frequently more vocal and that nuclear activists 
had to shout twice as loudly to have their point heard. It could also have been that there 
was more o f a demand in the market for anti-nuclear research, or that the books published 
against nuclear energy were well-financed by highly visibly anti-nuclear groups. Or, it 
could be that the proliferation of books supporting the anti-nuclear movement was simply 
reflective o f the general sentiment o f the public at the time. In 1986, this debate would 
become further complicated by the explosion o f  reactor number four at the Chernobyl 
plant in current-day Ukraine. Besides fueling the on-going sentiment that the generation 
of nuclear energy was unsafe, neighboring European countries and environmentalist 
groups were concerned with the spread of radiation from Chernobyl that, by some 
estimates, reached Helsinki to the north and Munich to the east.10
After 1986, much of the scholarship that was produced in the second wave was 
published in English and focused on what effects the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl would 
have on the future of energy policy. Many works attempted to measure public opinion 
post-Chernobyl, mainly in Western Europe where the nuclear debate was the strongest 
and most diverse.11 There was also a strong push to study nuclear technology in the light
9 Jerry Mansfield, The Nuclear Power Debate: A Guide to the Literature, (New York: Garland, 1984), 2.
10 Jim Smith and Nicholas A. Beresford, Chernobyl: Catastrophe and Consequences, (Chichester: Springer 
Books, 2005), 3.
11 See: Peter Gould, Fire in the Rain: The Democratic Consequences o f  Chernobyl (1990); James M.
Jasper, Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, France, and Sweden  (1990); Detlaf 
Jahn, “Nuclear Power, Energy Policy, and New  Politics in Sweden and Germany” (1992). Christian 
Joppke, Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison o f  the US and Germany (1992);
Koichi Hasegawa, “A Comparative Study o f  Social Movements in the Post-Nuclear Era in Japan and the 
United States” (1995); Peter Hodgson, Nuclear Power, Energy and the Environment (1999).
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of weapons acquisition during this time, and understandably so: both China and India had 
already tested nuclear weapons and there were rumors that Pakistan would soon follow 
suit.12 This wave o f scholarship also coincided with the beginnings o f the environmental 
movement, and the narrative o f “risk” vs. “benefits” begins to also appear as a theme in 
the literature.13 As nuclear energy became an attractive possibility to rapidly developing 
countries such as China and India, by the turn o f the 21st century, studies were being 
published that examined the nuclear energy programs of developing countries as well as 
Western ones.14 
Comparative Literature
The body of true comparative literature on nuclear energy spans a gamut o f topics 
though is mainly limited in geographical scope to Western Europe and the United States. 
Leon Lindberg is the researcher most often credited with composing the ground-breaking 
comparative work on the topic of nuclear energy policy The Energy Syndrome: 
Comparing National Responses to the Energy Crisis (1977), a work that examines the 
construction of the energy policies of 7 countries15 through a collection of country- 
specific essays16. In the introduction to this work, Lindberg identifies three characteristics 
common to all of the case studies in the book: 1) continued increases in energy
12 See: John Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb (1991); Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Nuclear 
Weapons and American Interests: Conflicting Policy Choices (1983); Geogre H. Quester and the Strategic 
Studies Institute, Nuclear Pakistan and Nuclear India: Stable D eterrent or Proliferation Challenge?
(1992); Praful Bidwai and Achin Vinaik, New Nukes: India, Pakistan an d  Global Nuclear Disarmament 
(2000).
13 See: Joseph V. Rees, Hostages o f  Each Other: The Transformation o f  Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile 
Island (1994); Gwyneth Cravens, Power to Save the World: The Truth About Nuclear Energy (2007).
14 See: M.R. Srinivasan, From Fission to Fusion: The Story o f  India’s Atomic Energy Program  (2003); 
Jonothan Benjamin-Alvarado, Power to the People: Energy and the Cuban Nuclear Program(2000); Yi- 
Chong Xu, The Politics o f  Nuclear Energy in China (2010); Daniel Marcos Bonotto, The Pocos de Caldas 
Hot Spot: A Big Blast fo r  Nuclear Energy in Brazil (2010).
15 Britain, Canada, France, Hungary, India, Sweden and the United States.
16 Leon Lindberg, The Energy Syndrome: Comparing National Responses to the Energy Crisis, (University 
of Michigan: Lexington Books, 1977).
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consumption 2) public policies that focus almost exclusively on the supply side and 3) 
institutional and structural obstacles to the adoption o f alternative policies, all o f which 
make up what Linberg refers to as the Energy Syndrome, a phenomenon which can 
explain a lack of policy reform. Ultimately, Lindberg suggests that, as the boundaries of 
energy policy continue to expand, fundamental reforms must be undertaken to if these 
energy policy lags and institutional rigidities are to be overcome.
Seven years after the publication of The Energy Syndrome, in 1984, Michael T. 
Hatch notes that the characteristics identified by Lindberg still represent an accurate 
assessment o f present energy policy and that Lindberg’s greatest contribution was a 
recognition that the creation o f energy policy was only going to become more complex. 
Hatch’s work Politics and Nuclear Power: Energy Policy in Western Europe details the 
specific responses of West Germany, France, and the Netherlands to this growing 
complexity o f the energy issue17. While the central question of his work is what pushed 
nuclear energy to the top of the political agenda in his chosen cases, his analysis 
examines the overall evolution of energy policy over time in an attempt to identify clear 
patterns of cause and effect often muddled by the complexities of energy policy creation. 
Hatch’s research concludes that it was not by chance that anti-nuclear forces became a 
politicized national movement in the 1970s. While opposition had existed before, it was 
not until this decade that the movement became cohesive and comprehensive and pushed 
a rational-analytic strategy of the articulation of energy-related concerns into the national 
agenda. However, Hatch disagrees with Lindberg’s assessment that this politicization of 
energy concerns would result in a political stale-mate; to the contrary, the opposite is
17 Michael T. Hatch, Politics and Nuclear Power: Energy Policy in Western Europe, (Lexington, K Y : 
University Press o f  Kentucky: 1984).
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illustrated by the varying degrees of success enjoyed by governments in the execution of 
their overall energy policies18. Hatch concludes that, while an analysis o f overall 
decision-making strategies is useful to understating how nuclear energy in particular was 
pushed to the top o f the political agenda, it is less useful in accounting for the different 
political outcomes in each country.
James M. Jasper takes up this theme of policy divergence in his 1990 comparative 
study Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, France and Sweden, 
which examines reasons why three countries that illustrated similar enthusiasm for 
nuclear energy ultimately diverged in their commitment to nuclear energy19. Jasper takes 
a state-driven approach to his analysis, largely because “Political conflicts within the 
state are crucial to an explanation of French, Swedish and American commitments to 
nuclear energy” (6). Even though decisions made outside the state did matter to some 
extent, these decisions were shaped by public policies so that the explanation for the 
decision ultimately leads back to the state. In regard to the anti-nuclear movement, while 
Hatch states that it politicized the nuclear issue and therefore thrust it onto the political 
agenda, Jasper claims that the pro-nuclear movement had far more access to political 
structures such as government agencies and politicians than did the anti-nuclear 
movement and, as a result, anti-nuclear movements had little effect o f nuclear energy 
policies in any country, therefore making it is impossible to explain the policy divergence 
by means of the anti-nuclear movement20. This lack of efficacy on the part of the anti- 
nuclear movement supports Jasper’s structural state-centered bureaucratic approach,
18 Hatch, Politics and Nuclear Power , 191.
19 James M. Jasper, Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, France and Sweden, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
20 Jasper, Nuclear Politics, 8.
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though it leaves little room for consideration o f the role o f individuals such as elected 
officials or scientific elites. In the end, Jasper would acknowledge this shortcoming and 
others of a purely structural state-centered approach when studying policy creation. His 
overall conclusion as to the divergence of American, French and Swedish nuclear energy 
policy lies in the rigidity o f policy-making structures. Reminiscent o f Linberg’s 
conclusions about nuclear politics and political stalemates, Jasper claims that as the 
flexibility of policy-makers in all three countries has shrunk in the past ten years, so has 
the potential for revival or reform of nuclear energy policy.
The scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s focused on the role of the state in 
determining energy policies, though scholars disagreed to what extent the state is 
autonomous from traditional, non-bureaucratic influences. Regardless o f to what extent a 
researcher finds it theoretically necessary to follow the lead of scholars such as Theda 
Skocpol and “bring the state back in” this theme in the literature suggests the general 
politicization of the production of energy. One influence that reinforces this notion began 
appearing in the 1980s and 1990s was the presence of Green parties across Europe. The 
first o f these ecological and alternative political groups technically emerged in Britain in 
1973, but most European Green parties were not created until a decade or more later. It 
was not until the early 1980s that the Green Parties o f Europe would make significant 
strides at integration into political structures, especially in Germany where the Green 
party Die Griinen attracted nearly a million votes in the Parliamentarian election and won 
a significant number of seats for the first time.
German scholar Detlaf Jahn examines the influence of the Green Parties in 
Germany and Sweden, the social movements from which the party grew, as well as the
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popular claim at the time that nations such as Germany and Sweden had reached the
2 1limits of their industrialized growth. Jahn claims that these two factors, the increasing 
popularity o f Green parties and the peak of growth, are interrelated and explain the 
politicization of energy production, thought the extent to which this production is 
politicized varies among countries. By comparing nuclear energy policy on the one hand 
and attitudes to and movements against nuclear energy on the other in Germany and 
Sweden, Jahn arrives at the conclusion that, in Germany, production is much more 
exposed to politicization than is Sweden and therefore stands a greater chance for new 
politics to form. Whereas Jasper claimed that Sweden’s bureaucratic flexibility left room 
for potential nuclear policy reform in Sweden, Jahn suggests that Sweden’s lack of 
politicization implied a decreased chance to institutionalize new energy politics. 
Koopmans and Duyvendak would return to this theme o f politicization in 200522 to 
examine the construction of the nuclear “problem” in Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland after the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. In an attempt to explain the 
countries’ differing reactions to Chernobyl, the authors conclude that similar conditions 
and events (like Chernobyl) do not necessarily lead to consensus reactions: to the 
contrary, Chernobyl led to widely divergent interpretations and levels o f antinuclear 
mobilization in their case countries, exhibited by varying levels o f success at slowing 
down or blocking the expansion of nuclear energy. They ultimately conclude that a 
combination of the political opportunity and framing perspectives is most fruitful in 
making sense of the differential careers o f the nuclear energy conflict in Western Europe.
21 Detlaf Jahn, “Nuclear Power, Energy Policy, and New Politics in Sweden and Germany,” Environmental 
Politics, 1:3 (1992).
22 Ruud Koopmans and Jan Willem Duyvendak, “The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue 
and its Impact on the Mobilization o f Antinuclear Movements in Western Europe.” Social Problems, 42:2 
(1995).
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While Jahn analyzes environmental social movements as a cause of the 
politicization of energy production, other branches of nuclear energy research examine 
these types of movements, particularly that o f the anti-nuclear sentiment, as an effect of 
nuclear politicization. One of the first works on the antinuclear movements in France and 
West Germany, Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollok’s The Atom Besieged: 
Exparliamentary Dissident in France and Germany23, offers a comparative analysis of 
the nuclear opposition in both countries in the 1970s. Perhaps most interesting is the 
authors’ discussion of their belief that fear is primarily responsible for fueling the nuclear 
opposition, a sentiment which, in their opinion, is fundamentally altering societal make­
up but has little effect on nuclear-related decisions which are made by the government 
and the nuclear industry. The authors conclude that these broad-based and widespread 
movements shared many structural similarities but ultimately differed in their ability to 
influence the decision to pursue nuclear power. In Germany, the protest movement 
accomplished a (temporary) moratorium on nuclear development by raising questions 
about the constitutionality o f nuclear technology. In France, however, where protest is 
dismissed an insignificant feature of political culture, ignorance, or demonstrative of 
popular resistance to change, there were no similar consequences.24
As demonstrated, the majority o f the comparative research on nuclear energy 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s focused primarily on Western Europe, particularly 
Germany, Sweden, and France. Perhaps similar political structures, histories, or political 
cultures explain this comparative limitation. By the 1990s, however, comparativists
23 Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollok, The Atom Besieged: Exparliamentary D issent in France and  
Germany, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981).
24 Other works by Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollok: The Politics o f  Participation and the Nuclear Debate 
in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria (1977); “Ideology as Strategy: The Discourse o f  the Anti-Nuclear 
Movement in France and Germany (1980).
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began widening their lens to capture a wider view of the nuclear debate beyond just that 
of Europe. The first of these comparisons to include the United States, “Political 
Opportunity Structures and Political Protests: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four 
Democracies” (Kitschelt, 1986) compares the antinuclear movements o f the United 
States, Sweden, France and West Germany, though the focus is not necessarily on the 
impact o f the antinuclear movements themselves25. Rather, Kitschelt uses the antinuclear 
movements in each of these countries to arrive at a theoretical generalized understanding 
of the factors that determine the dynamics of social movements. Echoing the findings of 
previous researchers, Kitschelt found that in societies where state capacities to implement 
policies were weak yet the system of inputs from society were strong, such as West 
Germany and the United States, the antinuclear movement had at least a chance to effect 
some change on nuclear development. Where state capacities were stronger, such as 
Sweden and France, the decision making process was shielded from the influence from 
the antinuclear movement, while Sweden best exemplified the type o f society in which a 
system of inputs and outputs allowed for most policy innovation. These conclusions 
about the efficacy of the German antinuclear movement and the flexibility of Swedish 
nuclear policy-making were not necessarily new at the time, though the addition of the 
United States to the comparative equation was.
In 1990, Dieter Rucht responded to Kitschelt’s model o f political opportunity 
structures, claiming that it was too simplistic to adequately explain the diversity of 
oppositional movement actors, strategies and action repertoires.26 In 1992, Christian
25 Herbert Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protests: Anti-Nuclear Movements in 
Four Democracies,” British Journal o f  Political Science, 16 (1986).
26 Dieter Rucht, “Campaigns, Skirmishes and Battles: Nuclear Movements in USA, France and West 
Germany” Organization and Environment, 4: 1990.
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Joppke would again take up this debate in his work Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy: 
A Comparison o f  the US and Germany27. Similar to the work by Rucht and Kitschelt, his 
topic harkens back to previous work that attempted to assess the role o f the state in 
energy policy decision making. Joppke uses the antinuclear movements as a medium to 
studying social movements and ultimately develops a political process perspective that 
focuses on the interrelationship between the state and social movements, thus bringing 
the state back into the study of process, but also incorporates a state-and-society approach 
that would later be popularized by Joel Migdal. Joppke’s model takes into account a 
variety of forces, including different state structures, political cultures, and movement 
organizations. Whereas including the United States in comparisons previously presented 
a theoretical hurdle, researchers such as Joppke used its inclusion as a way to strengthen 
theoretical models with their application to countries with different structures, cultures, 
and organizations. Though the intent of these types of studies was a contribution to the 
theoretical study of social movements, they also contributed to a better understanding of 
the politics o f nuclear energy as well.
The first study to turn its focus to the nuclear politics of non-W estem countries 
was that o f Koichi Hasegawa in his 1995 article “A Comparative Study o f Social 
Movements in the Post-Nuclear Era in Japan and the United States.”28 In contrast with 
skepticism from the US and other Western countries regarding nuclear energy from the 
1970s-2000s, East Asian countries such as China, South Korea and Japan all shared pro- 
nuclear energy policies. Hasegawa claims this is because o f the relative strength o f the
27 Christian Joppke, Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison o f  the US and Germany,
(Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 1992).
28 Koichi Hasegawa, “A Comparative Study o f Social Movements o f  the Post-Nuclear Era in Japan and the 
United States,” International Journal o f  Japanese Sociology, (1995).
2 2
antinuclear movements o f countries like the US and Germany compared to Asian 
countries such as Japan. Using qualitative data studying the antinuclear movements in the 
US and Japan, Hasegawa studies 1) political opportunity structures 2) resources, actors, 
and major support base 3) framing based on cultural attitudes in both countries.29 He 
concludes that a relatively open and decentralized system in the US allowed 
environmental groups to become the major influence on the management o f energy 
utilities by stressing efficiency and exploring energy alternatives. For sociopolitical 
reasons, however, the same influence over nuclear utilities was not shared by the 
antinuclear movement in Japan.
The most recent scholarship (prior to 2011) on energy reflects new themes and 
trends in the political debate on energy. Most comparative studies still focus on similar 
set o f countries, but have changed the focus from solely nuclear energy to more 
comprehensive studies o f energy and environmental policies in general. In 2003, Miranda 
Schreurs widened the scope beyond just nuclear energy to broad environmental politics in 
her comparative study o f American, German and Japanese environmental policy- 
making. Schreurs and In-Taek Hyun also released an edited work titled The 
Environmental Dimension o f East Asian Energy Security in 2007 that examines issues 
such as water scarcity, fishing and pollution, and climate change policies. In 2009, Martin 
Chick published a historical comparison o f the development of electricity and energy 
policy in Britain, France and the United States.31 This shift in focus is understandable as
29 Hasegawa calls this the “Triangular Model o f  Social Movement Analysis” (TRIM)
30 Miranda Schreurs, Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany and the United States, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
31 Martin Chick. Electricity and Energy Policy in Britain, France and the United States Since 1945, 
(Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009).
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nuclear energy is now increasingly linked with other topics, such as clean energy goals, 
economic growth, or energy security and proliferation.
This project is situated within this comparative literature by engaging similar 
issues as many of these previous works, such as the efficacy of public opinion and the 
anti-nuclear movement, lasting consequences o f nuclear disasters, and regional and 
international dynamics that play a part in determining a country’s overall energy 
portfolio. However, this project departs from the general literature on this subject in its 
overall explanatory goals. Whereas many previous works have focused on understanding 
political processes such as citizen opportunity structures or state capacities by using 
nuclear politics as a case study, this project’s goal is to determine the future viability of 
nuclear energy by exploring the impact o f citizen movements, public opinion, nuclear 
disasters, natural resource endowments and trading relationships in country-specific case 
studies. In this way, the independent and dependent variables are reversed and this 
project thus offers something new to the literature on nuclear energy.
The following chapters will explore each hypothesis in the United States, 
Germany and, finally, in Japan. These case studies will be followed with a chapter of 
analysis that unites the three cases with conclusions that return to the original hypotheses 
and offer an overall explanation for nuclear energy pursuance in each country. The 
concluding chapter will expand the focus o f the study to the issue o f nuclear energy in 
other countries beyond the scope of this project and will offer suggestions for future 
research on this topic.
24
CH A PTER 3 
NUCLEAR ENERGY IN TH E UNITED STATES
Objective
The goals of this chapter on nuclear energy in the United States are to first offer 
an historical background on the development o f nuclear energy in the US. Each country 
builds their energy portfolio to meet different demands, and an explanation of why and 
how nuclear energy became a part o f the US energy supply mix lends a greater 
understanding of how citizens view this energy source as well as to what extent the US 
chooses to use it. Secondly, this chapter aims to explore the relationship between public 
opinion and nuclear energy in an attempt to determine to what extent positive or negative 
opinion influences the pursuance of this energy source. “Nuclear energy pursuance” is 
operationalized as the overall percentage nuclear provides to the electrical energy supply. 
The hypothesis is that countries with higher levels o f public support for nuclear energy 
will more actively pursue nuclear energy and that in countries where negative opinion is 
higher, nuclear pursuance will be reduced. Public opinion is measured with opinion 
polling data supplemented by qualitative analysis of protest activity and recent voting 
activity related to nuclear political agendas. Next, this chapter will analyze data over time 
that measures to what extent public opinion and nuclear energy pursuance have changed 
in response to nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. Lastly, 
this chapter will turn to an analysis o f the US’s natural resource endowments and energy 
trading relationships with other countries. The hypothesis here is that if the US possesses
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endowments of natural resources and/or can easily and affordably obtain energy from 
other sources, it will be less likely to pursue nuclear energy.
Development o f  Early Energy Policy in the US
Following World War II, nuclear energy was allowed to develop in the US 
relatively free o f political controversy or public input. Because of the highly scientific 
and technical nature of the subject, there were few politicians, members o f Congress or 
laypeople who had the resources (or desire) to understand nuclear technology. In 
addition, nuclear technology really began as an issue of national security, not necessarily 
of energy production, and so was further insulated by the secrecy and security measures 
surrounding the issue. Following the conclusions o f Duffy in Nuclear Politics in 
America, the result of this initial insulation was that early American nuclear energy 
policy was allowed to grow within a particularly nurturing community composed o f four 
key sets o f actors: The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy (JCAE), the nuclear power industry and the scientist and engineers. 
This was an important time in American nuclear development. Early enthusiasm for 
nuclear power and the overwhelmingly positive perception of nuclear potential allowed 
favorable laws and institutions to develop that would set the stage for nuclear policy for 
the next two decades.1 
Atomic Energy Acts o f 1946 and 1954
It was originally out of a post-war fear for national security that Congress passed 
the Atomic Energy Act o f 1946, which effectively legislated a continuation of nuclear 
research and gave the Atomic Energy Commission ownership of all atomic materials, 
facilities and information from the Manhattan Project. This granting was significant,
1 Robert J. Duffy, Nuclear Politics in America, (Lawrence, KS: University Press o f  Kansas, 1997), 26.
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considering that, at the time of transfer, more than 2,000 military personnel, 4,000 
government employees, and 38,000 contactor employees were involved with the project, 
and the facilities used by the Manhattan Project swept in scope across the United States. 
The structure o f the AEC as well as the five year fixed tenure of its members indicated 
that Congress intended to make the committee independent o f the American president, an 
action the results of which were two-fold. First, the AEC would be less susceptible to 
legislative influence. Secondly, this independence reduced presidents’ control o f and 
effectively their interest in the program. Interestingly enough, it seems that lack of 
presidential involvement in nuclear programs has been very common throughout much of 
the atomic program’s history.2 In addition, all o f the information accumulated through the 
Manhattan Project was marked as confidential and, since nuclear technology was 
primarily seen in terms of security during this time, almost all of the information the AEC 
dealt with was marked ‘restricted,’ further insulating the Commission. Clearly this was 
intended to be a powerful agency capable o f exercising its agenda relatively free of 
confines.
Because the five members of the AEC were without significant technical 
knowledge, the 1946 act also created the General Advisory Committee (GAC) which 
would advise the AEC on “scientific and technical matters relating to materials, 
production, research, and development.3 Original members included J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, (two of the original designers o f the US atomic weapon) and 
Glenn Seaborg, three choices which indicate this committee represented truly the top 
nuclear scientists appointed by the president. Because o f their extensive scientific
2 Duffy, Nuclear Politics in America, 56.
3 Christopher Bosso, Pesticides and Politics: The Life Cycle o f  a Public Issue, (Pittsburg, PA: University o f  
Pittsburg Press, 1988.), 197.
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experience, especially with nuclear technology, the AEC often deferred to the GAC on 
matters of policy decisions, a behavior that is not uncommon in science and technology 
policy arenas. In fact, because these two groups worked simultaneously to form 
congruence between science and policy, they are often seen as a unitary actor.
Within Congress, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was chosen for their 
backgrounds in defense and security rather than for their scientific knowledge. States 
with national laboratories and atomic facilities were also represented disproportionately 
on the committee, signaling that the value of the program lay not only in terms o f security 
but also in its “pork barrel” possibilities. The JCAE operated relatively free o f hindrance 
from other Congressional committees for a variety of reasons. First, most o f the funds for 
nuclear technology were earmarked for defense spending at the time. The perception of 
the program and the Joint Committee as guardians of the atomic secret and its military 
application lent credibility and legitimized decision-making. Secondly, the theme of 
specialized knowledge is applicable in this instance as well, since the JCAE became an 
elite Congressional group to which others consistently and almost without choice 
deferred to on all atomic matters. Senator Brian McMahon (D-Conn) is noted as saying: 
“Congress has only the most general idea of what the atomic package contains.. .So far as 
atomic energy is concerned, Congress simply lacks sufficient knowledge upon which to 
discharge its constitutional duties.”4 Without an adequate understanding on nuclear 
technology, Congress was shy to impose legislative parameters upon its development. 
The Committee’s position was also protected by the perception that one had to be 
“qualified” to discuss nuclear energy, a perception which the JCAE created and then
4 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, (Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1993), 72.
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strove to reinforce, thus effectively controlling the dissemination of atomic energy 
information to Congress and the public throughout the 1940s and early 1950s.
Cold War Considerations and the 1954 Atomic Energy Act
In 1954, the Soviet Union began operation of the first nuclear energy power plant 
at Obinisk, a station which was state-owned but civilian operated. Because the US and 
the USSR were in the beginning stages of the Cold War and the USSR had already tested 
their own military nuclear devices, nuclear energy built upon military technology in the 
US was considered a necessary part o f the arms race o f the 1950s. The relationship 
between military and civilian uses o f nuclear technology in the US at the time was 
expansive. For example, private utility companies were given government subsidies to 
develop nuclear power plants, and “ ...in  1956 the AEC guaranteed that it would buy the 
plutonium these plants produced since it was needed for the governmental development 
o f nuclear warheads.”5 By 1957, the US’s first commercial atomic plant was ready to 
begin operation in Shippingport, Pennsylvania.
In an attempt to further the goal o f using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
(while also using the by-products for military ones), the Atomic Energy Act o f 1954 
opened the door to greater private industrial and international participation. Power 
companies were initially reluctant to invest in nuclear technology with the claim that the 
high risks of atomic energy production made it unlikely that the generation o f nuclear 
energy could ever be profitable.6 In response, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in 
1957 which guaranteed the law would “hold hold harmless [nuclear] licensee and other 
persons indemnified” from public liability claims arising from nuclear accidents causing
5 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy: The Social and Ethical Problems o f  Fission 
Technology, (New York: Springer Publishing, 1980), 10.
6 Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy, 10.
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damages in total excess of $560 million.7 Originally, the Price-Anderson Act was meant 
to only last ten years, with the assumption that the safety and regulatory issues that were 
of concern to power companies would be resolved within that time frame. The provisions 
in the Price-Anderson Act were extended in 1965 for another ten years, and then 
extended again in 1975 and in 1988 the operators’ liability was increased from $700 
million to $7 billion. The latest revision of this act was a part of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 which passed with strong bi-partisan support and extended the limited liability 
provision of the act Price-Anderson Act through December 31, 2025. 8
Because of the nature o f the Price-Anderson Act’s limited liability for investors 
and increased payout by taxpayers, it has been controversial through the years, though 
highly beneficial to electrical companies with nuclear interests. In 1973, a case was 
brought to the Supreme Court which challenged the act’s constitutionality. The court 
ruled that the act’s goal o f encouraging private investment in energy technology was not 
unconstitutional, and the act stood. Many argue that, without this provision, the nuclear 
industry in the US would never have survived to present day and, if  the limited liability 
provision is cut in the future, utility companies will be unlikely to shoulder the financial 
burden and risk of constructing nuclear reactors.
Energy Upheaval in the 1970s
After an initial thirty years following WWII in which the same government 
agency controlled, promoted and regulated the nuclear industry, in 1975 the Energy 
Reorganization Act separated the promotion and regulation functions o f the government
7 Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy ,17.
g
According to the American Nuclear Society, the puipose o f  the most recent incarnation o f  this act is to 
limit the liability private investors could potentially face in the event o f  a nuclear disaster, thus removing a 
major deterrent from private investment and ensuring greater supply o f  nuclear energy in the future.
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by abolishing the AEC and creating the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) which is the 
precursor to the modem Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Originally, the AEC 
was given the dual mission to both promote and regulate nuclear energy, which 
contributed to an early development o f regulatory capture between the AEC and the 
nuclear industry. The circumstances surrounding this change are that the AEC had 
repeatedly been under fire from courts and the public for failing to effectively regulate 
nuclear safety standards and for subscribing to the demands of the industry rather than the 
safety of the people. The Reorganization Act therefore created the NRC for regulation 
purposes and the Department o f Energy for promotion purposes, but there has long been 
a revolving door between the NRC and DOE— and the nuclear industry. It was also 
during this time in the early 1970s that, for the first time, nuclear experts and scientists 
began coming out against nuclear energy by pointing out potential safety hazards in an 
organization that came to be known as the Union o f Concerned Scientists, an 
organization that would eventually gain significant international membership. By 1971, 
the doubts o f these scientists were beginning to appear in journals and information was 
being leaked from inside the AEC as to disagreements among staffer scientists, which the 
AEC is rumored to have tried to cover up. Nelkin and Poliak argue that the nuclear 
establishment’s legitimacy was sustained by its expertise, and when disagreement 
happened within the establishment, that legitimacy was weakened.9 As this scientific 
opposition movement became more vocal, the AEC, which had previously been sheltered 
from public or governmental opposition, was moved into the public arena.
What had previously been a topic limited to technical scientific discussion, the 
1970s saw nuclear energy become an issue of public opinion. The media had previously
9 Nelkin and Poliak, The Atom Beseiged, 85.
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shown little interest in nuclear power, so anti-nuclear groups quickly learned that they 
had to bring the issue to public attention. Ralph Nader, who would later earn the title of 
the nation’s number one critic of nuclear power, became one of the movement’s most 
outspoken. In 1974, he organized a group called Critical Mass, which was designed to 
coordinate the activities of local anti-nuclear activists by providing them with 
information and technical expertise. As Duffy notes, like much of the movement activity 
of the 1970s, participation like Nader’s attracted media attention and mobilized grass­
roots support across the nation.10 It was also in the 1970s that a presidential candidate 
addressed the issue of nuclear energy for the first time during a campaign when Jimmy 
Carter endorsed an anti-nuclear movement in Oregon. The nuclear industry, which had 
grown up insulated from outside pressures and criticism, suddenly found itself spending 
millions of dollars on public relations campaigns to counter its critics.
This gravitation o f nuclear energy from protected industry to public topic of 
debate was magnified by the energy crises of the 1970s. The increase in oil prices from 
the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the 1979 Iranian Revolution had pushed the topic of 
energy supply onto a wider stage of debate and though it would seem logical to assume 
these crises helped the prospects o f nuclear energy, promoters of nuclear energy now 
found themselves competing with other alternative forms of energy for government 
development subsidies. At the same time, government officials began to recognize the 
need for a more comprehensive long-term energy policy rather than the ad hoc decisions 
that had been characteristic of energy policy in the past. By 1976, there were 23 
committees and 51 sub-committees in Congress that were responsible for energy issues.11
10 Mahaffey, Atomic Awakenings, 68
" Ibid, 70.
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Division in the 1980s
The discourse surrounding nuclear energy in the 1980s was drastically different 
from that of the past two decades. For one, there were two distinct coalitions with 
differing nuclear agendas. The ant-nuclear coalition of the time was comprised of 
environmental groups such as the Sierra Club, local citizen intervention groups specific 
to certain reactors, safety groups like the Union o f Concerned Scientists, and officials at 
state and local levels. The White House slid decisively into the pro-nuclear group with 
the elections o f Republicans Reagan in 1981 and Bush in 1989, both nuclear supporters. 
Other governmental nuclear supporters included the Department o f Energy (DOE) and 
various elected officials at the state and local levels, and private support came from 
reactor vendors and suppliers, nuclear utilities and construction firms, other private 
citizen groups.
Changes in actual energy policy during this time were limited, despite having 
presidential support again after an anti-nuclear Carter Administration. The nuclear 
accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986 precluded any serious 
changes that may have eased safety regulations and encouraged investment, and both 
presidents were unwilling to expend much political capital in a no-win situation. The two 
most important exceptions were the revision o f  the Price-Anderson Act in 1988 that 
increased the amount the nuclear industry would be responsible for paying should a 
disaster happen, and various legislation that attempted to find suitable storage for nuclear 
waste. States began increasingly blocking and protesting federal investigation of sites for 
nuclear waste repositories within their borders. Disagreements between and among states 
and federal legislators and bureaucracies continued through the 1980s until, in 1987,
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Congress designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a repository site, even though the 
decision was followed by outcry from Western states. Though other storage facilities are 
now in operation in most states with nuclear reactors, the largest proposed repository to 
date is still located at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, though the site was closed in 2011 
under the Obama administration.
Despite the controversy surrounding nuclear energy in the 1970s and 1980s, most 
of the working nuclear reactors that are online in the US today came into operation
1 7between 1967 and 1990. However, reactors are not generally built until 5-6 years after 
the sites have been approved and the NRC has reviewed and approved the application for 
the reactor. By this timetable, most o f the reactors in operation today were designed and 
approved between the late 1950s (when the nuclear sector was still insulated from outside 
pressures) and the late 1970s, before anti-nuclear opinion really gained ground. No new 
reactors were approved throughout the 1980s, 1990s, or early 2000s.
1992 Energy Policy Act
By 1990, the US was operating 110 nuclear power plants which accounted for 22 
percent of the electricity generated in the US. The problem with the licensing and 
construction process for these plants approved and built between the 1960s and 1980s 
was that plants were issued a construction permit based on a preliminary design and the 
plant’s safety issues were not fully resolved until construction was complete, which 
meant the public did not have the details o f the design until after the plant had already 
been built. The stipulations regarding licensing in the 1992 Act required the safety 
regulations be moved to the front of the three necessary processes: approval o f standard
12 “Nuclear Power in the USA,” World Nuclear Association, last updated March 2014, http://www.world- 
nuclear.org/info/inf41 .html.
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designs, early site permits (ESPs), and combined construction permits and operating 
licenses (COLs). Theoretically, the new process would allow greater opportunity for the 
public to be involved in the process and ensure that construction companies would build 
the sites according to the design agreed upon in the license.
In the 1990s the Clinton White House instituted deep budget cuts to reactor 
technology development and DOE subsidies. By 2005, after the world had seen another 
steep increase in the price o f oil following the American intervention in Iraq and 
President George W. Bush called for increased production of nuclear power plants, citing 
nuclear energy as one of the “safest, cleanest sources o f power in the world.”13 According 
to the Government Accountability Office, between 2002 and 2007, nuclear technology 
received $6.2 billion for research, twice as much as fossil fuel programs received.14 If the 
Bush administration began a nuclear renaissance, then President Obama’s administration 
and the current NRC has continued it in 2012 with the first new reactors approval since 
1979. Following the Fukushima disaster in Japan, President Obama continued his support 
o f nuclear energy with a public statement that all energy sources have their potential 
downsides, but all still have to be considered in the array that makes up energy supply.15 
In his 2012 campaign against Mitt Romney (who has also publicly supported pursuing 
nuclear energy) Obama mentioned nuclear technology as an energy source of the future 
and has included its pursuance as part o f his proposed energy policy, as has Romney. In
13 J.R. Pegg, “Bush Calls for Development o f  More Nuclear Power,” Environmental News Service, 28 April 
2005.
14 Ibid.
15 “Obama Defends Nuclear Energy,” NBC News, 16 March 2011. Accessed June 1, 2011, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42106967/ns/politics-white_house/t/obama-defends-nuclear- 
energy/#. Uy3 V 6 vld VTk.
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2011, following Fukushima, US Secretary of Energy Steven Chu announced the Obama 
administration would continue to support nuclear energy despite the crisis in Japan.
The history of the early development o f nuclear technology and policy in the US 
is important to this research because it illustrates three main issues that will contribute to 
the analyses in this project. First, nuclear technology in the US has a long history o f being 
a topic one has to be “qualified” to talk about. This creates a separation of power on 2 
levels: at the legislative level, this was seen in the 1940s and 1950s as the AEC created 
and then perpetuated its own singular legitimacy on the topic of nuclear energy policy. 
Even when the Energy Reconstruction Act separated the regulatory and promotion 
functions of the NRC and the DOE, regulatory capture and revolving door practices 
continued.16 This perception of qualification excluded public participation in the nuclear 
debate well in to the 1990s until the 1992 Energy Policy Act. Currently, the public has 
been granted greater participation in NRC proceedings, and though the general consensus 
has been that these public hearings and forums during the initial approval stages are 
exercises for show, calls for more public input are beginning to gain some teeth, 
evidenced by the recent federal court mandate that the NRC must either allow more 
public participation in its decision about fire safety at the Indian Point 3 nuclear reactor in 
New York or provide documented evidence as to why such input is impractical or 
inappropriate.
Second, nuclear power began as a military imperative in the US. The extent of 
nuclear power that was demonstrated in WWII coupled with the arms race of the Cold 
War mean that public perception of nuclear energy developed on a different time-line in
16 The consequences o f  regulatory capture and revolving door practices will be discussed in the conclusions 
section o f this chapter.
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the US than in other places around the world. Because its development was insulated for 
so long behind the curtain o f national security secrecy, following a war that did not 
necessarily create wide-spread feelings o f governmental mistrust and animosity for 
nuclear technology among citizens (unlike post-WWII in Germany) nuclear energy did 
not develop in a cloud of controversy, which only came much later in the 1970s, after 
most of the reactors currently in use had been approved.
Lastly, this history demonstrates the roots of the anti-nuclear movement in the 
US, which grew out of a community o f scientists rather than from groups o f citizens, 
though scientists were eventually able to mobilize them. In the US, the threat o f a nuclear 
attack, even from the Soviets, was not effectively linked to nuclear energy until the 1980s 
Cold War arms race build-up, at which point most operating nuclear sites had already 
been approved. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons operated in relative separation from 
one another in the most important years of licensing and building, and the threat o f 
proliferation, though present among the anti-nuclear groups, was a small consideration 
early-on. These early beginnings also account for the relatively depressed nature of 
nuclear protest in the US.
Nuclear Public Opinion in the United States
The original hypothesis of this project was that in countries where public support 
for nuclear energy is high, nuclear energy will have a greater share in a country’s overall 
energy supply. Conversely, in countries where public opposition to nuclear energy is 
high, there will be less nuclear energy pursuance. This will be tested in the U.S. by first 
examining public opinion polls that measure American public support for nuclear energy 
at present as well as over time and in reaction to disasters such as Three Mile Island,
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Chernobyl and Fukushima. This data will be compared with nuclear pursuance over time. 
The hypothesis is that greater public support for nuclear energy will equal a greater 
pursuance of nuclear energy.
To what extent the US pursues nuclear energy must first be determined. This will 
be done with two measures, first by looking at the percentage nuclear currently makes up 
of total electrical energy consumption and secondly by examining the number o f reactors 
that have been approved for life extension and new reactors that have been approved for 
construction. In 2013, 40 percent of energy consumption in the US was electrical. O f that 
40 percent, only 1 percent was supplied by petroleum, while coal provided 37 percent; 
natural gas, 30 percent; renewable energy, such as hydro-electric, geothermal, solar, 
wind, and biomass, 7 percent; and nuclear, 20 percent.17 Figure 1 illustrates this 
distribution:
17 “Primary Electrical Energy Consumption by Source and Sector, 2013” US Energy Information
Administration, Accessed October 14, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/totalencrgy/.
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Figure 1: Electrical Energy Sources in the US, 2013.18
In addition, 51 plants have applied to extend the life of their existing reactors; of 
those 51 applications, 42 have been approved and the remaining 9 are still under 
investigation, which is to say they have neither been approved nor denied. In September 
of 2007, an application was lodged with the NRC for a new reactor in southern Texas, the 
first new reactor application in over three decades. There would ultimately be 5 
applications for 8 reactors in 2007. The following year, the NRC received 11 applications 
for 16 new reactors in the US. In 2012, the first new reactor was approved since 1978 for 
a 2-reactor expansion at the Vogtle plant in Georgia. US nuclear pursuance can currently 
be characterized as relatively low compared to coal usage at 36 percent and natural gas at 
30 percent, but consistent since the mid-1990s. In 1973, nuclear made up 5 percent of
18 Data compiled by author from United States Energy Information Administration.
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overall electrical energy generation. By the early 1990s, that percentage share had grown 
to roughly 20 percent where it has remained ever since.19
In terms of new and existing reactors, the general trend has been for the NRC to 
approve life extensions for existing reactors, though with the exception of the new Vogtle 
expansion, few utilities are carrying applications for new reactors through the 
construction process to completion. In a few additional instances, reactor life expansions 
have been applied for, have been approved, and then intervening economic circumstances 
caused plants that were approved well into the future to shut down. For example, in 2008, 
the NRC approved an operating license for the Kewaunee Power Station located in 
Carlton, Wisconsin, to extent into 2033; however, the plant ceased operation in May of 
2013. According to the press release o f the operating utility company, Dominion, the 
decision was the result of falling wholesale electricity prices due to cheap natural gas, a
90purely economic decision that in no way reflected disapproval o f nuclear energy. In 
similar circumstances, the Vermont Yankee plant announced in 2013 that it would close 
in 2014 after receiving an extended operating license, again citing similar economic 
barriers to continued operation. These occurrences are only marginally important to this 
section on public opinion, but will be discussed more fully in the later section on 
endowments o f domestic natural resources.
To measure public opinion toward nuclear energy in the US, this research utilizes 
information gained from a poll conducted by Gallup which asked the same question in 
yearly polls from 1994 through 2012. When asked “Overall, do you strongly favor,
19 “Primary Electrical Energy Consumption by Source and Sector, 2012” US Energy Information 
Administration, Accessed October 14, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/.
20 “Dominion Shuts Down Kewaunee Power Station Permanently,” Dominion Press Release, May 17,
2013, Accessed March 22, 2014, http://dom.mediaroom.com/2013-05-07-Dominion-Shuts-Down- 
Kewaunee-Power-Station-Permanently.
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somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one 
of the ways to provide electricity for the US,” in 1994, 57 percent o f Americans were in 
favor o f nuclear power, meaning they either answered that they strongly or somewhat 
favor the use of nuclear energy as one o f the ways to provide electricity for the US. The 
highest level of support was in 2010, when 62 percent o f  Americans favored nuclear 
power, and the lowest in 2001, when only 46 percent favored nuclear power. In 2012, 57 
percent of respondents again answered that they were in favor o f nuclear power, a 
percentage equal to the response in 1994 and only 5 percent less than positive public 
opinion at its peak in 2010. Figure 2 illustrates these trends in opinion polling from 1994-
2012:
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Figure 2: Public Opinion on Nuclear Energy in the US, 1994-2012.21
21 “Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After Fukushima,” Gallup, March 26, 2012, Accessed July 
I, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/153452/Americans-Favor-Nuclear-Power-Year-Fukushima.aspx.
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A basic analysis o f nuclear energy pursuance and public opinion in 2012 alone 
reveals very little, considering public opinion for nuclear energy only decreased 5 percent 
from 2010-2012 and public opinion against nuclear energy only increased roughly 7 
percent in the same time period. To compare that with nuclear energy pursuance in terms 
of percentage shares of total energy, nuclear remained steady at from 2010-2012. In this 
respect, there was little change in either opinion or pursuance. Nor do minute changes in 
public opinion explain the move in 2011 to approve the first new reactors since 1978. 
The comparative results of public support for nuclear and nuclear pursuance show that 
while support has fluctuated over the years, varying from 48 percent support at the lowest 
and 62 percent at its peak, nuclear pursuance in the US has been consistent since the 
1970s, varying only between 18 and 21 percent of overall electrical energy production. 
Figure 3 demonstrates this relationship between public opinion data (from previously 
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Figure 3: Public Approval and Nuclear Pursuance in the US, 2000-2011.22
Similarly, while opposition to nuclear energy varies, nuclear pursuance remains 
steady. Figure 4 demonstrates this relationship:
22 Data compiled by author from Gallup poll and US Energy Information Administration.
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Figure 4: Public Opposition and Nuclear Pursuance in the US, 2000-2011.23
The data so far seems to point to a weak relationship between nuclear support or 
opposition and actual changes in nuclear energy pursuit. Fluctuations in public opinion 
(which have been small, according to these Gallup polls) have not resulted in any 
correlating, consistent changes in nuclear output as a percentage share o f total energy 
production. The following section will examine to what extent nuclear disasters had an 
impact on public approval for nuclear energy as well as any measurable effect on the 
decision to pursue nuclear energy.
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima
Nuclear pursuance in the US has varied little since the mid-1990s, but polling data 
from earlier time periods can be used to measure reactions to the nuclear disasters at the 
Three Mile Island accident and Chernobyl. Various media outlets reported that global 
citizen support o f nuclear energy dropped directly after Fukushima in 2011, though
23 Data compiled by author from Gallup poll and US Energy Information Administration.
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Fukushima was not the first nuclear disaster o f  its kind. A smaller, more contained 
disaster took place at the Three Mile Island facility in Pennsylvania in 1979, and the 
slightly more well-known disaster at Chernobyl, former USSR, happened in 1986. In 
order to determine whether Fukushima will have a long-term impact on nuclear 
pursuance, one can look to similar disasters like Chernobyl and Three Mile Island and 
measure responses over time for trends which may be applicable in the long-term wake of 
Fukushima. The hypothesis is that nuclear disasters negatively impact a country’s 
decision to pursue nuclear energy. This variable tries to capture public opinion reactions 
to disasters that may impact decision to pursue nuclear energy as well as possible post­
disaster cost-raising safety enhancements that would create a market-based deterrence to 
investing in nuclear energy. Rather than using data that merely measures general support 
or opposition to nuclear energy, this section will use polling data that also measures 
public support for building new nuclear reactors. The reason for this is that general 
questions about supporting or not supporting nuclear energy really only engage 
respondents at a theoretical level, or at a level where there is no risk involved. Asking 
more specifically about building new reactors makes the response more personal. An 
additional hypothesis here is that while people support nuclear energy in theory, they are 
less supportive when it comes to the possibility o f a reactor in their community.
The most comprehensive polling data available in the US24 reveals that, despite 
data which suggests Americans support nuclear energy in theory (such as that already 
provided here by Gallup), they have been increasingly opposed to the reality of 
supporting nuclear expansion in the form of building new nuclear reactors. The data
24 Eugene A. Rose, “Public Acceptance o f  Nuclear Power: Deja vu all Over Again?” Physics and Society, 
30 (April): 2001.
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reveals that, from 1974-1979, fewer people opposed new reactors with the decline in 
support beginning in 1979 following the Three Mile Island incident; however, that trend 
was inconsistent. Support for new reactors declined from around 45 percent in 1979 to a 
low of around 40 percent in February of 1980, but then jumped again to 50 percent 
support in April o f 1980 and declined very little until January of 1982. Opposition to new 
reactors did spike in February of 1979 from 30 percent to around 45 percent, but then 
hovered between 45 percent and 40 percent until a sharp increase in opposition in 
February of 1982. Because there are no significant and consistent increases or decreases 
in opposition or support following 1979, there is no clear correlation between the disaster 
at Three Mile Island and levels o f public support. Similarly, though nuclear output 
decreased between 1979-1980 from a 13 percent share to a 10 percent share, in 1981 
nuclear output again rose and climbed consistently until 1986.
Similarly, following Chernobyl in March of 1986, there was an increase in 
opposition for new reactors from around 62 percent to 70 percent, but then opposition 
levels fell back to 60 percent in April o f 1986 and hovered between 60-70 percent until 
January of 1990. Levels o f support for new reactors had dropped to around 30 percent in 
February of 1986 and rose and fell between 20-30 percent from early 1986 to January of 
1990. Again, there is no observable sharp and consistent decrease in levels o f public 
support that would demonstrate a strong and lasting impact on American public opinion 
resulting from the disasters at Three Mile Island in 1979 or Chernobyl in 1986. Similarly, 
there is a decrease in nuclear output from 1986-1987 from a 19 percent share to a 16 
percent share, but output levels again began increasing in 1988.
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Rather than demonstrating that public opinion turned in opposition to nuclear 
energy after Three Mile Island or Chernobyl, this data suggests that it was neither Three 
Mile Island nor Chernobyl that caused the most drastic and lasting impact on public 
opinion for building new reactors, but was rather triggered by the Cold War arms race 
buildup of the early 1980s. The most dramatic shift in public support for building new 
reactors happened between the polling in April o f 1981 and polling in January of 1982 
when, according to this data, opposition overwhelmed support in what proved to be an 
irreversible trend.
To gauge changes in public support for nuclear energy directly following the 
Fukushima incident on March 11, 2011, Gallup provides a measure o f public opinion on 
new reactors in the US in 2001 and again in 2011.25 Table 1 demonstrates the results of 
polling in regard to the question: “Which comes closer to your view about increasing the 
number of nuclear power plants in the country— nuclear power is necessary to help solve 
the country’s current energy problems, or, the dangers o f nuclear power are too great, 
even if it would help solve the country’s current energy problems?”.





Percent Dangers of 
Nuclear Power Are 
Too Great
Percent No Opinion
MAR 25-27,2011 46 percent 48 percent 6 percent
MAY 18-20,2001 49 percent 46 percent 5 percent
Table 1: Support for and Opposition to New Nuclear Reactors in the US, 2001-2011.26
Between May 2001 and 25 March of 2011, directly following the disaster at 
Fukushima on March 11 of 2011, public opinion on increasing the number o f nuclear 
power plants has remained fairly steady. This data further suggests there has been no 
substantial diminution in support for nuclear power plant construction over this past 
decade — despite the current and highly visible nuclear problems in Japan. This initial 
reaction to Fukushima showed the American public remained as it was before 
Fukushima: fairly equally divided in terms of new reactors.
This polling information seems to suggest that, though most Americans support 
nuclear energy in theory, the practical use o f that energy in terms o f building new 
reactors is problematic. When questions about nuclear energy in general are asked, there 
is moderate to strong support, but that support decreases when the specific question of 
building new reactors is posed. Respondents may see nuclear as a necessary part o f what 
should make up future energy sources, yet are uncomfortable with the idea of a nuclear 
reactor in their community. This is a typical “Not In My Backyard” response that is 
commonly observable in relation to a variety o f issues. Most importantly, it is evident 
from the polling data that support has never consistently decreased in response to
26 Ibid.
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previous disasters. Additionally, despite the immediate dip in nuclear output following 
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, nuclear output has always recovered to pre-disasters 
levels. This negates the hypothesis that nuclear disasters have a negative impact o f 
decision to pursue nuclear energy, and though Three Mile Island and Chernobyl caused 
temporary “shocks” to both public opinion and nuclear output, neither are long-term 
effects and the shifts in both are relatively small.
Despite this consistent support for nuclear energy, however, no new reactors were 
approved in the US for well over three decades, from 1978-2007. This trend of 
continuing the life of existing reactors but not approving new ones may be congruent 
with public opinion: Americans believe existing nuclear capacity will play a part in their 
future energy supply (approval to continue the life o f existing reactors) but oppose 
expanding nuclear capabilities with new reactors (absence of new reactors approved 
between 1978 and 2012). However, it is unclear what the causal relationship is in this 
case. Did public opinion cause a shift in nuclear pursuance policy for new reactors after 
1978, or was the decrease in building new reactors caused by something else (most likely 
legal, political and economic road blocks) and the American public interpreted no new 
reactors as a beneficial shift in policy after Three Mile Island? It is almost impossible to 
clearly state a clear directional relationship.
The most likely scenario is that the nuclear construction take-off in the early 
1970s cost electrical companies far more than they expected and saddled rate-payers with 
higher bills for decades. Some nuclear reactors approved prior to 1978 continued under 
construction until the early 1990s, but by 1985 twenty-eight nuclear plants under
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27construction were cancelled. The Shoreham plant on Long Island, for example, was 
finished but never brought online. It was not that the NRC was denying applications to 
build, but that utility companies were simply not applying for them, or were applying, 
starting construction, and then abandoning projects for various reasons. The costs of 
building and operating these nuclear facilities with their extensive licensing processes 
and safety regulations, especially after the public relations challenges o f the 1970s and 
the 1992 Energy Policy Act, became so great that many electrical companies decided the 
cost would exceed the benefit, which most likely resulted in the decline o f new reactors 
in the following decades. This indicates that the more important relationship in 
determining whether to pursue nuclear energy with new reactors may be between the 
government (NRC) and the nuclear industry rather than the government and the public, 
though markets also play a large role in determining cost-effectiveness and profitability. 
In order to better understand the nature o f the anti-nuclear movement in the US and 
determine to what extent it had any impact on the decision to pursue nuclear energy, the 
following section will offer a qualitative analysis of protests and organized movements 
against nuclear energy in the US.
Nuclear Protest in the US
Historically, protest against nuclear energy in the US gained little momentum 
until the early 1970s. A government technology that was federally funded and promoted, 
nuclear energy reactor production was already in full swing by the time the public knew 
enough about it to protest it. By the time a widespread awareness o f nuclear energy 
became main-stream in the 1970s, the nuclear industry had already received licenses to
27 Ralph Vartabedian and Ian Duncan, “First New US Nuclear Reactors in Decades Approved,” Los 
Angeles Times, February 9, 2012, Accessed February 27, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/09/nation/la-na-nuclear-20120210.
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build most of the 104 reactors currently in operation in the US. The beginnings o f nuclear 
opposition began in the 1960s not with the public but in elite scientific circles such as the 
Union of Concerned Scientists, many o f whom were working for the government within 
nuclear regulatory fields. In fact, only 12 percent of all licensing application submitted 
between 1962 and 1966 were legally contested by local citizen groups.28 However, 
between 1967 and 1972, local interveners challenged 73 percent o f all applications 
reviewed in the AEC hearings.29 Public interest lawyers, many of whom were skilled trial 
lawyers, entered the fray to represent intervening groups, and many of the hearings 
became long and acrimonious with much procedural wrangling which continued 
throughout the 1970s.30 Though these hearings delayed the commencement of some 
plants’ construction and operation, it is important to note that, in each case where there 
were such hearings, licenses were granted at the end of the proceedings.
Though no new reactors were licensed in the US from 1978 until 2012, a number 
of hearings have been scheduled in recent years in response to applications filed with the 
NRC to extend the operating life of existing plants. Original licenses issued in the 1970s 
were good for forty years with the option to renew for another twenty. This means that 
the utility owners of existing plants would begin seeking the option to renew around 
1998, allowing for time to proceed through the relicensing process (average time o f 3+ 
years) and make updates and corrections to the facility before the existing license 
expired. Since 1998, 51 plants have applied for renewed licenses.31 For example, the
28 Christian Joppke, Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 31
29 Ibid. 31.
30 Harold P. Green. “Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing.” William and M ary Law  
Review. 15:3 (1974).
31 “Fact Sheet on Reactor License Renewal,” United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Accessed  
April 5, 2013, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc~collections/fact-sheets/fs-reactor-l icense-renewal.html.
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operating license for the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts, 
was originally scheduled to expire in 2012. In 2006, the Louisiana-based company that 
owned Pilgrim, Entergy, filed an application with the NRC to extend the operating life of 
the plant until 2032. The local nuclear watchdog organization, Pilgrim Watch, filed 
multiple contentions and movements for hearings with the NRC and, according to NRC 
protocol, hearings were held on behalf of the group and other concerned citizens 
throughout 2011. The proceedings were open to the public and signs, banners, posters 
and displays were permitted in accordance with NRC policy.32
Despite repeated hearings initiated by Pilgrim Watch, in May o f 2012, the NRC 
eventually approved the 20-year extension for the Pilgrim reactor. In 2011, 18 separate 
hearings or pre-hearing conferences calls were scheduled to address concerns related to 
10 different nuclear operating plants or uranium enrichment facilities, down from 19 
hearings in 2010. The lowest number o f hearings held in one year between 2006 and 
2012 was 2007, in which only 11 hearings were held. In 2012, the number had increased 
to 22 separate events scheduled to address concerns over nuclear licenses.33
In fact, public hearings have taken place for each license renewal application 
since the first for Calvert Cliffs in 1998, a hearing at which the local Baltimore Sierra 
Club, among others, filed opposed the relicensing of the reactors.34 Every application for 
renewal that was filed between 1998 and 2008 was approved between 2000 and 2011 
with the exception of the Indian Point facility filed in 2007. When Indian Point in
32 Docket from NRC proceedings, Matter o f  Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. 9 Feb 2011. Docket # 50-293- 
LR http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/MLl 104/ML 110400428.pdf.
33 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Proceedings, 2012. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Accessed April 30, 2013, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc 
collections/aslbp/proceedings/201 2 /.
34Kevin McQuaid, “Worries Heard at Nuclear Relicensing Hearing,” Baltimore Sun. July 10, 1998. 
Accessed Feb 1 2012.
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Buchanan, New York, initially filed for an extension in 2007, the operating utility 
company asserted that because the buried pipes at the facility do not carry radioactive 
liquid they were not subject to the aging management review. Two years later in 2009, 
however, a leak from these pipes containing thousands o f gallons o f water containing 
radioactive material proved Baltimore Gas and Electric Company wrong. As a result, 
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman and Connecticut Attorney General 
Robert Snook began lobbying on behalf of their respective states against the NRC 
renewing the license for this facility. The operating license is set to expire in December 
of 2015, but the NRC has given Entergy permission to continue operation while the 
license renewal application is under review. This is the first instance o f a state countering 
the NRC’s relicensing, and also the first instance in which a new license was not granted
1 C
in the usual 30 month time frame.
Analysis of this information indicates that localized opposition to extending the 
life new reactors in the form of formal hearings and challenges has been consistently 
present yet ultimately ineffective, considering every relicensing application since 1998, 
with the exception o f Indian Point, has been challenged during hearings and then 
approved by the NRC. The significant difference with the Indian Point facility is the anti­
licensing lobby of New York and Connecticut as states rather than complaints lodged by 
individuals or groups. Separate conclusions can be drawn from this information. First, 
opposition to building new reactors exists in the US, but it is localized rather than 
nationalized. Nationally, polls reveal that Americans support nuclear pursuance. 
Opposition to the actual reality of pursuing nuclear energy in the form o f building new
35 With the exception o f the relicensing o f the Crystal River Unit 3, which has been delayed due to 
infrastructural damage.
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reactors exists, but at a more local level among those who live in the communities where 
reactors are supposed to be built.
However, that is not to say that significant support in favor o f new reactors does 
not exist within communities where reactors are proposed. The first plant to apply for and 
be granted a new reactor license since 1978 is a 2 reactor expansion o f the Vogtle plant in 
Georgia. During the public hearing proceedings o f  April 2008, twelve individuals in total 
addressed the panel, five speaking in support o f the Vogtle license and seven against. 
Those who spoke in favor of the license mainly represented organizations, such as 
Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness; the Burke County School Board; the Clean 
and Safe Energy Coalition; Columbia County Chamber o f Commerce; Augusta Metro 
Chamber o f Commerce; plus individual citizens from local communities. They cited 
clean energy, employment benefits, and low electricity prices among the reasons that 
SNC had their support to expand the Vogtle plant. Those who spoke against Vogtle’s 
license approval were, in contrast, comprised completely o f local citizens who did not 
represent groups or organizations, though it was the local anti-nuclear groups that 
originally lodged the challenges that instituted the hearings. Their reasons for concern 
were fairly consistent: pollution in the Savannah River; damage to local fish and animal 
populations; use of water in a drought area; radioactive contamination; high local cancer 
rates; waste disposal.36
The Voglte expansion public hearing in 2008 can be classified as fairly 
representative of the relicensing hearings documented since the late 1990s. The interest 
and governmental groups represented may go by different names, but most of them put
36 Docket from NRC proceedings, Matter o f  Southern Nuclear Operating Company Early Permit for 
Vogtle. 20 March 2008. Docket # 52-011-ESP http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0808/ML08080Q263.pdf.
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forth the same arguments for continuing the life o f existing reactors: economic growth, 
jobs provided, clean energy, and future low energy prices. Local chambers of commerce 
tend to support keeping and building reactors, as well as local pro-nuclear and 
environmental groups. Those who tend to oppose the reactors are anti-nuclear groups 
such as the Sierra Club (which is well represented at many of these NRC hearings) and 
local citizens with concerns for their personal quality o f life related to issues of 
contamination, cancer, or pollution. As with the applications for renewed licenses, the 
application for a license to build the two new reactors at Voglte was eventually approved. 
According to the timeline provided by the NRC, new licenses are generally approved or 
denied approximately 6 years after their application. SNC applied in 2006, obtained its 
ESP in August o f 2009, and then the COL in February of 2012, right on schedule. The 
next opportunity for public hearings will occur within the next 6 years during the Plant 
Construction/Verification stage.
Secondly, this information suggests that citizen complaints and challenges from 
local interest groups matter little in the approval process o f new or existing reactors. 
What does seem to matter are challenges brought forth on behalf of states in the licensing 
process. Indian Point provides the first opportunity to follow this process o f state 
opposition in the US system.
Historically, physical demonstrations and protests have been happening in the US 
since the 1970s. Some took place in Washington DC, such as the 65,000 person protest in 
1979, and some in New York City such as the 200,000 person protest in the same year. In 
1982, the largest anti-nuclear protest in the US took place in New York City’s Central 
Park. More often than not, these national demonstrations were organized on behalf of
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international causes like the International Day o f Nuclear Disarmament and Great Peace 
March for Global Disarmament, and so were politically focused on nuclear weapons 
rather than nuclear energy. To find specific protests against nuclear energy, one has to 
look locally. The Clamshell Alliance, for example, was organized in 1976 specifically to 
take non-violent action against construction of the Seabrook nuclear reactor in New 
Hampshire. The 4000+ members o f the group, known as “clams” have over the years 
continually engaged in “civil disobedience” with some protests resulting in arrests and 
the need for National Guard intervention. The Clamshell Alliance inspired similar 
protests at the Diablo Canyon plant in California by the Abalone Alliance, and then 
across the nation at other nuclear facilities. Despite these protests, both the Seabrook and 
Diablo Canyon reactors are currently in operation. There is one instance in the US in 
which a local community effectively decommissioned a nuclear power plant by public 
vote in 1989 in Sacramento, California. Though the local community initially voted to 
embrace the Rancho Seco plant in the mid-1960s, 14 years after its start date they again 
voted to decommission to plant, citing problems with fuel storage as their chief
^7concern. This remains the sole instance to date in which a reactor already in operation 
has been decommissioned as a result o f public vote.
Similarly, there is only one instance in which such protests are believed to have 
halted the initial constmction of a nuclear facility, the Black Fox facility, which never 
reached the stage of license application from the NRC. In May o f 1973, the Public 
Service Company of Oklahoma (PSO) announced plans to install Oklahoma’s first 
nuclear power plant in Inola, just south of Tulsa. The local movement against the
37 Andrew Sabey, “Sacramento Shuts Out Rancho Seco,” University o f  California Davis Law Brief, 
Accessed April 10, 2013. http://environs.law.ucdavis.edU/issues/13/2/articles/sabev-pdf.
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building of this plant, lead mainly by a local school teacher named Carrie Barefoot 
Dickerson, buried the construction plans and licensing process under so much legal 
wrangling and subsequent construction delays that in 1982, almost ten years after the 
reactors were first proposed, PSO cancelled the project called Black Fox due to cost 
overruns resulting from the large-scale community opposition to the reactors themselves 
and to paying the rate increases necessary to build the reactors.38 Though her efforts in 
protesting Black Fox bankrupted her, Dickerson is remembered as being the key actor in 
the movement that halted the construction o f a nuclear facility in the US.
Even in the instance of Black Fox, it is difficult to clearly demonstrate that public 
opinion against Black Fox’s construction was the sole variable driving the decision to 
abandon the project. The main question here is whether or not PSO would have 
consented to halt facility construction based solely on reactionary public opinion, or if  the 
abandonment of Black Fox had more to do with the increasing costs of building the 
reactors the longer the legal wrangling carried on. In the end, the most likely scenario is 
that negative public opinion created an anti-Black Fox movement that was able to 
mobilize in a way that created real and costly barriers to continuing construction. After 
all, similar protests existed in different places and reactor construction proceeded without 
delay. In Oklahoma, these costly barriers to construction were the key determinant in 
abandoning Black Fox, without which the movement most likely would not have been as 
effective.
Ultimately, there is no clear correlation between public opinion and nuclear 
energy pursuance in the US. The first hypothesis proposed in this project was that the
38 Scott Thompson, “Rogers Woman Who Fought Black Fox Plant Left Lasting Legacy,” O klahom a‘s 
Own, April 28, 2011, Accessed 28 Sept 2011. http://www.newson6.com/storv/14536815/decades-later- 
claremore-womans-fight-against-black-fox-plant-still-inspiring.
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greater the support for nuclear energy, the greater the pursuance and, conversely, the 
greater the opposition the lesser the pursuance. This relationship between public opinion 
and nuclear pursuance has proven weak at best in the US. When asked about nuclear 
energy in general, a majority o f Americans consistently support it. When asked 
specifically about building new reactors, support decreases. Therefore, it is difficult to 
define what public opinion really is in the US. Support is greater in theory, but less so in 
practice.
In terms of voting preferences, both major parties, Democrats and Republicans 
alike, are currently pro-nuclear and support an “all of the above” approach to a 
comprehensive energy policy. In the 2012 US election, both Democratic and Republican 
candidates Barack Obama and Mitt Romney ran on a pro-nuclear platform, though 
nuclear energy was not a central issue in the election, coming in far from first after the 
economy, healthcare, foreign policy and even after the importance o f other energy 
sources like petroleum and natural gas, which were mentioned more frequently by both 
candidates during the campaign than was nuclear. The only anti-nuclear political party in 
the US is the Green Party, which received .3 percent of the overall national total votes. In 
the US’s two-party, winner-take-all system, voters have little motivation to vote for a 
third party, anti-nuclear candidate when the chances of electing a Green Party President 
or even Congressional member are slim. Ultimately, American voters are left with only 
two viable candidates for President, and, in most cases, for Congress, both o f which 
support pro-nuclear platforms.
The greater the protests against nuclear energy the less a country will pursue it has 
also been shown to be a weak assertion. Though every re-license application has been
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formally challenged, they have all been approved. Similarly, challenges were raised for 
the first new reactor application at Vogtle, which was also approved. The lone exceptions 
are the Indian Point reactor, which faced intervention from NY and CT states rather than 
just individuals and organizations (and is still underway); the Rancho Seco plant in 
California which was abandoned after a negative public referendum; and Black Fox, 
which stands as the lone example o f how protests kept a reactor from being built (though 
in the end it had more to do with how the protest raised the cost of building the reactor 
than with push-back from the public).
The second hypothesis, that nuclear disasters negatively impact decision to pursue 
nuclear energy, is also without strong support. The amount of nuclear energy generated 
from the early 1980s until 2014 has remained relatively steady, even after Three Mile 
Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. Of course, most reactors in 
operation now that are generating that steady supply of nuclear power were approved 
prior to the 1979 Three Mile Island disaster. While it is true that no new reactors were 
approved after 1978, that is likely due to market considerations rather than safety or 
public approval issues. Various circumstances in the 1970s coalesced to increase the cost 
o f investing in nuclear energy: expensive public relations campaigns, necessary for the 
first time to counter an emerging anti-nuclear voice; competition with other resources for 
subsidization money after increases in the price o f oil; and policy enacted by anti-nuclear 
President Jimmy Carter, specifically the 1978 Energy Tax Act which rewarded citizens 
with tax credits for home investment in renewable energy all increased the price of initial 
investment in nuclear energy. This increased cost is the most likely explanation for the 
lack of new reactor applications after 1978. Though Three Mile Island in 1979 and
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Chernobyl in 1986 may have had some reinforcing impact, the market had already 
established this decline in nuclear energy investment in the 1970s.
Secondary findings in this case are that nuclear disasters— particularly 
Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and, to the extent that it can be tested now, Fukushima— 
have no discernible lasting impact on levels of public opinion in the US. Though there 
may be a momentary dip in support for nuclear energy, levels o f support eventually 
return to pre-disaster levels. Nuclear technology loses the most support when it is 
militarized in the sight of the public. For example, support after Three Mile Island 
decreased to a small extent and then rose again, but after the Cold War arms build-up 
began in the early 1980s, there was a sharp and unrecoverable decrease in support for 
nuclear energy.
Additionally, this research finds that support o f nuclear energy in the US varies 
nationally and locally. In theory, when asked about using nuclear energy, people tend to 
support it. However, when asked specifically about building new reactors, there is less 
support. This is a sort o f “not in my backyard” response. When it comes to protesting 
reactor applications, states are more successful interveners in the NRC licensing process 
than individuals or organizations. Protests brought about by individuals or organizations 
have only been successful when they can increase the cost of building a new reactor to 
the point where it is no longer economically feasible for the electrical company, as in the 
case of the Black Fox plant.
There should, of course, be some acknowledgement that true public opinion can 
be a difficult variable to capture. While Gallup is a generally reliable source o f polling 
information, depending on the makeup of the random sampling, the timing and wording
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of the questions, and participants’ willingness to answer truthfully, the results of any poll 
may not be representative of the true general feelings of a given population. It is for this 
reason that a qualitative study of protest activity and voting preferences have been 
included with public opinion polls as these are the most accessible outlets through which 
citizens can take action based on their opinions.
Access to Other Resources
Whereas the previous sections sought to determine to what degree public opinion 
and nuclear disasters influence pursuance of nuclear energy, this section will examine 
supplies of other electricity-producing resources with the hypothesis that the greater the 
endowment o f or access to domestic natural resources, the less a country will pursue 
nuclear energy. Renewable sources and petroleum do account for a small percentage of 
electricity generation in each case, but the share is so small that these energy sources are 
not yet a sole viable alternative to nuclear in the same way as coal and gas. For this 
reason, only coal and natural gas supplies will be considered in the US case.
In 2013, coal provided 37 percent o f American electrical energy, natural gas, 30 
percent; and nuclear, 20 percent. In relying on nuclear for 20 percent o f electrical energy 
needs, the US is the second largest nuclear consumer in the world, following only France. 
In 2011, nuclear made up a significant portion o f  overall electrical production in the US, 
equal to that o f natural gas. In the past 2 years, however, natural gas usage has increased 
from 20 to 30 percent, the result of technological advances in drilling technology that has 
granted access to natural gas reserves previously unreachable by existing extraction 
methods. Even with this natural gas boom, coal still remains the largest electrical energy
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generation resource, though its usage decreased from 46 percent in 2011 to 37 percent in 
2012, the continuation of a general trend o f decreasing reliance on coal since 2009.39
This hypothesis about nuclear energy in relation to other energy resources can 
first be examined by looking at consumption statistics over time to determine whether 
using more coal or natural gas at any given time necessarily equaled a reduction in 
nuclear generation. Nuclear energy did not have a share in the overall US electrical 
consumption until 1958, when 2 trillion BTUs were generated from nuclear. Since then, 
the reliance on nuclear has steadily increased; similarly, reliance on coal has likewise 
increased steadily until 2012, while reliance on natural gas deceased in the early 1980s 
only to increase again in the 1990s.40
As the US economy has expanded since 1950, there have been general increases 
in the use of coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy, with the most significant increases 
coming from coal-produced electricity, usage which only began to decrease in 2009. 
While there seems to be little relationship between usage of coal and nuclear (both 
increased steadily) there is a correlation between natural gas and nuclear. When natural 
gas consumption decreased in the early 1980s, nuclear energy consumption increased. 
Both consumption levels then remained steady, until the lines cross again in 2012, when 
reliance on energy sources for electricity in the US saw fairly significant shifts. Coal 
reduced its share from 46 percent to 37 percent; Natural gas increased its share from 20 
percent to 30 percent; Nuclear decreased slightly from 21 percent to 19 percent.41
39 Annual Energy Review, 2012, US Energy Information Administration, Accessed April 23, 2014. 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/Decss diagram.cfm.
40 Annual Energy Review, 2012, US Energy Information Administration, Accessed April 23, 2014. 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pecss diagram.cfm.
41 Annual Energy Review, 2012, US Energy Information Administration, Accessed April 23, 2014. 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pecss diagram.cfm.
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The biggest shift in these electrical energy sources came mainly from an increase 
in natural gas usage, which resulted in decreases in both coal and, to a much lesser extent, 
nuclear. The explanation here is clearly the intense surge in hydraulic fracturing 
techniques the US has been experiencing in the past year and the glut o f cheap natural gas 
that increased production is creating. While more natural gas did, in this case, mean a 
very slight reduction in reliance on nuclear (21 percent to 20 percent) the decrease was 
negligible compared to the changes in coal consumption (46 percent to 37 percent). 
Nuclear replaced natural gas in the 1980s as the price o f natural gas increased, but as 
natural gas prices plummet and the US moves to rely less on coal, there may be future 
increases in both natural gas and  nuclear.
This fluctuating reliance on different energy choices is not necessarily a new 
phenomenon, and has consistently been related to energy resource price. The greatest 
boom for new nuclear reactors in the US occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when coal was 
at its highest price and utilities were predicting a robust growth in electrical demand 
concurrent with economic growth.42 The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo also resulted in an 
increase in the price o f oil. The price o f natural gas, which had historically been coupled 
with oil prices, experienced the largest increase up to that point in the 1970s when well­
head prices rose from .17 dollars per thousand cubic feet (TCF) in 1970 to $1.18 TCF in 
1979 43 It was during this time that most o f the nuclear reactors in operation today were 
applied for and licensed. After oil and gas prices stabilized at higher prices in the 1980s, 
no new applications for reactors were submitted to the NRC. A second boom in reactor
42 Lucas Davis, “Prospects for Nuclear Power After Fukushima,” Energy Institute at Haas, Working Paper 
Series, Accessed August 10, 2013, http://ei.haas.berkelev.edu/pdfyworking papers/WP218.pdf.
43“US Natural Gas Wellhead Price,” US Energy Information Administration, Accessed August 10, 2013, 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hisbn9190us3a.htm .
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applications occurred in the late 2000s, when natural gas prices were at an all-time high 
of $6.25 TCF in 2007 and $7.97 TCF in 2008.44 Similarly, crude oil prices45 rose around 
the same time from an average of $56.6446 per barrel in 2005 to $99.67 in 2008.47 Finally, 
coal prices also increased from an average of $51.16 in 2007 to $118.79 in 2009.48 These 
recent trends demonstrate that when gas, oil, and coal prices are high, applications for 
nuclear reactors increase dramatically, from 0 applications in 2006 to 5 applications in 
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Figure 5: NRC Reactor Applications, 2000-2011.49
44 “US Natural Gas Wellhead Price,” US Energy Information Administration, Accessed August 10, 2013, 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3a.htm .
45 Though petroleum in only used in small quantities for electrical energy, I include their prices here to 
demonstrate general increased prices in energy sources, and because, historically, oil and gas prices 
fluctuated together.
46 West Texas Intermediary (WTI) Prices.
47 “Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB,” US Energy Information Administration, Accessed August 10,
2013, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rwtc&f=a.
48 BP Statistical Review o f World Energy Report, Accessed August 10, 2013. 
http: //www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Statisti cal -Rev ie w-
2 0 12/statistical review o f world energy 2012.pdf
49 Data compiled by the author from US Energy Information Administration.
Many of those plans for new reactors have now been abandoned, however. Other 
than the Georgia Vogtle plant, which was approved for a 2 reactor expansion in 2012, 
only one other approved site has started construction, in Jenksville, South Carolina. The 
Chicago-based utility Exelon, for example, which is the nation’s largest nuclear operator 
with 17 units, has postponed its decision on whether to build a twin-unit nuclear plant in 
Victoria County, Texas. Two other large nuclear suppliers, NRG Energy and UniStar 
Nuclear Energy, have put off building long-planned plants in south Texas and Calvert 
County, Maryland, respectively. O f the 11 applications in 2008, four have currently been 
shelved indefinitely.50
Based on this data, we can conclude that enthusiasm for expanding nuclear energy 
by way of applications for nuclear reactors increases when the price o f gas and coal 
increase as well, and when those gas and coal prices decrease, so do nuclear applications 
as well as forward movement in building approved reactors. This actually seems fairly 
commonsensical and is explainable by the fact that there has to be economic justification 
for building a new nuclear reactor, a venture for electrical companies that has become 
increasingly costly in the US since the 1970s. In other words, the cost o f building a 
reactor should be less than the cost of continuing to buy gas and coal at elevated market 
prices. In 2007 and 2008, when gas and coal prices were high, applying for reactor 
licenses made economic sense. Since then, however, the fracturing boom in the natural 
gas industry has decreased the price o f gas to the point that it makes more economic 
sense to increasingly rely on cheap natural gas than to buy coal or pay to build a new 
reactor.
50 “Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications,” Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Accessed August 
19, 2013, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/new-licensing-files/expectcd-ncw-rx-applications.pdf.
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Based on these findings about the past relationship between prices o f coal and 
natural gas and nuclear energy pursuance, testing the hypothesis that the higher a 
country’s natural resource endowments or ability to obtain energy from reliable sources 
and at affordable prices will decrease the likelihood o f nuclear energy pursuance will 
allow for future projections on nuclear energy pursuance in the US. In 2011, oil and gas 
exploration and production companies operating in the United States added 31.2 trillion 
cubic feet of wet natural gas reserves to a new record high o f 348.8 trillion cubic feet.51 
This is only the second time in US history that the number of natural gas added proven 
reserves had been over 30 trillion cubic feet, the first time occurring in 2010. The 2010- 
2011 year added almost 10 percent additional reserve capacity to US natural gas 
prospects. In terms of natural gas pricing, the US natural gas wellhead price has 
consistently decreased from its record high of over $10 per thousand cubic feet in 2008 to 
around $3 per thousand cubic feet in 201 1.52 Even accounting for monthly price increases 
during the exceptionally cold winter of 2013-2014, the average price of natural gas in the 
United States has not been this low since the beginning of the 21st century. In times of 
low natural gas prices, interest in continuing or increasing nuclear energy capacity 
decreases. This phenomenon explains the previously mentioned closure o f at least two 
nuclear plants, the Kewaunee and Vermont Yankee, which had been approved to 
continue operation well into the 2030s.
American coal reserves actually surpass natural gas reserves and are, in fact, the 
US’s most abundant natural resource. As of January 1, 2013, the demonstrated reserve
51 “US Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proven Reserves,” Energy Information Administration, Last Udpated 
August 1, 2013, Accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/.
52 “US Natural Gas Wellhead Price,” Accessed 23 March 2014. 
http://www.eia. gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm.
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base of recoverable coal in the US was 257 billion short tons and The US Energy 
Information Administration predicted that coal production was expected to grow 3.2 
percent in 2014. With this much coal abundance, the US only imported 1 percent o f the 
coal it used to generate electricity in 2011, while US exports of coal increased from 5 
percent of coal produced domestically to 10 percent in 2011.53 Recently pledged clean 
energy goals coupled with increased availability o f natural gas have likely contributed to 
the decrease in coal reliance. If natural gas abundance continues, as it is likely to do, it is 
also likely that reliance on coal will decrease as well, though coal production will 
continue as the US begins exporting more coal to other countries. There seems to be little 
relationship between coal usage and nuclear reliance, except to say that a guaranteed 
domestic endowment o f coal would likely to be a more affordable fall-back option than 
nuclear should unlikely circumstances limit natural gas availability.
Though it is established that the US possesses abundant endowments o f coal and 
natural gas, two resources on which it depends most heavily for electricity production, it 
is still worth mentioning regional energy trading relationships. Since the early 1970s, the 
US’s two most significant energy trading partners have been Canada and Mexico. In 
2008, the US imported 3.9 and 3.6 million cubic feet (MCF) of natural gas from each 
country, respectively. Those numbers have decreased to 2.8 MCF from Canada and 2.7 
MCF from Mexico in 2013.54 Both Canada and Mexico also possess large reserves of 
coal and natural gas; additionally, all three countries are bound into fair future trading 
cooperation with the US by the North American Free Trade Agreement, thus giving the
53 “Coal Explained: Imports and Exports,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated July 30, 2012, 
Accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal imports.
54 “US Natural Gas Imports by Country,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated February 28, 
2014, Accessed March 23, 2014, http://ww'w.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_sl_a.htm.
67
US multiple future options to obtain affordable energy imports from reliable trading 
partners should it need to increase imports in the future. The EIA, however, projects that 
the net import share o f total US energy consumption will decrease to 4 percent in 2040, 
down from 16 percent in 2012 and 30 percent in 2005, and the US will transition from 
being a net energy importer to a net exporter.55
This section produces two separate sets of conclusions: First, that coal 
consumption and nuclear consumption have little to no correlation in the US. The only 
relationship seems to be that the US has consistently used more coal for electrical energy 
than nuclear, and will most likely continue to produce large amounts o f coal, even with 
lower gas prices, for export purposes. Even with environmental movements against coal 
and allegations that it is a “dirty” resource, the current infrastructure in the US is 
conducive to using coal while supply remains abundant and prices remain low. The more 
clear relationship may actually be between natural gas and coal, evidenced by the 
changes in use of each for electrical energy supply between 2010 and 2012. When natural 
gas increases, coal (but not necessarily nuclear) decreases.
Second, when supplies o f natural gas decrease, nuclear energy production 
increases. This decreased supply of natural gas increases its price, thereby making 
nuclear seem a more attractive energy option. To return to the original hypotheses o f this 
section, it seems that the relationship between coal and nuclear is unclear, as usage of 
both have steadily increased since the 1950s. There also seems to exist a fluctuating 
relationship between gas and nuclear; that is, when there is less gas, there is more
55 “AEO2014 Early Release Overview,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated December 16, 
2013, Accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/earlv production.cfm?src=Anal vsis- 
b3.
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nuclear, and when there is more gas, there is less nuclear (though only small decreases, as 
in the case of the 2011-2012 decrease from 21 percent to 20 percent).
Other findings in this section relate to the relationship between the price o f energy 
resources and their supply share of US electrical energy. First, when coal and natural gas 
prices increase, so do application for new nuclear reactors. This phenomenon is 
observable when gas prices were high in the late 1960s and 1970s, when most o f the 
reactors in operation today were constructed, and then again in 2007/2008 when gas 
prices were high before the US oil and gas fracturing boom. Lastly, when natural gas 
prices decrease, so do the applications for new nuclear reactors. As the US supply of 
natural gas dramatically increased from 2010-2012 and therefore the prices decreased, the 
applications for new reactors have also decreased from 11 applications in 2008 to none in 
2012. Furthermore, much of the construction planned for the previously applied for 
reactors has slowed if  not halted as the high reactor construction costs are difficult to 
justify in the face o f abundant and cheap US natural gas and plants previously approved 
for extended continued operation are closed because of economic reasons.
Overall, the hypothesis that higher natural resource endowments or reliable and 
affordable access to resources through trading will equal decreased pursuit o f nuclear 
energy will only become clear in the coming years as operating utility companies apply 
or do not apply for extended operating licenses on existing reactors. The voluntary 
closure of the Kewaunee and Vermont Yankee plants for reasons of economic 
insufficiency seems to indicate that this could be a trend if  natural gas supplies remain 
high and prices remain low. However, the new reactor construction at the Vogtle plant
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seems to tell a different story of the future viability o f nuclear energy, though the 
completion and operation of those two new reactors are still years in the future.
Chapter Conclusions
The relationship between nuclear pursuance and public opinion is weak. Though 
opinion has varied over time, nuclear pursuance increased steadily until it reached the 20 
percent mark at which it hovers now. This is one interpretation o f the existing data, 
though another interpretation must be presented. Because opinion measured at the 
generalized national level has actually varied little over time, a consistent pursuance of 
nuclear energy could be seen as actually in line with opinion. The argument against this 
interpretation is that while generalized national support for nuclear energy has been 
relatively consistent, localized and specific opinion against nuclear has been much 
stronger. Despite protests and objections from the public, reactor life-extension 
applications have consistently been approved by the NRC, thus allowing for the 
continued 20 percent reliance on nuclear energy.
One issue that was not initially formulated into a hypothesis but has become 
increasingly worth o f consideration throughout this research is that o f the phenomenon of 
regulatory capture. Nuclear power seems to be a textbook example o f the problem of 
regulatory capture, a situation in which an industry gains control o f and then manipulates 
in its favor the agency that is meant to regulate it. The safety requirements set forth and 
enforced by the NRC have long been criticized as patchwork at best and negligent at 
worst. Victor Gilinsky, who served on the NRC during and after the Three Mile Island 
incident, recently said in an interview that the NRC is a “...wholly owned subsidiary of
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the nuclear power industry.”56 In 2008, during his presidential campaign, President 
Obama also said that the NRC is a “moribund agency that....has become captive o f the 
industry it regulates.”57 The NRC certainly has motivation to keep regulatory oversight 
weak. The commission’s defenders have pointed out that it must be cautious because 
increased safety measures would equal increased operating costs, which could hurt the 
nuclear industry and thus leave the commissioners out o f a job. There have also been 
instances of a “revolving door.” In 2008, Jeffrey Merrifield, who had served on the NRC 
since 1997, left the commission to take a job at The Shaw Group, which has a nuclear 
division regulated by the NRC.
The likely scenario is that the NRC has continuously made decisions in favor of 
the nuclear industry despite other considerations such as public opposition or concerns 
about safety after nuclear disasters. In doing so, the commission has placed its own 
survival over the integrity of its office. Public opposition seems to be effective only when 
it can create practical and costly barriers for utility companies, such as the case in the 
Black Fox plant, or when states intervene in the NRC approval process. Furthermore, 
voters have few options for electing anti-nuclear representation at the presidential, 
congressional or even local levels given the nature o f the two-party, winner-take-all 
system that favors the Democratic and Republican parties, both of which are pro-nuclear.
Ultimately, the market seems to provide the most explanatory power for 
decisions to pursue nuclear power. Most reactors in operation today were built in the 
1950s, 60s, and 70s, with original operation licenses for 40 years that can be extended for 
up to 20 additional years. It is from these reactors that the US gets most o f its nuclear




energy. The lack of new reactor applications and construction since the 1980s explains 
the steady 20 percent reliance since the 1980s and why we have not seen a significant 
increase in nuclear power generation. The early reactor boom brought most o f the 
reactors in operation now, but as these projects wore on, utilities companies realized the 
immense time and cost involved in constructing nuclear sites. While coal and gas were 
abundant and relatively cheap, investing such a large amount of capital into a nuclear site 
became less attractive than the more traditional sources o f energy. One may argue that 
rate payers actually absorb much o f the initial cost of construction over time, and this is 
true, to some extent. However, this increase in electricity rates for citizens is usually quite 
unpopular, which can in turn mobilize residents against a nuclear facility, even as it 
promises jobs and industry to an area. Citizen protest, if it is strong enough, can lengthen 
the process o f licensing and construction, thus again increasing the overall cost o f a given 
nuclear site. When citizens can involve states on their behalf, their overall chances of 
success increase. While this variable is likely insufficient alone, it may be an added 
deterrent to utilities companies to choose nuclear over less controversial and initially 
expensive coal or gas. In fact, the Chairman o f one of the largest US nuclear companies 
recently commented that he would not break ground on a new reactor until the price of
co
natural gas was double the current price.
Though the government has instituted policies to make investment in nuclear 
energy more affordable and with fewer risks for utility companies, it is difficult to say to 
what extent the US will pursue nuclear in the future. Once the initial construction costs 
are financed, the sites are relatively inexpensive to run, and since this initial cost has 
already been absorbed, there is little motivation for the NRC to not re-license an existing 
58 Lucas W. Davis, “Prospects for Nuclear Power,” Journal o f  Economic Perspectives, 26:1 (2012), 50.
plant. The real question is how many new reactors will be approved and then, more 
importantly, actually built and brought online. The new reactor expansion at Vogtle is 
already delayed, which may be an indicator of what many utility companies can expect in 
the future. Furthermore, with the glut o f cheap natural gas from new technologies and a 
large domestic supply of coal readily available (and Canadian and Mexican imports on 




NUCLEAR ENERGY IN GERMANY
Objective
Following the structure o f the preceding chapter on nuclear energy in the United 
States, this case study on Germany aims to first offer a brief background on the 
development of nuclear energy policy in Germany. Secondly, this chapter will explore 
the relationship between patterns o f nuclear energy pursuance and public opinion in 
Germany since the 1970s. Again, “Nuclear energy pursuance” is operationalized as the 
overall percentage nuclear provides to the electrical energy supply and public opinion is 
measured by using polling data with a supplemental discussion o f protest activity and 
voting preferences. The hypothesis is that in countries where nuclear approval is lower, 
nuclear pursuance will be lower and, in countries where nuclear approval is higher, 
nuclear pursuance will be higher. Next, this chapter will analyze data over time that 
measure to what extent public opinion and nuclear energy pursuance have changed in 
response to nuclear disasters, specifically disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and 
Fukushima. Lastly, this chapter will examine the share nuclear currently makes up of 
total German energy consumption with the hypothesis that if Germany has a greater 
endowment of electricity-generating natural resources or greater access to other reliable, 
affordable energy resources, its pursuance of nuclear will decrease. The chapter will end 
with conclusions based on these findings.
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Development o f  Early Energy Policy in Germany
Following World War II, German energy policy was essentially coal policy. The 
largest indigenous energy source in Western Europe, domestic coal production and 
consumption dominated German energy patterns.1 In the 1950s, however, German coal 
became increasingly uncompetitive with oil, which was priced very cheaply at the time. 
Despite policies and subsidies aimed at bolstering domestic coal exports, coal production 
dropped as Germany began importing more oil from foreign producers. The oil price 
shocks of the 1970s motivated Germany to escalate its on-going investment in nuclear 
energy (but also renewable energy sources as well) to increase its energy security and 
independence from oil imports. A relative late-comer to nuclear energy competition, 
pressure from chemical and electronic companies further pushed nuclear expansion in the 
1970s. The first nuclear research reactor came online in Germany in 1957 and the first 
commercial reactor opened in 1961, though the vast majority of Germany’s operating 
reactors came online in the 1970s and early 1980s. This increased pursuance of nuclear 
energy was not limited to Germany but was rather quite common policy throughout the 
European Economic Community (EEC) at the time. A 1972 projection reported that by 
1985, the total installed nuclear power in the EEC would provide 33 percent of total 
electricity consumed, an increase that would require the construction o f six to eight new 
power plants per year.3
Germany was banned from developing nuclear weapons after World War II, so 
the German nuclear industry did not grow up in the shroud of secrecy and protection of
1 Hatch, Politics and Nuclear Power, 12.
2 Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollack, “Political Parties and the Nuclear Energy Debate in Germany and 
France,” Comparative Politics, 12:2(1980), 127-141.
3 Nelkin and Pollack, “Political Parties and the Nuclear Energy Debate in Germany and France,” 127.
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the “national security” label as it did in the United States. However, very similarly to the 
US, conventional energy policies in Germany were managed largely by a group of 
policy-makers and scientists, known as the Economics Ministry, which was made up of 
officials and interested parties from labor and industry. Likewise, the development of 
nuclear energy technology was managed primarily by the Bundesministerium fuer 
Forschung and Technologie (the Federal Ministry o f Research and Technology, or 
BMFT) and experts within the scientific community. Until the 1970s, nuclear technology 
was largely ignored by the public and the government officials monitoring and legislating 
it enjoyed relative anonymity and isolation.
The 1959 Atomic Energy Act
The purpose of the 1959 Atomic Energy Act was originally two-fold. While it 
established a framework for regulating nuclear approval, construction, and operation, it 
also was fundamentally meant to promote nuclear energy, specifically, to promote private 
investment in new reactors by making them affordable. The German Atomic Energy Act 
bore striking similarities to the 1946 and 1954 American Atomic Energy Acts that 
preceded it by providing for: the privatization o f the nuclear industry; limited and exempt 
liability for nuclear investors; and mandatory public hearings in the reactor approval 
process. The most significant difference between the German and US Acts lies in the 
move away from a centralized federal agency to regulate or grant license approval 
(functions o f the NRC in the US) to a Lander (or state-based) control o f licensing 
approval where the reactor is to be installed. Public hearings were mandatory prior to 
license approval, but only individuals could participate as opposed to organized group
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participation on behalf of individuals as is allowed in the US. This contributed to the 
early regional character o f the anti-nuclear protests in Germany.4 
Subsequent Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act: 2002
Though the original version of the German Atomic Energy Act was consolidated 
and updated throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the intent to encourage investment in the 
nuclear energy sector was preserved until the late 1990s when the Bundestag (German 
Parliament) began proposing changes to the Atomic Energy Act and eventually amended 
the 1959 Act to the Act on the Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy and Protection 
Against its Hazards.5 The new policy codified a structured phase-out o f nuclear energy 
which granted the remaining reactors in operation an average life-span of 32 years. This 
policy shift was the result of a Red-Green Social Democrat-Green party alliance formed 
within the Bundestag in the late 1990s. Following Chernobyl in 1986, the Green Party 
gained popularity in Germany and united with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 
1998 under the leadership o f Gerard Schroder. The coalition remained in power in 
Germany until 2005, when the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Angela 
Merkel, defeated the Social Democrats. This conservative party has remained in the 
majority ever since.
Subsequent Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act: 2010
Merkel’s Conservative CDU-Liberal FPD (Free Democratic Party or FPD) 
Coalition changed nuclear course again in 2010, rescinding Schroder’s phase-out and 
granting further extensions for existing nuclear power plants in exchange for new taxes 
on nuclear power that would then subsidize renewable forms of energy such as wind and
4 Joppke, Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 39.
5 “German Nuclear Legislation.” Nuclear Energy Agency. Accessed September 14, 2013, http://www.oecd- 
nea.org/law/legislation/gerraanv.html.
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solar. Contributing to this decision to grant nuclear reactors a longer life was the official 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, which committed Germany to pursuing clean 
energy sources to reduce their C 02 emissions. In order to pursue the goals o f the Kyoto 
Protocol, Germany knew it would have to begin moving away from coal (their largest 
naturally occurring energy resource) and moving toward more natural gas and renewable 
energy sources. Once it was clear that move would mean importing more energy sources, 
particularly natural gas, it was quickly apparent that the largest supplier in Europe was 
Russia. Fearing an inconsistent supply bought at high real and political prices, nuclear 
energy slowly began a comeback in Germany in the form of the 2010 amendment. Der 
Spiegel, one of Germany’s most widely-read news outlets, addressed this nuclear 
comeback on July 2008 cover o f its magazine with a headline that read: “Atomkraft: Das 
Unheimliche Comeback” (“Nuclear Energy: Its Eerie Comeback”). The article outlined 
how factors such as the increasing urgency to limit C 02 emissions, the rising costs of 
fossil fuels, and the political instability o f fossil fuel exporters such as Libya and Russia 
were combining to revitalize a widely unpopular industry that once again appeared to be 
the “lesser of evils” for energy production.6 
Fukushima in 2011
The nuclear comeback was short-lived. Following the disaster at Fukushima in 
March of 2011, by late May Chancellor Merkel had announced that Germany would 
again begin a phase out of nuclear energy that would run through 2022. The oldest 
reactors that had been shut down for maintenance before Fukushima were not brought 
back online and the others would all be subsequently decommissioned before the 2022 
deadline. Now, Germany is pursuing what has been called a policy of “energiewende,” or
6 Michael Sauga, “Comeback der Reaktoren: Aufbruch ins neue Atomzietaler,” July, 2008, D er Spiegel.
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energy turn, from conventional energy sources to more renewable sources such as wind, 
solar, and hydropower, an initiative that so far has been financed largely by private 
German electrical customers who are paying the highest energy rates in the European 
Union aside from the Dutch.
This brief background on the development o f nuclear energy in Germany 
illustrates three important factors beyond providing a historical framework for the 
discussion that follows. First, it highlights the decentralized reactor approval and 
licensing process that is characteristic to German nuclear energy, a factor which is 
important when analyzing the efficacy o f public opinion and protest activity toward 
nuclear energy within the Lander in Germany.
Secondly, dissimilarly to the US, this history demonstrates ebbs and flows of 
pursuance of nuclear energy. Whereas the US has pursued nuclear energy at consistent 
levels since all operating reactors came online, the nuclear prerogatives o f decision­
makers in Germany have been in a state o f flux since the late 1990s. This is most likely 
explained by the different considerations in a Parliamentarian system o f government 
compared to a Presidential one. The unique Parliamentarian nature o f the German 
Bundestag means that while anti-nuclear Green Parties are often unlikely to win a 
majority, even taking a small share o f the votes affords them representation in the 
legislature and, as was the case in the 1998 elections, can also mean a coalition with other 
parties to form policy-making majorities within Parliament. In Germany, unlike the 
United Kingdom where a party must receive the majority o f votes in a constituency, there 
is a combination o f majority and proportional systems, and the proportional aspect 
dominates. Every party receiving more than 5 percent of national support gets
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parliamentary seats in proportion to its vote. This 5 percent threshold has been very 
important. It was high enough to force unity on the various Green factions; without it, 
Green groups and parties would have been fragmented. But it was low enough to allow 
representation in Parliament at an early stage.7
In 1998, the Red Social Democrats joined with the Greens to bring the Greens 
into the national government for the first time. Consequently, the late 1990s also marked 
the initial phase-out of nuclear energy that would be reversed with a pro-nuclear 
Christian Democratic Union win in 2005. In contrast, the US’s two-party “winner-take- 
all” system requires a majority o f votes for representation in Congress or a Presidential 
election. While there is a functioning Green Party in the US, the Green candidates only 
drew a small percentage of national votes in the 2012 Presidential election. What this 
difference in legislative structures points to is that, in the US, the low probability o f a 
Green Presidential or Congressional win means decisions and policies will not be 
influenced by Green Party anti-nuclear objectives. In the German Bundestag, however, 
even relatively small Green representations can form coalitions and exert influence over 
energy policy.
Lastly, this history illustrates a point o f departure resulting from Fukushima in 
2011 that was not present in the US. Following the Japanese disaster that made 
international headlines, public opinion in the US barely shifted and the NRC approved 
construction for the first new reactors since the late 1970s. In Germany, however, the 
reaction was quite different. The following chapter will attempt to determine what factors 
in addition to Fukushima could have had an impact on this decision to permanently turn 
away from nuclear energy.
7 Detlaf Jahn, “Green Politics and Parties in Germany,” The Political Quarterly, 68:B (1997), 174-182.
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Nuclear Public Opinion in Germany
After WWII, an anti-militaristic, anti-proliferation doctrine was strictly enforced 
in Western Germany. Very similarly to the US, there was little public protest against 
nuclear energy throughout the 1950s and 1960s when reactors were initially being 
designed and built in Western Germany (Soviet Eastern Germany was consistently pro- 
nuclear in its policies until its demise in 1990 and reunification with Western Germany). 
Though there was a strong anti-nuclear weapons peace movement in the 1950s and an 
anti-NATO sentiment as well, many of the proponents and members remained 
enthusiastic about the peaceful potential nuclear technology could offer for power
o
generation. Even the anti-nuclear energy movement that was gaining ground in the 
1960s was more concerned with environmental safety and waste issues than about the 
development of nuclear weaponry.
Some scholars try to explain the early lack o f clear public opposition to nuclear 
energy by claiming that public dissent existed but was repressed during this time in a 
post-Nazi shaming era which created a “culture o f consent.”9 Certainly, the image of 
“Model Germany,” or what political economists have termed the depiction of post-war 
Germany as an island of stability and strength in a crisis-ridden world economy, comes to 
mind. Most analysts agree that the apparent success o f Model Germany can be attributed 
to a persistent concern for monetary stability, an export-oriented economy, and an active 
policy o f modernization, one pillar o f which was a greater energy independence that 
could be obtained through nuclear power. A second explanation is that nuclear reactors 
were not numerous enough until the 1970s to cause much alarm. It was not until the
8 Paul Hockenos, “Angst or Arithmetic?: Why Germans Are So Skeptical About Nuclear Energy,” Heinrich 
Boll Stiftung, Series on Energy Transformation, 2012.
9 Hockenos, “Angst or Arithmetic,” 3.
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1970s oil price increases spurred motivation to build new reactors that people’s “not in 
my backyard” reactions were triggered. This section will first determine the state of 
current nuclear pursuance in Germany and then compare it currently and over time with 
polling data to determine whether patterns or relationships exist between these two 
measures.
Germany is currently the largest energy consumer is Europe. In early 2011, 
Germany received the majority of its electrical energy from fossil fuels such as coal, oil, 
and natural gas. By the end of 2011, nuclear energy production had dropped from 23 
percent to 15 percent, while other renewable sources such as wind, solar and hydropower 
grew to 15 percent. In 2011, Germany was the largest European producer o f non-hydro 
renewable electricity, wind energy, solar energy, and biofuels.10 In 2012, the percentage 
share of renewable energy in the overall mix had grown to 22 percent. Figure 6 illustrates 
this energy mix:
10 Germany Country Analysis, US Energy Information Administration, Last Updated May 30, 2013, 
Accessed March 25, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=gm.
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Electricity Production by Source in Germany, 
2011
■  Fossil Fuels (Coal, Oil, Gas) 
R enew ables
■  Nuclear
Figure 6: Electricity Production by Source in Germ any, 2011.11
Since the early 1990s, nuclear’s share o f total electricity generation hovered 
between 30 percent and 35 percent, until it began declining slowly in the early 2000s as a 
result of the phase-out policies of the Atomic Energy Act. In 2011, the nuclear share 
dropped to 16 percent and then to 15 percent in 2012. Figure 7 demonstrates this trend:
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Figure 7: Nuclear Percentage o f  Net Electricity Generation in G erm any, 1990-2012.12
Polling Results o f  German Nuclear Opinion
In 2010, a Financial Times/Harris Poll found that 35 percent o f  Germans strongly 
opposed the building of new reactors; 29 percent opposed more than favored; 25 percent 
favored more than opposed; and 12 percent strongly favored. The same poll, asking the 
same question about building new reactors, found in 2010 that the number o f Germans 
strongly opposed to the building of new reactors had increased to 43 percent; 34 percent 
opposed more than favored; 16 percent favored more than opposed; and only 7 percent 
strongly favored. This poll also discovered that Germans were strongly opposed to 
government subsidies to finance research for nuclear power: 47 percent strongly opposed 
a government subsidy; 35 percent opposed more than favored; 13 percent favored more 
than opposed; and only 5 percent strongly favored.13 This data reveals that in 2010, well
12 Data compiled by author from World Nuclear Association.
13 “Large Majorities in US and Five Largest European Countries Favor More Wind Farms and Subsidies for 
Biofuels, but Opinion is Split on Nuclear Power.” PRNewswire, October 13, 2010.
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before Fukushima, Germans were already opposed both to building new reactors and 
financing research to increase nuclear power (77 percent against new reactors, 82 percent 
against government subsidies). After Fukushima, in November o f 2011, Germans 
responded to a Globescan survey asking whether they supported the building of new 
reactors with a resounding no: 90 percent of Germans strongly opposed building new 
reactors.14 The same poll found that 52 percent o f Germans was not only opposed to 
building new reactors, but supported the Merkel policy to shut down all existing reactors. 
In June of 2011, 57 percent o f Germans responded that they thought the nuclear phase­
out would be feasible.15
Since Fukushima in 2011, polling conducted in Germany tends to focus less on 
the topic of nuclear energy and more on support for the energy transition from fossil fuels 
to more renewable energy sources that Germany is currently undergoing. For this project, 
support for the energy transition, or energiewende, can be equated with support for 
phasing-out nuclear energy, since the purpose o f the energy transition is to move away 
from nuclear (but also coal and oil) to other renewable energy sources such as solar, 
wind, and hydropower. The focus of much of current German polling has to do with 
willingness to pay energy prices since the transition from fossil fuels to renewables is 
largely being financed by energy customers through two ways. First, Germans pay an 
umlage charge on their monthly energy bills that amounts to roughly 14 percent of their 
total energy cost. This cost is not necessarily new, though the four largest electrical 
companies in Germany announced in 2012 that the umlage cost would increase to a rate
14 “Opposition to Nuclear Energy Grows.” Globescan, November 25, 2011, Accessed September 13, 2013. 
http://www.globescan.com/commentarv-and-analvsis/Dress-releases/press-releases-2011/94-press-releases- 
2011/127-opposition-to-nuclear-energy-grows-global-poll.html.
15 “What People Really Think About Nuclear Energy,” For Atom Project, 2012. 
http://www.foratom.org/isnnallfib top/Publications/Opinion Poll.pdf.
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that amount to an approximate additional €59 on monthly bills per customer.16 Second, 
the overall cost of energy is increasing as new electrical grids are built to support 
renewable energy as well as to finance a feed-in tariff that is paid to anyone who installs 
solar or wind technology and sells electrical energy to the grid.
A survey taken in mid-March 2013 found that Environmental Minister Peter 
Altmaier’s proposal to dampen increasing energy prices (which essentially meant slowing 
down the move to renewables) met with great popular resistance. 89 percent of those 
polled who associated with the Green Party naturally thought “renewables should be 
consistently expanded”; the Christian Democrats responded at 68 percent in favor of 
continuing to pursue renewables; and 81 percent of Social Democrats said renewables 
should continue to grow.17 Altmaier’s proposal has since been rejected in Parliament. 
Similarly, a German Forsa poll found in October o f 2012 that 72 percent o f those 
surveyed supported the switch-over, while only 24 percent opposed it.18
These responses o f support, however, are only in theory, and thus demonstrate a 
short-coming of polling data, for it is unclear whether those polled realized the practical 
price-increase consequences o f expanding renewables or supporting the switch-over 
when answering. When asked specifically about their willingness to finance the 
transition, responses are less enthusiastic. An Emnid poll conducted in October o f 2012 
found that two-thirds of those surveyed are not willing to pay more than €50 to finance
16 Lauren E. McKee, “German’s Renewable Energiewende: Pioneering Path or Troubled Turn,” Journal o f  
Energy Security, April 2013.
17 Craig Morris, “Energy Transition— Nuclear Power, Very Unpopular.” Renewables International, 
Accessed September 11, 2013, http://www.renewablesintemational.net/nuclear-power-verv- 
unpopular/150/537/62320/.
18 “Poll: Germans Support Abandoning Nuclear Power.” The Journal.IE, Accessed September 11, 2013, 
http://www.theioumal.ie/poll-germanv-nuclear-power-644340-Qct2012/.
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the switch-over, far less than the impending price increases.19 Similarly, a 2013 
Befragmich poll found that only 38 percent o f Germans surveyed were willing to accept a 
consistent increase in their electricity bill.20 The Financial Times/Harris Poll found in 
2010 that 43 percent o f Germans were not willing to pay more for energy if it was from a 
renewable source opposed to a fossil fuel, and 65 percent responded that they were not 
willing to pay more for energy to cut greenhouse gas emissions or finance renewables.21
In this respect, it seems that current nuclear energy pursuance policies correspond 
to the majority o f nuclear public opinion in Germany. Despite questionable willingness to 
finance the renewable switch-over, polls reveal that in 2013 Germans consistently 
support moving away from nuclear energy, specifically to renewable energy sources. 
Accordingly, German energy policy is doing just that— moving away from nuclear 
energy by closing the oldest reactors and resolving to shut down others in operation by 
2022. Both the public’s backlash to nuclear and the anti-nuclear policy shift have been 
attributed to Fukushima, though earlier disasters had already influenced public opinion in 
Germany. To gain a greater understanding o f this relationship between nuclear pursuance 
and public opinion over time, the following section will examine public reactions to the 
nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima as well as offer a 
qualitative examination of nuclear protest culture in Germany and changes in nuclear 
pursuance that may have been a result.
19 McKee, “Germany’s Renewable Energiewende.”
20 “Energy Policy and Willingness to Pay: 2013,” Befragmich. Accessed September 22, 2013. 
www.befragmich.de.
21 “Large Majorities in US and Five Largest European Countries Favor More Wind Farms and Subsidies 




The 1970s and Three Mile Island
The anti-nuclear movement was already well underway by the time o f the 1979 
accident at Three Mile Island, unfolding through a series o f sighting conflicts beginning 
in the late 1960s. In 1971, the first notable citizen opposition occurred in response to a 
reactor proposed for the small town of Wyhl, located in the southwest comer of 
Germany. Local farmers, vintners, and environmentalists mobilized early on in protest to 
issues such as reactor safety, water pollution, and ecological effects. By 1974, this local 
opposition has gathered 90,000 protest signatures.22 The structure o f the German nuclear 
license-approval process required a public hearing before the Lander government could 
vote on reactor approval. As it turned out, in this case, the state government was part- 
owner o f the utility company proposing the project, and thus had a vested interest in 
seeing the license approved. The opposition force which had grown to encompass most 
o f the outlying region of Baden-Wtirttemburg, where the town o f Wyhl was located, 
organized to show up at the public hearing and voice their opposition to the proposed 
reactor.
What happened at the public hearings was both predictable and similar to such 
hearings conducted in the US through the NRC. The impatient state government rushed 
through the proceedings on the first day, barring the majority of those who showed up to 
protest the reactor from speaking. The second day followed in much the same way, 
though those who showed up to the hearing to support the reactor were allowed to speak 
in favor o f the project. It became clear that the majority o f those opposed to the project 
were agriculturally invested, resided in the region surrounding where the reactor would
22 Joppke, Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 98.
23 Ibid, 98.
88
be placed, and feared damage to their livelihoods as farmers and vintners. Those who 
supported the reactor were primarily working-class citizens living in the actual town of 
Wyhl and saw the reactor as a source of employment for hundreds o f  people, cheap 
electricity, and a magnet for further metropolitan investment. In fact, a narrow majority 
of the citizens voted for the reactor, thus removing the last institutional obstacle to reactor 
construction.24 These same distinctions are apparent at public hearings in the US, where 
the support and opposition are likewise divided among those who fear environmental 
consequences and those who desire the local economic stimulation building a reactor 
would bring. As is also the case in the US, reactor licenses are approved regardless of 
concerns voiced in these public hearings.
The opposition movement saw direct action as their final resort and a spontaneous 
site occupation turned into a ten-month siege in 1975 that forced Wyhl and the anti- 
nuclear movement into national public debate. There were reports o f police brutality as 
magazines and television stations showed images o f farmers and their wives being 
dragged away from the proposed nuclear site. At is largest, the protest had grown to 
between 25,000 and 28,000 participants.25 This not only drew attention to local nuclear 
opposition groups, but also to the questionable nature o f the state’s actions in rushing 
through the reactor approval stage in spite o f  large-scale opposition. In light o f this 
negative publicity, the state government did agree to negotiations with local groups, but it 
would ultimately be actions by another municipality that would shelve plans for the Wyhl 
reactor. In 1977, the Administrative Court o f Frieburg, a town approximately 30
24 Joppke, Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 99.
25 Hatch, Politics and Nuclear Power, 73.
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kilometers from Wyhl, terminally revoked the construction permit for Wyhl, citing 
insufficient reactor contamination plans.
Several other critical protests followed, first at Brokdorf where a reactor had been 
proposed. The anti-nuclear movement had gained momentum from the conflict at Whyl 
and what had been a localized protest movement grew into nationalized mobilization at 
Brokdorf with 70-80,000 people participating.26 Though it was reported that 75 percent of 
the local population at Brokdorf opposed the nuclear reactor, the local municipal 
government quickly moved through the public hearing process and, courted by promises 
of increase tax income and utility donations such as a local swimming pool, they 
approved the license for a reactor at Brokdorf in 1975.27
What followed the Brokdorf license approval was the first instance in which the 
German anti-nuclear movement would encounter hard push-back from the state. While 
the anti-nuclear movement had been successful at Wyhl (though only after another 
municipality had intervened in an official capacity) protestors found that the battle at 
Brokdorf would be much harder fought. In 1976, local opposition groups announced that 
they would peacefully protest and occupy the construction site at Brokdorf. They were 
outraged when the utility company erected a tall steel barrier around the construction site 
and suddenly began work under the cover of “nacht and nebel” or night and fog. A 
November 1976 protest escalated into what the media called a “civil war,” complete with 
tear gas, police helicopters, the destruction of a security fence, and, ultimately, the 
severing of communication between the state and local groups.28 An administrative court 
agreed to postpone the construction of the reactor, but in 1981 the construction permit




was reinstated and the Brokdorf reactor first began operation in 1986. It remains in 
operation today.
Brokdorf was the first instance of violent confrontation in the German anti- 
nuclear movement, though other similar confrontations would follow throughout the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Many o f the same protestors who were involved at Brokdorf 
moved immediately to the small village o f Ghronde where a reactor site had been under 
construction for ten months. There protestors used blowtorches and electric chainsaws to 
cut through the security fence, and eight hundred protestors and police were injured. The 
“Grondhe Trials” in 1978 inflicted harsh prison sentences on many o f the protestors who 
were arrested and criminally charged. Similarly to Brokdorf, the protests only 
temporarily halted construction in 1977 due to unresolved issues concerning waste 
disposal, and construction began again in 1979. The first power from Ghronde was 
generated in 1984, and the reactor remains in operation today.
The final significant court case o f the time involved the reactor at Kalkar, where 
an administrative court halted construction because o f  questions regarding the 
constitutionality of the 1959 Energy Act, arguing that, having been written in 1959, it 
could not have foreseen the long-term far-reaching consequences inherent in the 
application of fast-breeder technology. Demonstrators attempted protest activity at 
Kalkar, though by this time local police forces and officials were familiar with their 
modes o f operation and blocked roads heading into Kalkar, thus keeping the majority of 
protests away from the site. Though the Kalkar plant again began construction in the 
early 1980s and was completed by 1985, it never came into operation. It was only after
29 “Brokdorf Nuclear Power Plant,” E.On, Accessed September 25, 2013, http://www.eon.com/en/about- 
us/stmcture/asset-finder/brokdorf.html
30 Hatch, Politics and Nuclear Power, 81.
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Chernobyl in 1986 that Social Democrat government on North Rhine-Westphalia refused 
to license the reactor into operation. In fact, a Dutch developer bought the land and the 
defunct reactor and turned them into an amusement park, complete with swing ride inside 
the nuclear cooling tower.
So, by 1979 and Three Mile Island, a vibrant anti-nuclear movement was already 
well established in Germany. From this early protest activity three major trends emerge in 
relation to the efficacy of public opinion in Germany. First, support and protest for 
nuclear reactor expansion was often split, and though polls may suggest that most people 
in a region did not support new reactors in their villages, there was always a faction of 
people who did support the reactor, whether it was blue-collar workers who anticipated 
employment or officials who anticipated tax dollars, industry and utility company- 
provided perks. Figure 8, taken from data from Christian Joppke’s 1993 study of anti- 





Figure 8: Support for and Opposition to New Nuclear Reactors in Germany, 1976- A ugust 1986.
This polling information demonstrates that many Germans did, in fact, support 
nuclear reactors, a fact that may not be apparent when only observing protest activity. 
Secondly, it demonstrates that the most significant moment of change in public support 
happened in 1986, not 1979, following Chernobyl rather than Three Mile Island.
Second, the evolution of the anti-nuclear protests from non-violent at Whyl to 
violent thereafter had both positive and negative effects on the movement itself. It is 
unclear to what extent the anti-nuclear movement would have gained such national 
attention without having gone to such extreme measures, for it was only after Wyhl and, 
to a greater extent, Brokdorf that the movement gained national notoriety and increased 
support. On the other hand, the escalation of the violent protests also brought negative 
attention, as the trials from Grondhe and the movement itself was increasingly associated 













Meinhof (Red Army Faction or RAF) attacks happening across Western Germany in late 
1977 and the resulting “German Autumn” during which labor union representatives were 
kidnapped and murdered. The result was that the anti-nuclear movement fractured in the 
1980s, as various parties and groups chose to promote the anti-nuclear cause in varying 
ways through different outlets.
Lastly, it is clear that by 1979 and Three Mile Island, the damage to the nuclear 
industry had already been done. An industry which had previously been unrestrained 
found itself engaging in costly skirmished with local populations and governments, often 
with delays in construction that increased the overall prices of construction. No new 
construction licenses were issues for nuclear power plants in Germany between 1977 and 
July of 1982, during which time a moratorium was placed on licensing new reactors until 
the approval process could be streamlined and made more efficient and less costly. Thus 
no new nuclear construction began in Germany between 1978 and 1981.31 Immediately 
following the end of the moratorium in 1982, however, three new “convoy” permits were 
issued for construction. The nuclear industry, federal government and state governments 
had worked together to revamp the license process, limiting public input unit the late 
stages o f licensing (when the plants were nearing completion). The new process also 
implemented “standard reactor designs” that could be approved as a group in convoys 
rather than individually.32
This demonstrates a rupture in nuclear energy pursuance between 1975 and 1980: 
almost all projects begun before that time were completed, in most cases after long and 
costly struggles; but only three projects would be started and fought through afterward.
31 Felix Kolb, Protest and Opportunities: The Political Outcomes o f  Social Movements, (Berlin: Campus 
Verlag, 2007), 250.
32 Joppke , Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 164.
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Three Mile Island was a contained event: there was little damage to the surrounding 
environment and no one died. Those in Germany who were already anti-nuclear remained 
so after Three Mile Island, but the event had little effect on German public opinion 
overall or on nuclear pursuance. Other external factors, such as increased oil prices 
throughout the 1970s as a result of the global oil shocks, also played a role in positively 
determining people’s reactions toward nuclear energy, and certainly influenced energy 
policy at the time. Perhaps even more important, Three Mile Island happened far from 
Germany in the US, though the reactor explosion at Chernobyl would be a different story 
altogether.
The Early 1980s and Chernobyl
The early 1980s in Germany brought a decrease in anti-nuclear protests, perhaps 
due to the decrease in new reactor licenses issued during the time, but also because o f the 
anti-violence related backlash of the earlier protests from which the movement was still 
recovering. There were fewer than five protests reported from 1982-1985, with an 
increase to ten protests in early 1986. The increase from 1984-early 1986 is the result of 
reactions to a nuclear processing plant proposed in Wackersdorf, Bavaria, which attracted 
national attention and 80,000 participants less than a month before the explosion at
Chernobyl. However, in 1986, the number o f protests more than quadrupled to
"1
approximately fifty protests nation-wide. The previous figure also demonstrates that 
approval for new reactors dropped significantly from 50 percent o f respondents to 30 
percent and then even further to 15 percent, while negative responses to new reactors 
increased from 45 percent to 70 percent to 80 percent.
33 Koopmans and Duyvendak, “The Political Construction o f  the N uclear Energy Issue and its Im pact on
the Mobilization o f  Anti-Nuclear Movements in W estern Europe,” 240.
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In this way, the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl created a negative “shock” during 
which public support for nuclear energy decreased dramatically. This reaction is 
understandable, as the German (and European population in general) dealt with fears 
about spreading radiation clouds, radiation-contaminated rain, and ground water 
pollution. Compared to Three Mile Island, the Chernobyl incident resulted in two 
immediate casualties of plant workers and the deaths o f twenty-eight other workers from 
radiation exposure in the next few months. Chernobyl’s impact was not only more 
significant in scale, but the threat was closer and more immediate than in the case of 
Three Mile Island. Immediately following this shock, however, protest frequency 
returned to pre-1986 levels, from a high of 50 protests in 1986 to 15 protests in 1987, to 
10 protests in 1988, and eventually back to 0-2 protests in 1990.34 Even though public 
opinion may not have quickly recovered from Chernobyl, protest activity decreased 
quickly following the incident.
What did affect did shifts in public opinion resulting from Chernobyl have on the 
practical pursuance of nuclear energy in Germany at the time? As the reactors built in the 
1970s and early 1980s became operable and started generating electricity, there was a 
general increase in the nuclear share o f electrical energy during the 1980s to peak in 
1990, demonstrated here in Figure 9:
34 Koopmans and Duyvendak, “The Political Construction o f  the N uclear Energy Issue and its Im pact on
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Figure 9: German Nuclear Generation in Terawatt H ours, 1970-2010.35
However, no new construction projects for new reactors have occurred in West 
Germany since the 1982 convoy licenses. Though Chernobyl did have a negative effect 
on public opinion and temporarily increased protest activity, there is no clear relationship 
between public opinion and nuclear policy implementation throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. The 1970s saw intense and violent public reactions to nuclear energy, significant 
enough to halt the licensing o f new reactors, but this was only a stop-gap measure until 
the industry, federal and state governments could agree on changes in the licensing 
process to actually make it easier to approve reactors with less public input. The 1980s 
and Chernobyl brought about similar negative reactions, and while it is true that no new 
reactors were constructed after 1982, there are numerous other intervening variables that 
could explain the nuclear slow-down besides, or in addition to, public opinion.
For one, oil prices had stabilized in the 1980s following the shocks of the 1970s, 
and nuclear was becoming a less cost-effective option compared to the new wash of
35 Data compiled by author from BP Annual Statistical Review o f  W orld Energy, 2013.
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cheap oil and gas. Domestic coal prices had also risen and government interest and 
subsidies began shifting to the coal industry. The neo-liberal economic policies o f the late 
1980s also encouraged the privatization of utility companies with the result o f a price 
increase in electricity as energy was opened up to market policies. Utility companies 
were less willing to accept the risk of building a new reactor, especially considering the 
capital required up-front, even though the reactors were relatively cheap to run once built. 
But other contradictory forces were at work as well in Germany, namely, a new concern 
over carbon emissions and environmental health. Since nuclear was known to be a low- 
carbon emission energy source, it remained a viable option in energy policy. 1991 also 
happens to be the time o f the first market creation and introduction o f the Electricity 
Policy Feed-In Act, which regulated the purchase and price of electricity generated by 
hydropower, wind energy, solar energy, and biomass/other gases.36 This act was meant to 
encourage the development of a national base for renewable energies, with the promise of 
connection to the grid and a Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff.
The 1980s and early 1990s brought a time of indecision over nuclear energy. On 
one hand, other sources were becoming cheaper and the initial excitement over nuclear 
technology was beginning to wane. Accordingly, there were fewer applications for 
reactors in the mid-to-late 1980s than in the 1970s. On the other, nuclear energy still 
provided a clean source of energy, and what would eventually count for over a quarter of 
Germany’s electricity. Though it seemed the nuclear industry survived Chernobyl to 
some extent, at least to continue operation of existing reactors, the 1990s would not be 
kind to the nuclear energy industry in Germany as the first Green party win signaled a
36 “30 Years o f  Policies for Wind Energy: Lessons from 12 Markets,” International Renewable Energy 
Agency, 2012, 68.
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policy-based move away from nuclear. Before examining the reactions to Fukushima, it 
is important to examine the 1990s and 2000s and the back and forth policy movement on 
nuclear that happened in the interim between Chernobyl and Fukushima, mainly to 
demonstrate the importance that political parties and electoral systems play in the nuclear 
question in Germany.
The 1990s and the Rise o f  the Der Griinen Partei
Every reactor that would come online in Germany had already done so by 1990. 
The last finished and approved reactor, Neckarwestheim, began operation in 1989. Figure 
10 demonstrates the trends of reactor operation:
I
Figure 10: Number o f Reactors in Operation in G erm any, 1960-2011.37
37 Data compiled by author from German Energy Agency DENA
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Since 1990, the number of reactors in operation in Germany has steadily 
decreased due to a variety of reasons. Several plants that opened in the 1960s closed in 
the 1980s on schedule, but were replaced with other power generating stations that came 
online in the same decade. In 1988, two reactors, Miilheim-Karlich and Hamm-Uentrop, 
were closed after inspections revealed structural unsoundness and utility companies 
determined the cost of correcting these were too high. During the period of German 
reunification in 1990, several East German nuclear stations were closed due to concerns 
about inadequate Soviet designs and safety standards. The Wiirgassen reactor closed in 
199438, followed by two other reactors in 2003 and 200539, but no other reactors would 
close in Germany until 2011 after Fukushima. These trends reveal that the heyday of 
nuclear pursuance in terms of building a greater reactor capacity peaked in the 1980s and 
then steadily decreased throughout the 1990s. This is partly due to the scheduled closures 
of old reactors brought online in the 1960s, but also to the wave of Eastern German 
closures as a result of reunification. Fewer and fewer reactors were replacing those that 
closed in the 1990s, a trend that was compounded by anti-nuclear policy in the late 
1990s.
The German Green Party, or Der Griinen, grew out o f the anti-nuclear movement 
of the 1970s and was formally founded in 1980 to give the movement political and 
parliamentary representation. In addition to anti-nuclear goals, the party also supports 
anti-pollution laws, environmental protection, reproduction and immigration rights, and 
were strongly against NATO efforts to place Cold War weapons systems in Western
38 Though the utility operating company PreussenElektra cites economic reasons as the cause for the 




Germany in the 1980s. Though the Greens had some success in state-level elections and 
received large enough percentages o f votes to gain seats in the lower house of Parliament, 
they would not enter the Federal Parliament until 1998, when they formed a Red/Green 
coalition with the Social Democrats led by Gerard Schroder, an alignment that would last 
for seven years until 2005. Once in Parliament, however, the Green Party’s anti-nuclear 
agenda was challenged by the SDP, and negotiations between the Green-led 
environmental ministry and the power companies dragged on for a year before a 
compromise was reached to shut down all of Germany’s nuclear reactors by 2020.40 
Though the nuclear phase-out was a policy gain for the Greens, this was hardly what anti- 
nuclear activists who had supported the party had envisioned after three decades of 
protest. Many left the party in frustration, arguing that the compromise was weak and left 
the door open for Conservatives to repeal it, which they formally did in 2010. Table 2 
illustrates these voting trends:
40 Paul Hockenos, “Red-Green Germany: Joschka Fischer on the hurly-burly o f the Red-Green Years,” 
German Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed October 10, 2013. https://ip-ioumal.dgap.org/en/ip- 
ioumal/topics/red-green-germanv.
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Table 2: Percentage o f Votes for German Green Party, 1980-2009.41
Even if  it can be concluded that anti-nuclear opinion grew in the 1980s and 1990s 
(though not necessarily that it became the majority opinion) the effects o f that opinion on 
policy are still debatable. The anti-nuclear agenda of the Greens only received real policy 
attention when they joined a Parliamentarian coalition, and even then the SPD left the 
Green-led environmental ministry to fight its own battle with the utility companies 
operating the nuclear power plants. Even when they were able to pass policy to phase-out 
nuclear energy, it was a gradual phase-out over the course of decades and had little 
staying power in the event o f an election loss to the Christian Democrats. Only two
41 Paul Hockenos, “Red-Green Germany: Joschka Fischer on the hurly-burly o f  the Red-Green Years,” 
German Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed October 10, 2013. https://ip-ioumal.dgap.org/en/in- 
ioumal/topics/red-green-germanv.
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reactors closed between 1998 and 2005, and this was not a result o f policy but of 
economic reasons related to flaws in reactor designs. Accordingly, as these reactors 
closed in the 1990s and 2000s and no new reactors came online to replace them, nuclear 
energy’s overall percentage share decreased. The relationship between this decrease and 
negative public opinion, however, is weak. Old reactors closed because they were 
scheduled to close or because it was not an economically sound decision to repair design 
flaws or damages to infrastructure. New reactors were not constructed because other 
energy sources were cheaper, and with the policy-phase out passed in the late 1990s, 
utility companies were not looking to invest.
The strongest case that can be made about a correlation between public opinion 
and nuclear pursuance concerns cost. In the case of the US, analysis reveals that public 
protest against nuclear construction was successful when citizens could persuade states to 
intervene on their behalf (which also worked in the case o f Wyhl) and when citizens 
could pose enough of a roadblock with delays, requests for additional environmental 
reports, unfavorable media coverage, etc, to make the project too expensive to continue. 
This also seems to be the case in Germany, where the capital required for construction 
was similarly high. Reactors license applications were numerous throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, but would decrease in the 1980s as the costs o f nuclear construction increased 
and the cost o f coal and gas decreased.
Angela Merkel, the CDU, and Fukushima
In the early 2000s, several events coalesced that would ultimately effect the 
Christian Democratic Union’s nuclear policies after they regained the Parliamentary 
majority in the 2005 elections. First, in 2002, Germany signed and ratified the Kyoto
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Protocol, which committed it to reducing emissions from greenhouse gases. Angela 
Merkel, who would later become Chancellor, aided in negotiation terms of the Protocol 
as Minister for the Environment and Nuclear Safety. This predicated a move away from 
using coal, Germany’s largest domestic energy resource but also dirtiest form of energy, 
and a move toward more renewable energy and nuclear, which produces less harmful 
emissions than other non-renewable sources. However, a move away from coal also 
signaled a move toward more natural gas, the largest supplier of which to the European 
market was Russia. Fearing high gas prices, both in real terms and in political terms, 
nuclear began its comeback through CDU policy in the late 2000s.
In 2007, Chancellor Merkel began laying the foundation for nuclear’s return at an 
energy summit in Berlin where, despite criticism from industry, she insisted Germany 
stick closely to its ambitious clean energy goals. Among the options she presented for 
reaching these goals, one was extending the lives o f existing nuclear reactors beyond the 
2020 deadline set by the Green/SPD coalition. In 2010, this reactor extension was made 
policy when Merkel announced the existing reactors would continue operating into the 
2030s, an average life extension of 14 years for older reactors. Around this same time, it 
seemed Germans were somewhat split on the issue of the nuclear extension as a way to 
pursue clean energy. In 2007, a TMS Enmid poll found that 48 percent of Germans 
polled favored nuclear energy, compared to 43 percent of Germans who did not, a slim 
majority. Additionally, the same poll found that 48 percent of Germans polled thought 
the lives of existing reactors should be extended while 44 percent opposed this move.42 
Germans were split, but it seemed there was still substantial support for continuing
42 “Emnid Survey: Majority for Further Use o f  Nuclear Power,” German Atomic Forum, June 27, 2006, 
Accessed October 20 ,2013 .http://www.kemenergie.de/kemenergieen/press/Dressemitteilungen/2007/2007- 
06-27 emnid umfrage.php.
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nuclear energy with the existing reactors well into the late 2000s. This would all change 
in 2011.
In February of 2011, five federal German states, lead by opposition parties, filed a 
lawsuit against the extension in Germany’s federal court. The lawsuits would not have to 
wait to go to court, however, when the Fukushima explosion on March 11 o f 2011 
prompted the government to shut down its seven oldest nuclear reactors, declare a 
moratorium on the nuclear extension plan, and launch a safety probe into the other 
German reactors still in operation. Immediately following Fukushima, German citizens 
congregated in Berlin and other major cities to protest nuclear power and the reactor 
extension, and activists formed a 27-mile chain around the Neckarwestheim power plant. 
In the largest anti-nuclear demonstration in German history, people gathered across 
Germany to protest under the slogan “Fukushima Reminds: Shut O ff All Nuclear Plants.” 
Polling at the time reflected a growing anti-nuclear sentiment as well. In early 2011, a 
Globescan survey found that opposition to building new nuclear reactors in Germany had 
grown from 73 percent to 90 percent.43
Initially, it seemed the Merkel government was unclear in how to respond to the 
Fukushima disaster. The event had breathed new life into the pre-existing anti-nuclear 
movement that was fighting the nuclear extension plans o f the previous year. It had also 
galvanized much of the remaining half o f German citizens who seemed divided on 
nuclear energy into a solid anti-nuclear stance. But German nuclear pursuance had 
survived public criticism before—throughout the 1970s and 1980s, even post- 
Chemobyl— and Merkel’s CDU had won a majority in 2005 running on a pro-nuclear




reactor extension platform. Immediately announcing a nuclear shut-down, however, 
would bring its own problems, as Merkel’s government well knew, among these, finding 
other energy sources to compensate for nuclear’s generation share, increased energy 
dependence on neighbors, and unavoidable lawsuits from the utility operators such as 
Swedish-owned Vattenfall demanding compensation for early shutdowns of their 
facilities. The 3-month moratorium was only ever a temporary measure, but it was never 
clear immediately following Fukushima that a nuclear phase-out was inevitable.
The deciding blow to Merkel’s nuclear pursuance policy was a historic CDU loss 
on March 27 in Baden-Wiirttemberg, a state that had been a stronghold for the party for 
58 years, to the Green Party. The Greens won 24.2 percent of the vote in that election, 
and the SPD 23.1 percent of the vote, thus giving their coalition 47.3 percent majority 
over the CDU/FDP’s 44.3 percent and securing the Green Party a state premier spot for 
the first time.44 On the same day in the state o f Rhineland-Palatinate, the election results 
were similar as the Greens managed to attract 15.4 percent of the vote whereas in the 
previous election they failed to even break the 5 percent threshold for representation. It 
became clear that voters considered the moratorium a weak response to the Fukushima 
disaster: a Forsa poll reported that 71 percent o f Germans surveyed considered the 
moratorium a measure implemented for pure election engineering.45 The same poll found 
that a majority o f CDU supporters also found the abrupt nuclear policy shift unacceptable 
and considered Merkel “untrustworthy.”46
44 “CDU Suffers Historic Loss in Baden-Wurttemberg,” The Local, March 28,2011, Accessed 4 October 
2013, http://www.thelocal.de/politics/20110327-34003.html.





At the end of the three month moratorium, in May o f 2011, the German 
government announced plans to shut down all o f the nuclear reactors in the country by 
2022 and expand the use o f renewable resources to compensate for the energy lost from 
nuclear. The disaster at Fukushima pushed a policy of nuclear abandonment that neither 
Chernobyl nor Three Mile Island had been able to. In questioning this line o f causality, 
however, we have to wonder if  it was a governmental response to the disaster itself—that 
is, the German government genuinely felt Fukushima had effectively demonstrated 
nuclear energy was unsafe—or if the nuclear turn-around was a response to the turning 
tide of public opinion that nuclear energy was unsafe? Would Merkel’s CDU and the rest 
o f the government have chosen the same anti-nuclear path had the shift in public opinion 
not carried real electoral consequences? It is difficult to say with certainty, especially 
considering Merkel’s past position as a minister for nuclear safety.
There are multiple ways to analyze the relationship between public opinion, 
nuclear disasters and nuclear pursuance in Germany. First, it is clear that Three Mile 
Island had little effect on either public opinion or nuclear pursuance. There was already 
an anti-nuclear movement in Germany underway, and this nuclear incident in the United 
States was relatively small. Those who did not support nuclear energy continued to not 
do so, but polling revels the effects on population in general were negligible. By 1979 
there were multiple reactors already in operation and more were being built. Chernobyl 
increased both protest intensity in the months following the explosion in former-USSR 
Ukraine as well as increased German resistance to building new reactors, though slim 
majorities o f the population continued to support using the reactors already in existence. 
To a small extent, there seems to be a correlation between opinion and pursuance—
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support for and continued operation o f existing reactors, but opposition to and reticence 
to build new reactors after Chernobyl. However, when considering other externalities, a 
clear correlation between nuclear pursuance and public opinion is impossible as a variety 
o f other variables could also explains a decline in new reactor applications— cheap oil, 
expensive coal, market privatization, etc.
The first actual policy shift in nuclear energy did not come until the late 1990s. If 
it can be assumed that the voting behavior is a tangible outcome o f public opinion, then 
this election signals the first practical impact o f growing anti-nuclear sentiment for the 
anti-nuclear Green Party. Still, it is unclear whether this policy shift reflected an opinion 
majority as the shares won by the Greens were relatively small, and even members o f the 
Green Party felt the 2020 phase-out was a weak compromise. Eventually, even this 
decision was overturned by the Merkel-led CDU because extending the lives o f existing 
reactors satisfied other demands on German energy and environmental goals. Real 
change to nuclear energy policy did not happen until 2011 after Fukushima when nuclear 
support clearly plummeted in Germany. It still remains unclear, however, whether the 
same nuclear phase-out would have happened had the Green Party been unable to 
capitalize and ultimately squeeze an electoral win from the nuclear frenzy. Also unclear 
is to what extent the decision to phase out nuclear energy was in response to actual fears 
about nuclear safety or public opinion in general. Polling shows that most Germans 
believe the decision to be a carefully calculated political move on the part o f Merkel and 
the CDU in response to a Green Party win in a CDU state stronghold and fears o f larger 
Green wins throughout Germany. Though a case can be made for a correlation between
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public opinion and nuclear policy after Fukushima, the case is still somewhat weak, as 
distinct lines o f causality difficult to distinguish.
Access to Other Resources
Whereas the previous section sought to determine to what degree public and 
nuclear disasters influence pursuance of nuclear energy, this section will examine supply 
of other electricity-producing resources with the hypothesis that the greater the 
percentage of overall energy consumption that comes from other electricity-producing 
resources, particularly coal and gas, the less a country will pursue nuclear energy. In 
concurrence with the previous hypotheses tested in the US, the hypotheses to be tested in 
this section are that the greater extent that coal makes up an overall energy supply, the 
less likely a country will be to pursue nuclear; likewise, the greater the supply of natural 
gas, the less likely a country will be to pursue nuclear. In the case o f Germany, petroleum 
makes up such a small percentage of electricity production that it will not be considered 
here.
The most recent data on Germany’s electrical energy mix reveals that, in 2011, 
Germany’s main energy resource was coal, which alone accounted for 43.5 percent of 
German electrical production in 2011; Renewable sources (including biomass, solar, 
wind, hydropower and domestic waste) made up 19.9 percent; nuclear, 18 percent; and 
natural gas, 13.7 percent. In terms of domestic energy resources, Germany has the second 
largest coal reserves in Europe and Eurasia, second only to Russia.47 Germany’s natural 
gas reserves are trapped in shale, and they have no naturally occurring oil reserves, but it 
does produce far more energy from biofuels than any other Eurasian country and
47 “BP Statistical Review o f  World Energy, June 2103,” British Petroleum, Accessed November 2, 2013, 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistieal-review/statistical review of world energy 2013.pdf.
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produces 12 percent of all wind and 35.8 percent of all solar energy generated in the 
world.48
These numbers reveal interesting trends in German energy. First, that it relies 
heavily on coal for electricity, yet since the early 1980s, it imports most o f its coal, a 
move rationalized by the US coal market’s consistently cheaper price than that of 
European coal markets.49 Second, almost ironically, that in addition to using the least 
“clean” energy source, Germany leads Europe in clean, renewable energy production 
through the solar, wind, and biofuel industries. Perhaps one reason Germany felt more 
confident phasing out nuclear is because of this previously well-established foothold in 
renewable energy, greater than any other regional country, to be sure. The problem of 
dirty coal consumption, however, remains.
German coal exports decreased in the 1990s. In 2013, however, German coal 
began to make a comeback in the wake of the turn from nuclear. First, German electricity 
exports actually increased in the first quarter o f 2013, an event explainable only by 
increased production from coal-fired plants.50 Second, two of the largest German utility 
companies, RWE AG and EON SE both reported increased coal imports o f up to 25 
percent in the same quarter.51 By this token, Germany is both importing more coal to 
create energy, and then exporting the energy created by the imported coal. O f course, the 
government has faced harsh criticism for this choice that will produce more greenhouse
48 Ibid.
49 “BP Statistical Review o f World Energy, June 2103,” British Petroleum, Accessed November 2, 2013, 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bD/pdf/statistical-review/statistical review o f world energy 2013.pdf.
50 Paul Hockenos, “German Export o f  Coal Power Way Up,” German Council on Foreign Relations,
August 21, 2013, Accessed October 1, 2013, https://ip-ioumal.dgap.org/en/blog/going-renewable/german- 
export-coal-power-wav.
51 Stefan Nicola, “Merkel’s Green Shift Backfires as German Pollution Jumps,” Businessweek, July 29, 
2013, Accessed October 30,2013, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-Q7-28/merkel-s-green-shift- 
backfires-as-german-pollution-iumps-energy.
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gas emissions than in previous years, especially considering she is a former 
environmental minister who helped negotiate the carbon emission standards o f the Kyoto 
Protocol.
This section hypothesized that the greater extent coal made up overall energy 
consumption, the less likely a country would be to pursue nuclear energy. Coal 
consumption decreased in the 1980s and 1990s as the reactors built in the 1970s came 
online in the 1980s, though the decrease in coal consumption would level off in the early 
1990s until the recent increase in 2013. Though coal consumption decreased, it still 
consistently made up the majority of energy production in Germany from the 1990s until 
present time. Both natural gas and nuclear consumption increased in the same time 
periods, accounting for the decreased coal consumption. Similarly, as nuclear production 
began decreasing in 2011 and will continue to decrease indefinitely, coal production and 
imports have both increased. Germany has natural gas reserves of its own, but the gas is 
trapped in shale and the state has currently placed a moratorium on developing the shale 
fracturing technologies needed to extract the resources. Germany has, however, been 
linked to plentiful Russian gas by the Nord-Stream Pipeline, which moves gas from 
Vyborg in Russia to Griefswald in Germany, since 2011 when 60 percent o f its gas 
imports came from Russia.52
When Germany announced in May of 2011 that it would shut down all o f its 
nuclear reactors by 2022, there was much speculation as to how it would make up the 
roughly 20 percent share of electricity that nuclear power provided. There were 
predictions that Germany would resort to importing nuclear energy from France, a move
52 “Germany Marches East, Russia Moves West: Energy Diplomacy,” Natural Gas Europe, March 13, 
2012, Accessed November 3, 2013, http://www.naturalgaseurope.coin/germanv-russia-energv-diplomacv.
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that would not only seem hypocritical but would also increase their energy reliance on 
their neighbors. Others spoke of energy blackouts and brownouts from unreliable 
renewable energy supplies. So far, neither of these scenarios has been realized, and in the 
cold winter o f February 2012, Germany actually exported energy to France when heating 
energy ran low. Granted, this energy came from a coal-fired plant, a sticking-point that 
has not gone unnoticed as running counter to Germany’s clean energy goals and Kyoto 
Protocol obligations. Normative judgments aside, the nuclear turn-around announcement 
came as a surprise to many, though considering Germany’s numerous energy options, it 
should not have.
First, Germany has long lead Europe in renewable energy technologies. In 2011, 
renewable energy sources accounted for roughly equal amounts o f energy production as 
nuclear. O f course, there is little practicality in the assumption that Germany could turn 
off all of its nuclear reactors tomorrow and immediately substitute that loss with 
renewable sources. The grid system has to be converted to become compatible with 
renewable feed-ins, and all renewable sources have to be expanded to compensate for the 
nuclear gap. However, if government funding were to move from nuclear technology to 
renewable technology, this expansion could be possible. The decision to move away from 
nuclear had to have been influenced by the knowledge that renewables were already 
viable in Germany and that expansion was an option. In fact, in 2010, Germany amended 
its Atomic Energy Act to align with an “energy concept” where nuclear power would 
serve a “bridging function” until the infrastructure for renewable technologies were in
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place.53 While this amendment did not set a specific time-line for the nuclear phase out, it 
does indicate that moving away from nuclear energy toward renewable sources was a 
well-established part o f the Germany’ future energy plan as early as 2010.
Second, though it runs counter to clean energy goals, the increased use o f  coal is 
also a viable nuclear substitution option for Germany. Coal is Germany’s biggest 
domestic resource, and even if it continues to import coal, those imports will consistently 
be priced cheaply. A consequence of increased American gas production and 
consumption has been low coal prices and increased exports to European markets. Even 
if coal is only a temporary solution to a long-term problem, it can buy Germany time to 
expand the renewable sector without increasing the price of energy to consumers.
In addition to coal, natural gas is also a viable option, and not just in the short­
term. The Nord-Stream Pipeline was criticized for many for increasing German 
dependence on Russian gas. As do many Eastern European countries, Germany is almost 
solely reliant on Russian gas exports to make up its natural gas needs. This does not 
necessarily have to be a problem, though. While Germany is dependent on Russian gas, 
Russia is also dependent on the German gas market and the revenue it will bring. Rather 
than see this relations as one of dependence, it can be viewed as an interdependent 
relationship which may create cooperation rather than conflict. Moreover, Russia is not 
the only gas supplier in the market. In June of 2013, German EON announced that it 
would begin tapering its dependence on Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas company, 
and instead develop ties to the Canadian company Pieridae Energy. Pieridae says it will 
build Canada’s first Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) export terminal in Nova Scotia by 2020
53 “Countries’ Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident,” 
United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate. March 2014.
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now that they have secured reliable shipping client in Europe. Similar developments are 
also happening the US, as the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission continues to 
approve ports across the US and Mexico for shipments of LNG. Even if dependence on 
Russian gas becomes problematic, the price o f gas will remain stable with the presence of 
multiple suppliers and as Canada and the US continue developing the infrastructure to 
ship to a European market, gas consumers have supply options. Since natural gas is 
cleaner than coal, it may also present a long-term option for German energy in addition to 
renewable expansion.
Chapter Conclusions
As is the case in the US, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions as the genuine 
relationship between public opinion and nuclear pursuance. The moratorium on nuclear 
licensing from 1979-1982 to create a system where public input was less valued in the 
licensing process seems to point to a lack of concern on the part of government and the 
industry. Green Party electoral gains could also be interpreted as an indicator o f public 
opinion efficacy, but their overall electoral percentages remained quite low in comparison 
to other parties. Reactor approval and construction continued throughout the 1970s and 
even into the 1980 until the last reactor came online in 1989 though, granted, reactor 
approvals slowed significantly in the 1980s. This slowing could be a result of anti-nuclear 
opinion (though it still difficult to determine that anti-nuclear opinion was the majority 
opinion of the time) but could also be linked to other factors such as low coal and oil 
prices, rising capital costs, and the privatization of energy markets. Ultimately, it is 
impossible to draw clear lines of causality between public opinion and nuclear pursuance 
in Germany, at least until 2011 and Fukushima.
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Though Three Mile Island had little effect on public opinion or nuclear pursuance 
in Germany, Chernobyl did cause a clear shift in opinion that lasted into the 1990s and 
contributed significantly to the growing popularity of the Green Party, which was able to 
form a Parliamentarian coalition in 1998 and make real moves toward anti-nuclear 
policy. The policy was weak, however, and was eventually overturned. Anti-nuclear 
protest movements are most successful when states or municipalities become involved on 
behalf o f citizens. Though organizations cannot be involved in the official public input 
mechanism, the decentralized nature o f the German state-based licensing approval 
process makes it possible for cities or states to refuse to grant site licenses for reactors. It 
is still unclear, however, what specifically motivates these actors to do so. At times, cities 
are swayed by the promise o f industry, employment, and utility company perks; other 
times, the state may own part o f the utility company and have a vested interest in 
licensing approval (though this does not happen now since the privatization of the 
market). But sometimes, as was the case with the Wyhl plant, Administrative Courts can 
intervene to deny construction permits. This makes the Germany system fundamentally 
different from the federally centralized NRC approval system, and creates conditions in 
which intervention to stop reactor construction may be easier.
The only clear relationship between public opinion and nuclear pursuance 
involves cost. Reactors are expensive to initially build, and if citizen groups can make the 
process longer by creating roadblocks like physical confrontation, media coverage, 
damage to facilities, etc., then utility companies are less likely to finish reactor 
construction or apply to construct new reactors.
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Fukushima does seem to present a turning point in German energy policy, more 
so than any other event that preceded it. Similar nuclear phase out policies have been 
passed and have failed before, but they were conceived by a weak coalition that was 
replaced shortly after the policy shift. We currently lack the hindsight to know if  the 
current nuclear phase out policy will stick, but the current Merkel government plan will 
remain policy at least for the foreseeable future, considering the recent German federal 
elections in September 2013 that solidly returned a CDU majority. At this point, 
Germany has also created such a strong, normative narrative around moving away from 
nuclear energy that returning to nuclear would be seen as a weak political move. The 
question of why Fukushima was different from Chernobyl has to be asked and answered, 
especially considering Chernobyl was so geographically close to Germany and 
Fukushima happened on the other side o f the world.
Part of the explanation for the impact o f Fukushima can be found with an already 
weakened nuclear energy sector. The mid-1980s was the peak operating time for nuclear 
reactors in Germany. In 2011, however, the circumstances surrounding nuclear were 
much different. In 2010, the Merkel government passed legislation that allowed for a 14 
year life extension o f existing reactors. Barring another life extension, those reactors 
would be only be safe for operation for another thirty years, meaning they would be 
scheduled for decommission beginning in 2040. Without new reactors to replace the 
aging ones (and a new reactors has not been approved in Germany since 1982) nuclear 
energy was never really a long, long-term energy option. The same legislation also 
increased energy company payments to fund renewable energy technology. By
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Fukushima in 2011, it was clear that nuclear energy was only a stop-gap measure on the 
way to greater renewable capacity, anyway.
Other Fukushima explanatory power lies in the momentary revitalization it added 
to the anti-nuclear movement and subsequent Green Party electoral gains, especially in 
the historically CDU dominated area o f Baden-Wurttemberg. The Green party has been 
more effective at influencing nuclear policy in Germany than in the US, even with low 
representation numbers, not just because it has stronger voter support but because it 
operates in a system o f Parliamentarian proportional representation.
However, it remains unknown whether the impact of Fukushima truly had 
anything to do with genuine safety concerns. Surely this is what spurred citizens to 
disapprove of nuclear energy in record numbers, but to what extent that same concern 
was a factor influencing policy is unclear. Would the Merkel government have made the 
same decision about nuclear energy if it made up 50 percent of their electrical energy 
needs rather than just 25 percent? Or if  there was not an already established renewable 
sector? Or if the CDU had won in Baden-Wurttemberg rather than the Greens? O f course, 
these “what-ifs” are impossible to answer, but important to consider. Again, the 
relationship between the post-Fukushima nuclear phase out and public opinion is unclear.
What is clear is that German has well-established and affordable energy options, 
and this may be the most important explanatory variable for its nuclear phase out. With a 
well-established renewable sector already in operation and access to cheap coal and 
natural gas, the move away from nuclear was not as drastic as many interpreted.
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CHAPTER 5 
NUCLEAR ENERGY IN JAPAN
Objective
Following the structure o f the preceding chapters, this case study will first offer a 
brief history on the development o f nuclear energy policy in Japan before turning to an 
examination of public opinion, past disasters and access to other energy resources. 
“Nuclear energy pursuance” is again operationalized as the overall percentage nuclear 
provides to the electrical energy supply and public opinion is measured by using polling 
data from both before and after 2011. Quantitative polling data will be supplemented with 
a brief qualitative discussion of nuclear energy protest activity in Japan, which is 
supplemented by a discussion of the limitations placed on protests by traditional Japanese 
political culture. The hypothesis is that in countries where nuclear approval is low, 
nuclear pursuance will be low as well. Next, this chapter will analyze data over time that 
helps examine to what extent public opinion and nuclear energy pursuance have changed 
in response to the nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. This 
chapter will also include a discussion o f nuclear incidents in the 1990s and 2000s that 
were specific to Japan and the impact these had on public perceptions and nuclear 
pursuance. Lastly, this chapter will examine the share nuclear power currently makes up 
of total Japanese energy consumption with the hypothesis that if Japan has greater access 
to other affordable energy resources, its pursuance of nuclear will decrease. The chapter 
will end with conclusions based on these findings.
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Before the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, Japan was the second largest 
nuclear energy generating country in the world behind France. Figure 11 illustrates 
Japan’s overall electrical energy sources in 2011, before Fukushima, when nuclear still 
provided a large share of overall electricity generation with 54 reactors:
Japan's Electrical Energy Sources, 2011





■  Liquid Natural Gas 
Figure 11: Japan's Electrical Energy Sources, 2011.'
Before March of 2011, Japan had a varied mix o f electrical energy sources, 
depending on no one source for more than 30 percent o f its energy needs. Coal, liquid 
natural gas (LNG), and nuclear each made up roughly 25 percent o f the electrical energy 
needs (though some estimates place nuclear with a 30 percent share in 2011) with oil, 
hydroelectric and other renewables such as solar, wind and biomass comprising around 
18 percent combined. When the Japanese government shut down the majority o f the
1 Data compiled by author from Japan Profile, US Energy Information Administration.
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country’s nuclear energy generating plants after the Fukushima disaster in 2011, 
nuclear’s percent share generation was primarily compensated for with LNG and oil. 
Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) reports that in 2012, LNG and 
oil’s shares rose to 48 percent and 16 percent, respectively, as nuclear’s power share fell 
to 2 percent. Japan’s coal consumption only increased from 25 percent to roughly 28 
percent. By May of 2012, Japan had no nuclear generation for the first time in over 40 
years, though current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s plan for economic recovery includes 
reintroducing nuclear energy to meet at least 15 percent o f generating capacity over the 
next decade. Japan is extremely resource poor, importing 80 percent o f its primary energy 
requirements. Before Fukushima, the target was to increase nuclear generation from 30 
percent to 41 percent by 2017 and 50 percent by 2030 with the construction o f additional 
reactors.
Development o f  Early Energy Policy in Japan
Japan has been impacted by nuclear technology more than any other country in 
the world. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 that ended World 
War II and obliterated these two cities set Japan on a staunch course o f nuclear arms non­
proliferation coupled with a desire to use nuclear technology for peaceful energy- 
generating purposes. A decade after these bombings, Japan would pass the first piece of 
legislation that would eventually make it one of the biggest consumers o f nuclear energy 
in the world, an act which perhaps signifies remarkable tolerance o f nuclear disasters. 
With few natural resources o f its own and import dependence coming at both real and
2 “Country Profile: Japan,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated October 29, 2013, Accessed  
December 13, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=JA.
3 Toshihiko Nakata. “Nuclear Energy Development in Japan,” Nuclear Energy Developm ent in Asia: 
Problems and Prospects, Ed Xu Yi-Chong, (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2011), 98.
120
security-related costs, Japan’s plan for rebuilding and recovery after WWII was built 
around using nuclear power for peaceful energy.
Japanese nuclear energy policy began, ironically enough, with a trip to the US. 
Japanese Diet member Yasuhiro Nakasone first introduced the budget for nuclear energy 
research and development after visiting nuclear facilities in the US in 1953 and receiving 
advice from Dr. Ryokichi Sagane of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in 
California. Dr. Sagane advised Nakasone to introduce nuclear energy to Japan with a 
three-pronged approach: establish a national long-term strategy for nuclear energy; back 
up nuclear research and development (R&D) with a liberal budget and enshrine the 
energy initiative in law; encourage the nation’s top engineers and scientists to join the 
nuclear industry.4 This advice would come to shape the development o f early energy 
policy and initiatives in Japan when Nakasone, then head of the executive board members 
of the House of Representatives Budget Committee, returned to Japan and swiftly had the 
budget for nuclear R&D enacted through the Diet. Nakasone would later join the Kishi 
Cabinet as Minister of Science and Technology, and acted as the first chairman of the 
Atomic Energy Commission o f Japan in 1956, eventually rising to become Japan’s Prime 
Minister in 1982. With support from Nakasone, a member of the Liberal Democratic 
Party who would become increasingly influential in Japanese politics, nuclear energy had 
a viable start in Japan even in the midst of skepticism from a public who had not 
forgotten the dark side of nuclear technology. Even very early on, there is clearly a strong 
relationship between the LDP-controlled government and the bureaucracy machine that 
would make nuclear energy viable.
4 Nakata, “Nuclear Energy Development in Japan,” 99.
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Atomic Energy Basic Law o f 1955
In 1955, the Japanese Diet passed the Atomic Energy Basic Law, which was 
established to “contribute to enhancing the welfare of human society and improving the 
standard of living by promoting the research and development and utilization o f atomic 
energy.”5 The 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law also created the legislative bodies that 
would oversee regulation and safety standards, the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission 
and the Nuclear Safety Commission as well as the Japan Atomic Energy Research 
Institute. The law promoted a three-part mission statement for the development o f nuclear 
energy: democratic methods, independent management, and transparency.6 The first test 
reactor in Japan was commissioned in 1963, and the first commercial reactor to generate 
electricity began operating in 1966. The early nature o f reactor construction was marked 
by a unique system of horizontal integration by private utility companies which would 
purchase designs from American vendors and then contract other Japanese companies 
like Mitsubishi and Hitachi to build the reactors in Japan. Later, these same companies 
would develop the capability to design and then construct reactors themselves, and by the 
end of the 1970s, there was a thriving nuclear construction industry in Japan that supplied 
the majority of domestic nuclear construction as well as exported reactors and reactor 
designs to other East Asian countries and even the UK.7 8 Exporting nuclear energy 
technology continues to be an important part o f Japan’s economy, and one that current 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is keen to promote.
5 “Legal System for Nuclear Safety Regulation in Japan,” Japanese Ministry o f  Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology, Accessed January 15, 2014, www.M EXT.go.jp.




From 2011-2013, Japan did not export any nuclear reactors, though they will supply Turkey with one 
reactor and Vietnam has recently ordered two reactors. These will be the first reactor exports since the 
Fukushima disaster.
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Japan was one of a handful o f countries following this horizontally integrated 
business model at the time, when most publicly-owned utility companies followed a more 
vertically integrated model that allowed the same company to supply chain the reactor 
construction from start to finish. At a time when the bureaucrat-led economic model 
favored anything “made in Japan,” this system worked well in avoiding tighter 
regulations or restrictions from the regulatory bodies overseeing approval and 
construction. This further illustrates the early involvement o f the government in Japan’s 
nuclear energy development. It was very clear that a strong relationship existed not just 
between bureaucrats and regulatory bodies, but also between the government, nuclear 
construction industries and utility companies. The manufacturing industry received 
advice from the Ministry o f International Trade and Industry (MITI, which would later 
become the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry [METI] that would oversee 
nuclear energy); transportation advice from the Ministry of Transportation; financial 
advice and subsidies from the Ministry o f Finance, and so on9. This very close integration 
of governmental bodies and the nuclear industry was beneficial during the early years of 
nuclear development, but would later come to be seen as an aspect o f the industry that 
violated the pillar of Transparency set forth in the original 1955 Atomic Energy Basic 
Law.
The Oil Crises and Economic Growth
In the mid-1970s, Japan generated 66 percent o f its electricity from oil.10 Like 
many oil-consuming nations o f the world, the adverse effects of the oil embargo in 1973 
and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 caused Japan to reconsider its dependence on oil,
9 Nakata, “Nuclear Energy Development in Japan,” 99.
10 Steve Austin, “Japan Seeks Resilient Energy Policy,” Oil-Price.net. Accessed December 10, 2013, 
http://www.oil-price.net/en/articles/iapan-seeks-resilient-energy-poliev.php.
123
particularly from the Middle East. The government began taking new measures to deal 
with oil rising oil prices, such as dimming the lights on Tokyo Tower or prohibiting late 
night television shows across the country to save electricity.11 Japan also continued 
aggressively pursuing nuclear energy by approving and bringing new reactors into 
operation throughout the 1970s and 1980s, though pursuing nuclear energy was part o f 
Japan’s national development strategy well before the oil shocks o f the 1970s. From 
1970-1979, 20 reactors became operational in Japan, the majority o f which were applied 
for and approved for construction in the 1960s, well before oil prices rose in the 1970s. If 
anything, Japan continued an already aggressive nuclear policy by bringing another 15 
reactors online in the 1980s and 15 more in the 1990s.12
Japan’s reasons for this aggressive pursuance beginning in the 1960s had much to 
do with its need to industrialize quickly. Economically devastated and occupied after 
defeat in WWII, Japan was playing “catch-up” to the rest o f the modernizing world. After 
WWII, the country began a period of rapid industrialization, with growth especially 
heavy in industries like steel, chemicals and machinery, and advanced technology. This 
rapid period o f growth raised the per capita income, increased standards of living, and 
worked to reestablish Japan’s place in the international community, but it came at a high 
price. Pollution was rampant, and the first cases o f mercury poisoning surfaced in 
Minamata and Niigata in the 1950s. In Toyama prefecture, another debilitating disease 
that affects the nervous system and is associated with cadmium waste was discovered. 
The locals named it “itai-itai byo” or “it hurts-it hurts sickness”.13 Both instances are long
11 Nakata, “Nuclear Energy Development in Japan,” 100.
12 “Nuclear Reactors in Japan.” Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center. Accessed December 8, 2013. 
http://www.cnic.jp/english/data/nucreactors.html.
13 Schreurs. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany and the United States, 36.
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and sordid stories involving a corporate cover-up that was aided and abetted by 
government officials who made it possible to prolong the chemical dumping, even as the 
number of victims increased.14 It would not be until the 1970s that those affected by itai- 
itai byo would begin filing lawsuits that trickled through the court systems and even later 
in the 2000s when the Japanese government would officially acknowledge these 
industrial pollution-related poisonings and offer the victims limited monetary 
compensation.
Another primary cost of this rapid economic development was increases in 
electricity and energy use in general, a phenomenon which, for Japan, a country with 
limited natural resources, meant increased energy imports and dependence. At the peak of 
Japan’s development between 1960 and 1974, the average annual growth rate of 
electricity consumption per capita exceeded 10 percent, which was much higher than that 
o f many European and North American countries at the time.15 For this reason, 
aggressively pursuing nuclear energy after WWII became intrinsically linked to 
economic development. In addition, the government was also able to create an effective 
narrative that linked economic development to restoring national pride, an attitude which 
would persist throughout the 1970s and 1980s as Japan continued to grow, eventually 
becoming the world’s second largest economy from 1978-2010. The 1970s and 1980s 
were the decades when nuclear energy gained full “citizenship rights” to secure Japan’s 
energy supply and fuel their economic growth, but without significant input from the 
public or debate about the environmental impacts of nuclear power.16 When the demand
14Kingston, Contemporary Japan, 188.
15 Yi-Chong Xu, “Nuclear Energy in Asia: An Overview,” Nuclear Energy Development in Asia: Problems 
and Prospects, Ed Yi-Chong Xu, (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2011), 5.
16 Ibid, 100.
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for public and private electricity decreased with the economic downturn in the 1990s, so 
would the demand for new nuclear reactors.
Energy Policy o f  the 2000s
The cornerstones o f Japan’s energy efficiency policies include the Basic Act on 
Energy Policy of 2002, the New National Energy Strategy (NNES) in 2006 and the Basic 
Energy Plan (BEP) in 2010. These directives together set the general direction for Japan’s 
energy policy. They specifically identify securing stable supply, environmental 
sustainability, and the utilization of market mechanisms as key policy directions.17 A key 
point o f this energy plan is the increased attention paid to energy efficient measures in the 
commercial, resident and transport sectors. Japan also adopted a front-runner plan that set 
forth specific measures for achieving its goal of improving energy consumption 
efficiency by at least 30 percent by 2030 compared to 2003.18 Nuclear energy became a 
natural part of the strategy to pursue these energy priorities of stable supply, energy 
conservation and environmental goals.
Development o f  the “Nuclear Village”
Any discussion of nuclear energy in Japan would have to include reference to the 
“nuclear village,” or “genshiryoku-mura,” which is the term commonly used in Japan to 
refer to the institutional and individual pro-nuclear advocates who comprise the utilities, 
nuclear vendors, Japanese Diet, bureaucracy, financial sector, media and academia. This 
“village” is bound by a shared solidarity to promote nuclear energy, which it has 
successfully done since the 1950s. The village significantly overlaps with the “Iron 
Triangle” of big business, bureaucracy, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which




has been in power almost consistently since the 1950s except for brief periods between 
1993 and 1996 and 2009 and 2012. This interdependence of government, industry and 
bureaucracy created “Japan Inc.” during the period of economic growth following the 
1950s. Though the practices o f Japan Inc. are now largely discredited (primarily by the 
economic recession of the 1990s and 2000s) these same practices were the accepted 
status quo from the 1950s through the 1980s, practices that allowed nuclear energy to 
grow unfettered by variables like public opinion or environmental impacts.19
Over the years, as Japan’s nuclear energy sector grew, so did the influence o f the 
nuclear village and the benefits associated with being a member. Vested interests in 
nuclear power development ranged from construction companies to lenders and investors 
in energy firms, extending down to grant-seeking academics and even journalists. 
Though there are disagreements on policy within the nuclear community, they are the 
“squabbles o f a gated community where cooperation and reciprocity prevail.”20 While 
exclusion from the community has been the stick of cooperation, access to vast resources 
and power have been the carrots. Those who don’t support the Village consensus on the 
need for, safety, and economic logic o f nuclear power are denied access to grants and are 
passed over for promotions. Similarly, journalists who criticize nuclear power are denied 
access to press junkets or politicians seeking re-election on an anti-nuclear platform 
suddenly lack campaign contributions. Media outlets eager for a portion of the utility 
companies’ massive advertising budgets adjust their reporting accordingly. Just as 
crossing the nuclear village carries severe consequences, support for their pro-nuclear 
agenda also carries perks. The chairman of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO,
19 Jeff Kingston, “Nuclear Village” The Asia-Pacific Journal. Accessed December 15, 2013, 
http ://www. iapanfocus.org/-Jeff-Kingston/3 822.
20 Ibid.
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the utility company responsible for the operation of the Fukushima nuclear plant) first 
heard of the Fukushima crisis while in China treating favored members o f Japan’s largest 
media organization to a luxury junket.21 Though Japan Inc. is defunct, the nuclear village 
lives on as a short-hand description of a powerful interest group with a very specific 
agenda.
Regulatory Capture and the Practice o f  Amakudari
Understanding the nature of the nuclear village in Japan at least partly explains 
the phenomenon of regulatory capture that has historically been so prevalent in the 
Japanese nuclear industry. Regulatory capture is a form o f political corruption that occurs 
when a regulatory agency tasked with acting in the public interest instead advances the 
commercial or special concerns of interest groups that dominate the industry or sector the 
body is charged with regulating. The institutions created to regulate the nuclear industry 
in Japan were housed within the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), a 
sprawling organization that is responsible for promoting nuclear energy as it was deemed 
critical to Japan’s economic development. In the context of the Iron Triangle, the 
cooperative ties between the industry and the regulators were standard operating 
procedure. In short, nuclear regulators have long been regulating in the interests o f the 
regulated, meaning that policies and regulatory implementation were carried out in ways 
that supported utility interests.22 This culture o f regulatory capture nurtures practices that 
promote solidarity and group-think and marginalizes dissenting opinions.
21 Jeff Kingston, “Nuclear Village” The Asia-Pacific Journal. Accessed December 15, 2013, 
http://www.iapanfocus.org/-Jeff-Kingston/3822.
22 Mark J. Ramseyer, “Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case o f  Japan,” 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law. 13:2, (2012), 459.
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This practice is, of course, not limited only to Japan. Frank von Hippel, a nuclear 
physicist and expert on nuclear energy policy at Princeton University, said in 2011 that 
the process of regulatory capture has long been at the heart o f US nuclear energy, as first 
introduced in this study within the US case study.23 This revolving-door employment and 
regulatory capture practice is intensified in Japan through and culturally reinforced by the 
practice of amakudari (descent from heaven), in which senior government officials secure 
post-retirement, well-paying jobs at companies they previously supervised in carrying out 
their official duties.24 This conflict o f interest has long raised suspicions that officials 
exercise their oversight authority and discretionary powers with an eye toward landing a 
lucrative job at companies they regulated in an official capacity. Jeff Kingston claims that 
“amakudari is a notorious hotbed of corruption that costs taxpayers considerable sums in 
subsidies and inflated government contracts.”25
This brief history of the development o f the nuclear energy sector in Japan 
illustrates, above all, that pursuing nuclear energy has primarily been a decision made by 
the Japanese state, codified into law by the Diet, protected by bureaucracy, and enshrined 
into a national policy of greater energy independence. Since the beginning o f the Meiji 
Restoration period in 1868, the “public good” came to equal the “official good” or the 
national interest. Equating nuclear energy with economic growth and then promoting 
the two as the path to a restoration o f national pride allowed nuclear energy to develop 
relatively free o f public input. The Japanese people have historically refrained from
23 Frank von Hippel, “It Could Happen Here Too,” New York Times, March 23, 2011, Accessed December 
14, 2013, http://www.nvtimes.com/201 l/03/24/opinion/24Von-Hippel.html?pagewanted=all& r=0.
24 Kingston, Contemporary Japan, 31.
25 Ibid, 31.
26 Mindy L. Kotler and Ian T. Hillman. “Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy and Public Opinion.” The 
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University Japan Access Information Project (May 2000), 3.
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challenging authority, instead expecting Japan’s central governments and bureaucrats to 
protect and advance the national interest as a matter of course. Pursuing nuclear energy at 
all costs has been made easier by the processes o f  regulatory capture and amakudari, both 
practices working to strengthen the ties between the nuclear industry, the Nuclear and 
Industrial Safety Agency (now the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, renamed and reorganized 
and housed in the Ministry of Environment since Fukushima) and the LDP.
The oil crises of the 1970s gave full citizenship rights to nuclear energy to secure 
a reliable and affordable energy source for Japan to fuel its post-WWII period of rapid 
economic growth, though the country was already pursuing an aggressive nuclear energy 
strategy well before the 1970s. It seems the advice Dr. Ryokichi Sagane gave to Yasuhiro 
Nakasone in 1953 would prove successful, though a series of nuclear accidents in the 
1990s (resulting from lax safety standards and regulatory oversight) began to erode 
public trust and fuel public skepticism of nuclear energy. Incestuous business and 
government relationships that are openly questioned as unethical in other places in Japan 
were defended as sound and efficient governance, at least until Fukushima uncovered the 
industry’s dirty secrets to a global audience in 2011.
Public Opinion in Japan
Traditionally, public opinion has played a smaller role in policy formation in 
Japan than in other democratic societies, especially in the immediate decades after WWII, 
when many Japanese generally refrained from challenging authority. Though a post-war 
shaming era is thought to have created at least a temporary culture o f consent in 
Germany, Japan’s culture of “haji,” or shame, has its roots well before WWII. Haji 
restricts many actions including the expression of emotions, especially when those
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emotions run counter to the official line o f “what is best for the country”. People fear 
being embarrassed or being shamed in public by choosing to do something that is 
different from the mainstream and may turn out to be “wrong,” so many find comfort and 
safety in conformity as it limits their exposure to shame. Social harmony, or “wa,” is the 
societal norm, and those who disturb that harmony are punished socially. Similarly, civil 
society organizations such as non-profits have few opportunities to participate in policy-
97making at the national level. Labor restrictions and a serious shortage of funds create an 
environment where few people want to work for these types of organizations. The result 
is that most political activity, such as protests, was initially restricted to the local level 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s and even then seemed to have little impact on policy 
decisions.
Operating in tandem with this cultural emphasis on conformity and harmony was 
the long-standing belief that government officials knew what best for the country. Since 
the establishment of a modem government system in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration, the 
public good equaled the official good or national interests. Officials were to be looked up 
to with the attitude of kanson mimpi (officials honored, public despised).28 Well into the 
20th century and even after WWII, many Japanese continued to equate the national 
interest, which was based on pursuing nuclear to advance economic development, with 
the public good. O f course, this worked well for politicians, who were able to pursue their 
own agendas free from public scrutiny or criticism inherent in most democratic societies. 
However, political scandals, mismanagement and the quick resignations o f a handful of
27 Kawata Yuto, Robert Pekkanen and Tsujinaka Yutaka. “Civil Society and the Triple Disasters: Revealed 
Strengths and Weaknesses,” In Natural D isaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan. Ed Jeff Kingston, (New  
York: Routledge, 2012), 80.
2SKotler and Hillman, “Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy and Public Opinion,” 4-5.
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prime ministers in the early 1990s began eroding an already shaky trust in modem 
government. Polls conducted by the World Values Survey reveal that, in 2005, at least 
half of those surveyed did not trust the government “very much at all” and fourteen 
percent did not trust the government “at all” .29 To what extent this erosion o f public trust 
affected decision-making power is unclear, especially in regard to decisions about nuclear 
energy, which have historically been made separate from public input. Bureaucrats hold 
decision-making authority but accountability for their decisions has not been rigorous or 
transparent. Professionalism and expertise overrode the need for transparency, citizen 
input or discussion of local concerns.30
Though the Japanese model of nuclear regulation and industry was closely 
modeled on the American market-based system, Japan departed from this model early in 
the development of its site approval process. Rather than allowing private utility 
companies to handle the issues o f siting and public acceptance on their own, the Japanese 
government developed an “ ...extensive array o f policy instruments and soft social control 
techniques designed to bring public opinion in line with national energy goals.”31 Some 
examples include pep talks and rallies for new reactors in communities from the central 
government, the development of pro-nuclear science curricula for school-aged children, 
Nuclear Power Day, and an annual fair where local farmers and fishermen could sell their 
products so they would not feel a nuclear plant was taking away their livelihoods. The 
government would additionally provide information to help utility companies locate
29 World Values Survey 1981-2008, Official Aggregate v. 20090901, 2009. World Values Survey 
Association, Accessed December 20, 2013, www.worldvaluesurvev.org. Aggregate File Producer: 
ASEP/JDS, Madrid.
30 Kotler and Hillman, “Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy and Public Opinion,” 2.
31 Daniel P. Aldrich, “Post-Crisis Japanese Nuclear Policy: From Top-Down Directives to Bottom-Up 
Activism,” Asia Pacific Issues, Analysis from the East-West Center (January 2012), 3.
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possible sites with the necessary logistical elements for a reactor, such as access to 
cooling water and existing electrical power grids. The government would also provide 
information that helped utility companies map the social characteristics o f local 
communities in order to determine locations that would be most likely to be approved for 
reactors. Internal documents from the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JIFA) show that 
planners of the late 1960s and 1970s were well aware o f the dangers posed by well- 
organized and motivated local opposition groups, especially fishermen’s cooperatives. To 
avoid these groups, planners placed projects in rural communities which were less 
coordinated and more fragmented and hence less likely to mount anti-nuclear 
campaigns.32 To overcome any remaining opposition, the government often offered jobs 
and financial assistance to local fishermen so the nuclear plant would not be seen as 
causing financial damage to individuals.
The 1970s, however, brought about a period in which many previously ineffective 
local opposition groups would organize into national movements. Yasumasa Kuroda 
wrote in 1972 that the nationalization o f many local groups during that decade would 
represent the second phase o f growing democracy in Japan, spurred by two previous 
decades o f economic growth and what Kuroda calls “the people’s awakening,” or the
->•5
development of an active political culture. As several anti-nuclear umbrella 
organizations began to mobilize nationally, the government responded with increased 
pressure to gain approval for new reactors. As a result o f this new push, the system that 
developed to allocate benefits to potential nuclear host communities became so complex 
that the central government had to create a new agency, the Agency for Natural
32 Aldrich, “Post-Crisis Japanese Nuclear Policy: From Top-Down Directives to Bottom-Up Activism,” 5.
33 Yasumasa Kuroda, “Protest Movements in Japan: A New Politics,” Asian Survey, 12:1 (Nov 1972), 949.
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Resources and Energy, to manage it. The central government also organized workshops 
for local officials to educate them on what had worked or not worked in other places in 
terms of getting approval from the public for nuclear plants. Eventually, the government 
would provide up to $20 million per year to communities to accept nuclear power in what 
became a tremendously well-funded policy instrument that funneled hidden taxes on 
electricity into a pooled account that bureaucrats would then divide among communities 
in rural and coastal Japan.
The Three Power Source Development Laws, also known as the Dengen Sanpo, 
provide enormous subsidies for communities that agree to host nuclear power plants. By 
2002, a community agreeing to host a 1.35 million kilowatt reactor could expect to 
receive up to 450 billion yen from the government.34 This obviously represents an 
enormous sum and an enticing offer for local cities that regularly struggle with deficits. 
This system, however, has only been partly successful. O f the total amount o f money 
collected for the Three Power Source Development Laws through an invisible tax levied 
on all power consumption, the government has only been able to spend a small amount. 
In 2001, for example, despite budgeting 2.5 billion yen for nuclear power plant siting, the 
government only spent 1.5 billion.35
The very existence of this system of exploitation and manipulation seems to 
suggest that government officials eager to have new reactors approved did fear the 
possible adverse effects of pushback from the public, a fear that motivated them to pay 
local residents off in exchange for their silent consent. Perhaps maintaining the fa?ade of 
harmony that is so fundamental to Japanese society was well worth the price o f creating
34 Daniel P. Aldrich, “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Quelling Resistance,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 
Accessed February 6, 2014. http://www.iapanfocus.org/-Daniel P -Aldrich/2047.
35 Aldrich, “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Quelling Resistance”.
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the illusion that people were happy having reactors in their communities when, in reality, 
they were likely far more happy with the subsidies and perks that came with those 
reactors. As negative public opinion against nuclear energy increased in the 1980s, so did 
the money funneled to keep people happy. However, decreases in the 1990s in the actual 
money the government would be able to spend on siting incentives coupled with an 
increase in the time it takes to get reactors approved suggests that citizens may be 
becoming increasingly immune to these techniques. According to Danile Aldrich, the 
lead times necessary for negotiation and construction of new power plants in a greenfield 
situation has tripled over the past three decades.36
Japan does have formal procedures for licensing nuclear reactors that allow for 
public involvement, but, as in many other countries, the proceedings seem to be a routine 
part of procedure with little actual value. Before the official approval o f a reactor 
establishment license, there are two public hearings at which concerned citizens can 
request more information or voice their dissent. For the purpose of public involvement, 
the most important step comes when the operating utility company has to first obtain a 
local agreement to begin the process of reactor approval from the mayor o f the local 
municipality, the governor o f the prefecture and from the municipal and prefectural 
assemblies. The sooner in the approval process citizens can voice their opposition, the 
more likely they are to halt reactor approval. However, it is precisely in these preliminary 
stages that access to information about the proposed nuclear plant in question is limited, 
especially if the local authorities are keen to receive subsidies from utility companies for 
hosting a nuclear plant or to bring reactor construction and operating employment to their 
towns and prefectures. The only publicly available information is simple explanatory
36 Aldrich, “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Quelling Resistance”.
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material provided by the power company, but power companies sometimes prepare 
detailed documents for members o f the local council and influential people in the local 
community. There are a few instances in which local residents have exerted considerable 
power over the reactor approval process, such as with the abandoned Ashihama site in 
2000 or the cancelled project in Miyama in 2001, but these cases have tended to be the 
exceptions rather than the rules. Residents o f neighboring towns are also without 
opportunity for input into the approval process, nor do they receive any incentive 
subsidies from the utility company while shouldering equal risk should the reactor 
malfunction. Public hearings and public commencements tend to be proforma in nature 
and if residents are not successful in blocking the initial agreement between the local and 
prefectural authorities and the utility company, the approval process gains momentum 
that is difficult to stop.37
The government discovered early on that the best way to circumvent any possible 
challenges to siting would be to manipulate public compliance through many of the 
techniques previously mentioned. While effective, these soft policy tools did not 
guarantee success when it came to siting approval. Of the 95 attempts to site nuclear 
power plants in Japan over the postwar period, only 54 were actually completed.38 That 
represents only a 57 percent success rate. Well organized and informed anti-nuclear 
groups fought citing approval in many well-publicized battles, and it seems the 
conclusion is that even the best soft policy incentive techniques cannot assure siting 
success in an era of increasingly active and concerned citizenry. Despite ongoing 
opposition, the combined force of the government, bureaucracy, and utility companies
37 “Public Involvement in Japan’s Nuclear Licensing System,” Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, 
Accessed January 3, 2014, http://www.cnic.ip/english/newsletter/nitl 35/nit 135articles/licensing.html.
38 Aldrich, “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Quelling Resistance”.
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continued moving nuclear power forward in Japan well into the 1990s when 15 new 
reactors were approved. A string of domestic nuclear accidents in the 1990s, however, 
would contribute to altering nuclear power’s future viability in Japan.
Current Opinion Polling
In 2006, approval of nuclear energy at 40 percent o f  those surveyed outweighed 
disapproval at 35 percent for the first time in Japan since 1986.39 In 2009, a poll carried 
out by the Prime Minister’s Office revealed that roughly 60 percent o f respondents 
approved of increasing the country’s number o f reactors.40 This modest trend continued 
until 2011 when approval o f nuclear energy slowly began to decrease after the 
Fukushima incident. Polling in late 2013 indicated that the majority o f people in Japan no 
longer support turning the country’s reactors back on. Though it would seem that the 
decision to turn off all nuclear reactors after Fukushima for inspection, evaluation and 
maintenance correlates with a rise in public opposition to nuclear energy, this relationship 
is actually quite unclear. In September of 2012, the Japanese government under the 
leadership o f PM Yoshihiko Noda and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) released the 
“Revolutionary Energy and Environment Strategy” which called for a complete nuclear 
phase out by 2040. This nuclear phase-out plan satisfied few people. In a reaction that 
echoes those heard in response to Germany’s first proposed nuclear phase-out in the late 
1990s, anti-nuclear proponents said the strategy did too little in allowing reactors to 
operate another thirty years while the business and industry lobby were unhappy to lose
39 “Public Attitudes to Nuclear Power,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Report, 
2010, NEA no. 6859.
40 Daniel P. Aldrich. “Post-Fukushima Nuclear Politics in Japan, Part 3: Empowering Anti-Nuclear 
Sentiment.” The Monkey Cage. Accessed January 31, 2014, http://themonkevcage.org/2013/04/Q3/post- 
fukushima-nuclear-politics-in-iapan-part-3-empowered-anti-nuclear-sentiment/.
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money on their nuclear investments.41 This plan would prove to be short-lived, however, 
when the DPJ was defeated by the LDP party in December of 2012 and Shinzo Abe, a 
pro-nuclear advocate, was again appointed PM. The policy shifts that followed were a 
part of Abe’s plan to jumpstart the Japanese economy with nuclear technology exports 
and increasing nuclear energy reliance to limit foreign dependence on imported energy. 
The current plan is to restart the country’s commercial reactors when they have cleared 
the new safety standards implemented after Fukushima. Construction is also on-going at 
many sites that were approved for new reactors before 2011, in Shimane Prefecture, for 
example, where citizens have collected thousands o f signatures to present to the 
prefectural assembly to challenge the reactor.
Overall, it is difficult to determine whether current plans to restart nuclear 
reactors and continue pursuing nuclear energy are in line with public opinion or not. In 
Germany, Angela Merkel and her CDU-lead government was prompted by Green Party 
wins to announce a phase-out o f nuclear power that correlated to high levels o f public 
opposition to nuclear post-Fukushima. The CDU was rewarded with popular wins in the 
next general election. In Japan, however, the DPJ decision to phase out nuclear resulted 
in a DPJ majority loss in the Diet and a return to majority for the pro-nuclear LDP. It is 
impossible to know for sure, however, whether voters put the LDP back into power or 
just ensured the DPJ stayed out of majority power, considering there was rampant public 
criticism over PMs Naoto Kan and then Yoshihiko Noda’s handling of Fukushima. On 
one hand, polls indicate that the majority o f Japanese polled want to move away nuclear 
energy; on the other, voters returned the pro-nuclear LDP to office in 2012.
41 Hiriko Tabuchi, “Japan Sets Policy to Phase Out Nuclear Power Plants by 2040,” New York Times. 




This section will examine to what extent past nuclear disasters impacted the 
decision to pursue nuclear energy as well as the impact these disasters had on public 
approval for nuclear energy. In addition to examining the cases o f Three Mile Island, 
Chernobyl and Fukushima, I will also include an analysis o f a series o f nuclear accidents 
in Japan during the 1990s that revealed serious lapses in security measures and cover-ups 
undertaken by the nuclear industry.
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
Opposition to nuclear energy did exist in the 1970s and 1980s, but it was 
localized rather than national in a NIMBY response, and was usually temporary and lead 
by left-wing groups or local trade associations.42 Local protests often gained immediate 
attention but rarely had any long-term effects on policy-makers’ decision to pursue 
nuclear energy. Little legitimacy was given to the public concerns over nuclear safety. 
Public officials were unrelenting in their assertion that they knew what was best for the 
nation. In addition, opinion polls throughout the 1980s and 1990s showed that the 
majority of Japanese found nuclear plants to be “safe” or “somewhat safe” (which is not 
necessarily to say they supported building more reactors) and that the majority o f people 
who supported nuclear energy did so because they viewed it as the only way to escape 
from the dependence on oil and coal.43 In the end, central authority almost always 
overruled local opposition.
The events nuclear incidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl did not affect 
the nuclear industry in Japan as greatly as in other countries. This is evident in the
42 Kotler and Hillman, “Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy and Public Opinion,” 4.
43 Ibid. 5.
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increase of nuclear energy production beginning in the 1980s that continued 
uninterrupted through the 2000s. Figure 12 demonstrates Japanese electricity production 
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Figure 12: Percentage Share o f Nuclear Energy Generation in Japan, Terrawatt H ours, 1980-2005.44
For a side-by-side comparison, the Figure 13 demonstrates public opinion on 
nuclear energy during the same period:
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Figure 13: Approval for and Opposition to Nuclear Energy in Japan, 1975-2010.
These graphs demonstrate two things. First, that neither the Three Mile Island 
incident in 1979 nor the Chernobyl incident in 1986 had any measurable effect on nuclear 
energy pursuance as defined as power coming from existing reactors in terawatt hours, 
which increased after each of these disasters. Nor did Three Mile Island or Chernobyl 
have any discernible effect on nuclear pursuance as defined by number of reactors 
approved in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, in the 1980s, 15 new reactors were approved 
for construction and an additional 15 more in the 1990s. Second, these graphs 
demonstrate that despite a marked increase in disapproval o f  nuclear energy in the late 
1980s, there are no correlating changes in nuclear energy pursuance. The lone indicator 
that would suggest effective push-back from citizens is the lead time necessary for 
reactor approval and construction that tripled from the 1970s to the 1990s as citizen 
groups were able to at least delay approval if  not outright halt it.
45 “Public Attitudes to Nuclear Energy, OECD, 2010.
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Domestic Nuclear Incidents, 1990-2011
Often referred to as the “Lost Decade,” 1990-2000 was the time after the asset 
bubble burst and the Japanese economy slumped. GDP growth slowed and deflation 
increased as people began saving their money thereby creating a liquidity trap that 
reinforced the economic slump. Officials surely thought that the recession was temporary 
and growth would return. In preparation, 15 reactors were approved during this period, 
though a series of highly publicized and badly managed nuclear incidents would create a 
backlash that would carry into the 2000s.
Tokai-mura Crideality Accident, 1999
The criticality accident at Tokaimura occurred at a uranium processing facility 
operated by JCO, formerly the Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Company. The accident 
occurred as technicians were preparing a batch o f fuel for the reactor when the solution in 
the tank, reaching past the fill line, created a self-sustaining reaction that began emitting 
gamma and neutron radiation. The three technicians immediately became sick and two 
would eventually die, but the workers were able to contain the reaction once the fuel had 
cooled the next morning. In the meantime, almost 200 people were evacuated from their 
homes in a 350 meter radius around the plant and people in a 10 kilometer radius were 
advised to stay indoors. Dozens of workers and residents were hospitalized for radiation 
exposure well above what is considered safe. The following investigation by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that the cause of the accident was human 
error and serious breach o f safety principles, considering the technicians preparing the
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fuel for the reactors seemed to not have had any specific training for their tasks and were 
unfamiliar with safety protocol in the event of an accident.46 
Shika Nuclear Power Plant Cover-Up, Monju Cover-Up, 1995
During a 1999 inspection of the Shika reactors, due to improper rod inspection 
techniques, one reactor was in a state o f criticality for 15 minutes. This, in itself, would 
not have been sensational. The Hokuriku Electric Power Company cover-up o f the 
incident, however, was quite sensational when the news of the incident was leaked to the 
public in 2007. The chairman o f the Japan Nuclear Safety Commission inspected the rod 
housings in the reactor and determined that the incident was due to cutting comers and 
unnecessary pressure on reactor operators. A lower court had ordered the entire plant to 
be shut down, but a higher Nagoya court overturned that ruling and the unit returned to 
operation in May of 2009.47
In 1995, molten sodium leaked from the cooling circuit o f the Monju reactor, 
resulting in a fire that made headlines across the country. Following the fire, officials at 
the government-owned Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation 
downplayed the extent of the damage and the seriousness o f the fire at the Monju reactor. 
They also denied the existence of a videotape showing the sodium spill, and the reactor 
was closed in 1995 for maintenance. Ten years later, in 2005, that same video would 
come hack to haunt them when it was leaked to the public following an announcement 
the Monju reactor would be restarted. This video showed men in “space-suits” walking
46 Nathalie Cavasin, “Citizen Activism and the Nuclear Industry in Japan,” Local Environmental 
Movements: A Comparison o f  the US and Japan, Eds Pradyumna P. Karan and Unryu Suganuma, 
(Lexington, KY: The University Press o f  Kentucky, 2008), 65.
47 Cavasin, “Citizen Activism and the Nuclear Industry in Japan,” 66.
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around as sodium crystals hung from above, in a scene straight from a post-apocalyptic 
movie. The Monju reactor would eventually come online again in late 2000s.48 
Mihama, 2004
The Mihama steam explosion of 2004 occurred when a broken pipe could not 
contain the hot water and steam emitted in a building at the plant used for housing 
cooling turbines. The steam killed 4 workers and resulted in the injury of 7 others, though 
the accident was found to have not released any hazardous radioactive contaminants into 
the environment. The accident had been called the worst nuclear accident in Japan until 
the Fukushima disaster in 2011. After this highly publicized string of nuclear incidents, 
citizen trust was further eroded as the safety culture in Japan’s nuclear industry came into
49question.
Fukushima, 2011
By the time of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the most extensive in Japan’s 
history and certainly the most expensive since Chernobyl, the Japanese public had 
already seen a decade of mistakes, mishandlings, and cover-ups. Leading up to 2011, 
polling reports showed that a large percentage o f the population, or 87 percent o f those 
polled, knew about the Tokia-mura incident from ten years previous and 68 percent o f
respondents feared another nuclear accident would happen.50 Figure __ further
demonstrates that public support for nuclear power had declined to below 40 percent for 
the first time since the mid-1980s. Opinion polls conducted by the Asahi Shimbun 
following March of 2011 show that disapproval for nuclear power was immediately slow
48 Cavasin, “Citizen Activism and the Nuclear Industry in Japan,” 67.
49 Ibid, 68.
50 “Ten Years Since the Criticality Accident at Tokai-mura: Fear Lingers,” NHK Broadcasting Culture 
Research Institute, January 2010, Accessed October 10, 2012. 
httn:/7www.nhk.or.in/bunken/enulish/renorts-''summarv/2 0 1001 /02.html.
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to respond to the Fukushima disaster. Figure 14 illustrates approval ratings for nuclear 
energy, as reported by the Asahi Shimbun, from April of 2011-October of 2012:


















Figure 14: Nuclear Opinion Polling in Japan Following Fukushima, 51
Many possible explanations exist for the public’s slow response to Fukushima 
inside Japan. Large numbers o f people were directly affected by the earthquake or 
tsunami in ways not related to the nuclear disaster, and so many were preoccupied with 
their own problems of structural damage or flooding. Though the international press was 
reporting constantly on the nuclear disaster, with comparisons to Chernobyl and dooms­
day scenarios the most popular headlines, the nature o f the reporting inside Japan was 
more controlled. The Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), Japan’s national broadcasting 
corporation, has faced serious allegation in 2014 that it deliberately controlled the flow of
51 Data compiled by author from Asahi Shimbun W eekly O pinion Polls, 2011-2012.
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information to the public following Fukushima in accordance with what the then-current 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government allowed. For example, rumors have 
circulated since 2011 that the NHK complied with government efforts to conceal the 
extent o f the radiation release.52 In December of 2013, the chairman o f the NHK, 
Masayuki Matsumoto, announced he would be stepping down from his position, claiming 
he had been driven out by Abe administration criticism that he had allowed current NHK 
nuclear coverage to become too critical. There are further allegations that Abe’s LDP is 
stocking the NHK’s governing board with political appointees that will stifle the NHK’s 
criticism of the conservative party, which supports a policy of nuclear reactor restarts. 
Though an official investigation is yet to take place, a explanations for the public’s 
sluggish immediate concerns about safety following Fukushima are likely tied to a lack 
o f information about what was precisely going on in Fukushima Prefecture.
It became increasingly difficult to hide the evacuation o f residents from 
Fukushima or to conceal the reasons for displacing so many people. Though many 
residents in the immediate vicinity o f the Fukushima reactors were evacuated 
immediately, the radius o f evacuations continued widening until September o f 2011 when 
residents within fifty miles of the reactors were ordered to move out o f the radiation zone, 
totaling, at one point, approximately 100,000 people. The misplacement o f 100,000 
people is difficult not to notice, and it seems as time wore on after Fukushima, and as 
people were able to access more information on the status o f the Fukushima reactors and 
the damage they had caused to property and in terms of safety to residents, approval for 
nuclear power dropped with disapproval peaking in 2012 at 70 percent o f respondents.
52 “Widespread Public Distrust o f  NHK Over Fukushima Radiation Cover-Up,” EnergyNews, Accessed  
March 28, 2014.
146
All plants were shut down immediately following Fukushima for regular safety 
inspections until June of 2011 when the Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) 
utility was allowed to restart its reactor at Oi, a move that was controversial among the 
public. In June of 2012, 46 percent o f respondents claimed they were against restarting 
this reactor while 37 percent opposed the move. However, in July o f 2012, opinion was 
split when 41 percent responded that they thought it was right to restart the reactor and 42 
percent opposed the restart, though only 35 percent o f people approved of restarting 
reactors other than Oi. In August o f 2012, the support for restarting reactors other than Oi 
dropped to 31 percent. In October o f 2012, construction resumed at the Ooma nuclear 
power plant in Aomori Prefecture. 25 percent o f  respondents agreed with this, while 55 
disapproved.
While respondents seemed to be split regarding the restart the Oi plant, it seems 
most respondents do not want new nuclear power plants in Japan and do not want to 
restart most of the existing reactors. By June of 2012, energy prices had increased nearly 
30 percent throughout the country, a result o f increased imports of coal and natural gas to 
compensate for losses in nuclear.53 The public may have thought that restarting Oi would 
alleviate some o f this energy price increase, especially heading into a warm Japanese 
summer. In fact, in March of 2012, 75 percent o f respondents reported that they were 
either very concerned (20 percent) or moderately concerned (55 percent) about how the 
suspension of nuclear energy would impact the economy. In December o f 2012, voters 
would return the pro-nuclear LDP back to a majority in the Diet, a move away from the 
DPJ that has been seen as largely reflective of concerns about the economy. In 2014, the
53 “Japan Halts Last Reactor at Ohi,” BBC News, September 15, 2013, Accessed January 4, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24099022.
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Tokyo Governor’s race became heated between candidates running on pro and anti- 
nuclear platforms. Though anti-nuclear former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi tried to 
turn the election into a referendum on nuclear power, a Yomiuri poll found that most 
respondents (84 percent) thought medical and welfare policies were the most important 
issue of the election and disaster preparedness and unemployment as second most 
important.54 In the end, voters elected the pro-nuclear LDP candidate to the gubernatorial 
position as weak anti-nuclear candidates split the opposition vote.
In a country long seen as lacking a political culture of protest, it seems the 
Fukushima incident pushed citizens to a point o f criticality. Immediately following 
Fukushima, hundreds of thousands of people would amass in Tokyo’s political district 
every Friday to protest nuclear power and the government’s decision to restart nuclear 
reactors. Though there were also mass demonstrations in the 1960s over the US-Japan 
Security Treaty, the participants were primarily college students and the activity ended 
after approximately two months. The anti-nuclear demonstrations’ demographics now 
seem to represent many different cross-sections o f society, from young people to senior 
citizens, men, women, professionals and working-class citizens. In a 2012 interview, Eiji 
Oguma, professor at Keio University, says he believes this is a result o f a growing 
distrust of the government resulting from 20 years o f economic stagnation. Further, he 
says that the reasons demonstrations in Japan have been limited in the past are related to 
decades of stability in people’s lives and jobs as well as a lack o f knowledge or 
experience with protests. Now, however, people are worried about the economy and 
globalization has brought knowledge about other cultures of protests to Japan. For
54 E. Tammy Kim, “Tokyo Governor’s Race Puts Nuclear Power to Electoral Test,” A1 Jazeera, February 
7, 2014, Accessed February 28, 2014, http://america.aliazeera.com/articIes/2014/2/7/in-tokvo- 
electionreferendumonnuclearpowerandnationalpolicies.html.
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Oguma, this symbolizes a major political shift in Japan, away from a consenting and 
comfortable public to one in which people will demand more o f a voice in their 
government.55 As of yet, however, an organized, national opposition to nuclear energy 
has yet to emerge in Japan, though that is not to say that local opposition is incapable of 
blocking or stalling reactor restarts in the coming months.
Current Nuclear Politics in Japan: The New Basic Energy Plan
In 2012, the incumbent majority DPJ ran its Diet candidates on a promise that 
they would make a nuclear phase-out into policy in Japan. In the December o f 2012 
General election, voters returned the LDP party to a majority and the LDP returned 
Shinzo Abe to the office o f Prime Minister. The LDP, long a supporter o f  nuclear energy, 
has announced plans to restart most, if  not all, o f the now dormant reactors after they 
have been tested and are found to pass new, stricter safety guidelines. Shinzo Abe has 
publicly stated that continuing to rely on nuclear energy while also pursuing other forms 
of renewable energy are primary components o f his “Three Arrows” plan for economic 
revitalization, a plan known popularly as “Abenomics.” In the Japanese electoral system 
of one-party dominance, the likelihood of the LDP’s return to majority was always high, 
and after the immediate mishandling o f so many elements o f the triple disaster in 2011, 
the majority held by the usual opposition DPJ party became increasingly tenuous. 
Considering the LDP’s vast array o f networks within business, the nuclear industry, and 
bureaucracy, it is no wonder the party is pro-nuclear. Nor is their rise from defeat and 
return to Parliamentarian majority a surprise.
55 “Anti-Nuclear Protests Show Japan is Becoming an Ordinary Nation, Scholar Says,” Asahi Shimbun, 
July 19, 2012, Accessed March 1, 2014,
http://ai w.asahi.coin/article/0311 disaster/opinion/AJ201207190080.
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In February o f 2014, the Abe administration released a draft o f the New Basic 
Energy Plan that outline Japan’s energy plans for the next 20 years and include keeping 
nuclear power at the core o f baseload56 power production along with coal-fired and 
hydroelectric plants.57 The draft plan is cautious about providing an estimated energy 
mix, it does allow room for both restarting existing reactors and building new reactors. 
The most recent approval ratings for Abe and his administration are, for the first time in 
Diet history, higher now than when he took office in 20 1 2.58 Abe’s approval ratings are 
likely linked more to forward progress in the Japanese economy, however, than to his 
policies on nuclear energy, though, in Japan, it is often difficult to separate one issue 
from the other.
Access to Other Resources
Whereas the previous section sought to determine to what degree public and 
nuclear disasters influence pursuance of nuclear energy, this section will examine Japan’s 
energy options by examining its access to other electricity-producing resources, either 
through natural endowments or through reliable and affordable trading options. In 
concurrence with the previous hypotheses tested in the US and German case studies, the 
hypotheses to be tested in this section are that the greater the endowment o f coal, oil or 
natural gas, the less likely a country will be to pursue nuclear; likewise, the greater the 
access to resources through trading options, the less likely a country will be to pursue 
nuclear. In the case o f Japan, petroleum makes up such a large enough percentage of
56 A baseload power source is one that can produce energy at a constant rate and lower cost than the 
alternatives.
57 Mari Iawata, “Japan Sees Key Role for Nuclear Power,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2014,
Accessed February 15, 2014,
http:///online.wsi-com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304610404579403741256563088?mod=:dist smart 
brief.
58 “Asahi Poll: Abe Cabinet Breaks Trend, Increases Support Rate to 62%,” Asahi Shimbun, February 18, 
2013, Accessed February 24, 2014, http://aiw.asahi.eom/article/behind news/politics/AJ201302180099.
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overall electricity generation (16 percent) that it will also be tested with the hypothesis 
that the greater the supply of or access to oil, the less likely a country will be to pursue 
nuclear as a power source.
In 2013, Japan was the second-largest net importer of energy resources, second 
only to China.59 In 2013, the electrical energy mix in Japan included a significant reliance 
on LNG at 48 percent of overall consumption, with coal making up approximately 28 
percent, oil an increased 15 percent, and other renewables contributing roughly 10 
percent of overall electricity generation. Japan ended its own domestic coal production 
program in 2002 and has since steadily increased its coal imports, primarily from 
Australia. In fact, Japan takes 40 percent of Australia’s black coal exports, comprising 
Australia’s largest share going to a single country in 2013.60 Unlike Germany, Japan has 
been able to compensate for nuclear without significantly increasing coal imports, a move 
likely linked to its clean energy and reduced carbon emission goals and an abundant 
regional supply of LNG.
Rather than relying on coal, the Japanese government has declared its preference 
for LNG as a short-term substitute for nuclear energy. About a third o f Japan’s LNG 
imports come from regional suppliers, though the country’s overall portfolio is 
reasonably balanced with no one provider supplying more than 20 percent o f overall 
LNG. Australia surpassed Indonesia and Malaysia to become Japan’s largest LNG 
exporter in 2012 and, in 2013, Shinzo Abe began talks with the United Arab Emirates 
that were continued in Tokyo in February of 2014. The 2014 bilateral agreement reached
59 “Japan is the Second Largest Net Importer o f  Fossil Fuels in the World,” Energy Information 
Administration, November 7, 2013, Accessed January 31, 2014,
http://www. eia.gov/todavinenergv/detail.cfm?id= 13711.
60 “Exports,” Australian Coal Association,” Accessed February 18, 2014, 
http://www.australiancoal.com.au/exports.html.
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between the two countries will enhance cooperation on energy development in the two 
countries, giving Japan the chance to renew its interests in the UAE’s oil and gas fields. 
In return, Japan will export nuclear technology to the UAE to aid the country in 
developing its own civilian nuclear energy program. Currently, Qatar, Australia and 
Malaysia are Japan’s most significant suppliers o f LNG, though additional future supplies 
could come from projects in Papua New Guinea or from US LNG exports once the 
American terminals are approved for exports.61
Though Japan’s supply of LNG is relatively steady and reliable, the most 
significant problem the past few years has primarily been associated with cost. 
Historically, natural gas prices have been tied to oil prices, and after oil prices rose in 
2008, the demand for natural gas rose as well, resulting in an overall higher LNG price. 
One prong of Abe’s economic stimulus plan has been to engage in quantitative easing to 
increase the monetary base and depreciate the value of the yen to fight deflation and 
make Japanese exports more competitive. While this plan has begun working to reverse 
deflation, it has also meant paying more for energy imports, particularly natural gas. 
Higher global demand for LNG has resulted in an increased gas price for Asian buyers, 
an increase from $9/MMBtu in early 2008 to $16/MMBtu in 2012. Japan and other LNG 
importers have been in the process of negotiating contracts for lower LNG prices that are 
tied to US gas market prices rather than international crude oil prices. Kansai Electric, 
for example, reached an agreement on a long-term contract with BP in 2012 that links 
LNG prices with the lower US Henry Hub spot price that, in 2014, hovered around
61 “Japan is the Second Largest Net Importer o f  Fossil Fuels in the World,” Energy Information 
Administration, November 7, 2013, Accessed January 31, 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/todavinenergy/detail.cfm?id=l 3711.
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$4/MMBtu.62 These advances are merely reactionary, however, may not take effect 
immediately, and cannot compensate for high prices of LNG from 2011 to the present.
Even with some of the lowest electricity demand growth rates in the developed 
world and a high level o f energy efficiency (electrical energy demand actually decreased 
8 percent after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, no doubt partly due to higher than normal 
energy prices63), importing almost all of its natural resources since 2011 has taken a 
financial toll on a Japanese economy that has been limping along since he 1990s. Abe’s 
plan to depreciate the Yen to make Japanese exports more competitive has only 
marginally been effective. According to the World Bank, the export o f goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP rose in Japan from 13 percent in 2009 to only 15 percent 
in 2013.64 A successful plan to increase exports with currency devaluation would also be 
balanced with a strategy to control increases in imports, but imports to Japan actually 
increased 25 percent from 2012 to January of 2014, reaching an all-time imports high of 
8044.06 JPY billion.65 34 percent of those imports are mineral fuels, which include coal, 
natural gas and petroleum. This increase in imports without a correlating increase in 
exports is further fueling a Japanese debt-to-GDP ratio that is already the highest in the 
world at 230 percent.
For years, nuclear energy formed the cornerstone o f Japan’s energy plan, a power 
source that was abundant, domestically-produced, and created the opportunity for Japan 
to export nuclear technology. Without nuclear, Japan must continue to import LNG and
62 “Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated March 26, 2014, 
Accessed March 27, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/mgwhhdm.htm.
63 “FY2012: Energy Supply and Demand Report,” Japanese Ministry o f  Economy, Trade and Industry, 
October 2, 2013, Accessed February 6, 2014, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2013/1002_01 .html.
64 “Exports o f  Goods and Services as a Percentage o f  GDP,” The World Bank, Accessed March 7, 2014, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS.
65 “Japanese Imports,” Trading Economics, Accessed March 10, 2014, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/imports.
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coal, which, even at lowered negotiated prices, will stall the economic revitalization the 
country needs to fight its debt-to-GDP ratio. The lone bright spot in this energy scenario 
is a significant increase in renewable energy investment. Japan saw investment in 
renewable renewable energy (excluding research and technology) increase 73 percent to 
$16 billion in 2013, thanks to a surge in small-scale photovoltaic investment on the back 
of a new feed-in tariff subsidy for PV installation.66 With the new subsidy, developers are 
now finding that they can get a reasonable return on PV investment as prices continue to 
all for PV and wind resources. Even more impressively, utility-scale investment in 
renewable energy sources jumped 230 percent in Japan between 2011 and 2014 as the 
feed-in tariff for large-scale projects likewise makes investment attractive. The general 
hope is that eventually the market will reduce the cost and increase the return on 
renewable energy investment to the point that the government will no longer need to 
provide subsidies which, while they encourage beginning investment, will only continue 
to increase government budgetary expenditures and the staggering overall debt. A 
practically challenge will be pursuing a PV and wind renewable policy that is aggressive 
enough to compensate for nuclear energy, especially considering these energy sources 
require space for installation and Japan is a country that is not land-abundant. 
Hydroelectric power, which made up barely 7 percent o f  Japanese electrical energy 
portfolio in 2011, has reached its maximum output as the locations that are appropriate 
for such installations have all been utilized.




One of the hypotheses tested in this section was that the greater the public 
opposition to nuclear energy, the less likely a country would be to pursue it as an energy 
source. If this study only compares opinion for and against nuclear energy with levels of 
nuclear energy generated or number o f reactors approved, then the conclusion is that 
there is an unclear relationship between public opinion and nuclear energy pursuance. 
There has always been public opposition to nuclear energy in Japan which was reflected 
in polling throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Public support for nuclear energy vacillated in 
the 1990s and 2000s, as people were unsure whether the reported incidents happening 
across Japan at various nuclear plants such as Tokai-mura were more important than the 
economic stagnation that was gripping a country quite proud of their previous decades of 
“miraculous” economic growth. It is also unclear whether Three Mile Island in 1979 or 
Chernobyl in 1986 had any significant, lasting impact on public opinion in Japan, though, 
by some reports, support for nuclear energy reached an all-time low in 1990. If that is a 
response to Chernobyl in 1986, it is a delayed response.
Similarly, measuring protest activity and intensity in Japan may be a misleading 
methodological tool considering the heavy cultural emphasis placed on social harmony 
which may hinder marching in the streets. It is a far more likely scenario that, even if  and 
when people do not approve o f nuclear energy, they will not participate in a protest and 
may even be reticent to voice their dissenting opinion in polls. Fukushima may have 
changed these social norms to a certain extent, especially among younger generations, but 
it still too soon to determine the extent or duration of any impact on political culture in 
Japan.
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However, if this study measures public efficacy toward stopping nuclear energy in 
terms of reactors that were not approved, constructed or brought into operation over the 
decades of nuclear investment, then the issue becomes even murkier. Previous studies 
have shown that despite the use of flexible and adaptive institutions and incentives in the 
siting approval process, even the best designed techniques could never guarantee siting 
success, a reality that is especially poignant in an era of increasingly active and 
concerned citizenry within Japan. Citizens have been able to mobilize in organized and 
effective ways to stop nuclear reactor construction in their communities, but these cases 
tend to be the exception rather than the rule. The Iron Triangle and nuclear village have 
always had resources to offer that incentivized siting approval, and a pro-nuclear LDP in 
majority office and a pro-nuclear utility and construction industry are difficult opponents 
to fight. In the end, as with any issue and any place or time, citizens are most effective in 
stopping nuclear construction when they can dis-incentivize the investment by making 
the approval process longer or the construction more costly. To what extent opposition 
groups will be able to do this in the future is unclear, as is whether the majority of 
citizens even want to stop nuclear power from expanding in Japan. On one hand, opinion 
polls show that people are opposed to restating dormant reactor and to building new ones; 
on the other, the pro-nuclear LDP enjoyed a majority win in 2012, returning a Prime 
Minister and Diet to office that has since created a future Basic Energy Plan based 
heavily on utilizing nuclear power.
The clearest conclusion is that neither public opposition nor Three Mile 
Island/Chernobyl dampened the Japanese government’s enthusiasm for nuclear energy. 
Ever since Nakasone travelled to the US in the 1950s and received advice about how to
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institutionalize nuclear energy in Japan, the government has consistently insisted that 
nuclear power is an imperative ingredient in the recipe for Japanese independence from 
energy imports and economic success. The LDP and the DPJ both encouraged nuclear 
investment and reliance until 2011, and even though the DPJ in majority at the time of 
Fukushima approved a plan to phase out nuclear, the LDP has since been returned to 
office and is enjoying high approval ratings while promoting a pro-nuclear economic 
plan.
It is perhaps on this point that the clearest explanations behind nuclear pursuance 
in Japan can be found. From early on, nuclear energy was efficiently linked to economic 
growth in Japan, and especially after the destruction o f WWII, economy recovery and 
growth were also linked to the restoration of Japan’s place at the table o f the international 
community. The early establishment o f the nuclear village created and then perpetuated 
this narrative, rewarding those who climbed aboard the nuclear platform and punishing 
those who spoke out against nuclear energy. The close integration of business, the LDP 
and the bureaucratic structure it created, and the utility and construction industries 
(known broadly as the Iron Triangle) has allowed the state to effectively pursue nuclear 
energy by channeling incentivizing subsidies from utility slush funds to proposed reactor 
sites, while bureaucracy simultaneously created policies that were beneficial to the 
approval, construction and safety regulation processes (a process reinforced by the 
practice of amakudari). All o f these mechanisms working together created a system in 
which nuclear opposition, either from the public or from interest groups, found it 
difficult, if not impossible, to gain a foothold in stopping the advance o f nuclear power in 
Japan leading up to the 2011 disaster at Fukushima.
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In the context of Japan’s current post-Fukushima landscape, it is doubtful that the 
same opposition, though now perhaps larger and marginally stronger, will be able to gain 
that elusive foothold to stop the comeback of nuclear energy. Japan can do nothing to 
change its lack of domestic energy sources, and, as always, will be forced to import 
energy from other countries. Even with an abundance of trading partners and negotiations 
to lower energy prices, this reliance on other countries leaves Japan vulnerable to 
international price fluctuations, changing security relationships, and infrastructural 
demands. This dependence places Japan in the unique position that requires it prioritize 
nuclear energy far more heavily than other energy resources. Even with the memory of 
Fukushima only 3 years old, the Japanese public has responded to higher electrical bills 
and economic depression in ways that seem to convey a tolerance for returning to nuclear 
energy. Though opinion polling support for nuclear energy remains relatively low, pro- 
nuclear candidates are returning to office and garnering high approval ratings for their 
economic recovery plans. One could conclude that people in Japan seem to be more 
concerned with economic recovery as it is linked to unemployment, deflation, and 
decreasing social benefits, and since the economy has historically been positively linked 
with nuclear energy, the logical conclusion is that the public realizes it will have to accept 
nuclear energy, even at the price o f the possibility of future disasters. And while trust in 
the government has steadily decreased in Japan, perhaps official assurances o f new safety 
regulations and structural adjustments will be enough to convince the public that nuclear 
energy is safe, even in a country located on massive earthquake fault lines. In the end, 
with or without public approval and left with few energy options, it is likely that Japan 





This chapter will integrate the three previous case studies on the United States, 
Germany and Japan with comprehensive analysis and then draw conclusions based on the 
original hypotheses of this study. Each variable will be discussed, beginning with public 
opinion, protest activity, and voting patterns; continuing with responses to the disasters at 
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima; and concluding with a section on access to 
other energy resources either through endowments or affordable and reliable trading 
options. Findings are divided into primary and secondary categories. Primary findings are 
conclusions drawn in direct response to the original hypotheses o f the study for each 
variable. Secondary conclusions are findings discovered in the process o f research that do 
not directly relate to an original proposed variable or hypothesis but are nonetheless 
significant in explaining nuclear energy pursuance.
Public Opinion: Polling
The original hypothesis o f this study was that nuclear energy pursuance would be 
higher in countries where public approval for nuclear energy is also higher and that 
nuclear energy pursuance would be lower in countries where public approval for nuclear 
energy is lower. Current opinion polling in each case study reveals that, in the US, 
approval for nuclear energy tends to be higher than approval in Germany or Japan; 
according to one Gallup poll, 57 percent of respondents approved of using nuclear energy
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as one way to generate electricity while 40 percent were opposed.1 These numbers alone 
would indicate that most Americans approve of nuclear energy, a sentiment reflected in 
the US’s consistent pursuit of nuclear energy since the first commercial reactor came 
online in Illinois in 1960. However, when asked specifically about support for increasing 
the number o f nuclear power plants in the US, respondents’ support decreased from 57 
percent to 46 percent and opposition increased from 40 percent to 48 percent, resulting in 
an almost even split in favor and opposed.2 Even with the decreases in support for new 
reactors, American citizens seem to generally approve o f nuclear energy more than 
citizens in Germany or Japan.
If  the proposed hypothesis were true, one would expect the US to have the highest 
percentage of electrical generation from nuclear power o f the three countries. At the 
current rate of 20 percent of overall electrical generation, the US does, in fact, rely more 
heavily on nuclear energy than Germany (currently at 18 percent, down from 25 in early 
2011 and expected to decrease to 0 percent3) and Japan (currently at 0 percent with no 
operable reactors, but expected to increase to 15 percent within the next year4), especially 
considering the approval of the first new reactor since 1978 is meant to increase nuclear 
energy’s overall share of electricity generation. In this respect, it does seem that current 
nuclear energy pursuance is more or less in line with the prevailing approval o f nuclear
1 “Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After Fukushima,” Gallup, March 26, 2012, Accessed July 
1, 2012, http://www.eallup.com/polFl 53452/Americans-Favor-Nuclear-Power-Year-Fukushima.aspx.
2 “Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After Fukushima,” Gallup, March 26, 2012, Accessed July 
1, 2012, http://www.eallup.com/poll/153452/Americans-Favor-Nuclear-Power-Year-Fukushima.aspx.
3 “Nuclear Power in Germany,” World Nuclear Association, Last Updated March 13, 2014, Accessed  
March 29, 2014, http://www.world-nuclear.ore/info/countrv-profiles/countries-e-n/eermanv/.
4 “Nuclear Power in Japan.” World Nuclear Association. Last Updated March 25, 2014. Accessed  
December 5, 2013. http://www.world-nuclear.ore/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Japan/.
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energy, though whether that approval extends to the building of new reactors is difficult 
to discern.
Examination of the relationship between approval for nuclear energy and nuclear 
pursuance over time, however, suggests a different story. According to polls conducted 
by Cambridge National Samples between 1974 and 1990, approval for building new 
nuclear power plants has varied considerably over time in the US. This report suggests 
that approval for new plants decreased to less than 30 percent of respondents in 1982 and 
never recovered. Though the last reactor approved in the US was prior to this public 
opinion downturn, reactors approved before 1978 were under continued construction 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s until the last reactor came online in Tennessee in 1996. 
Consequently, nuclear pursuance (as defined by the percentage o f overall electricity 
generation that comes from nuclear energy) steadily increased throughout the 1970s, 80s 
and 90s as these new reactors came into operation until reaching the current 20 percent 
share. When viewed across time, the data on nuclear pursuance and public opinion 
shows less of a correlation considering the periods of wide variance in public approval 
for new power plants and consistently steady increases in nuclear energy production. 
With this steady increase in nuclear production, we would expect to see steady approval 
for nuclear energy, which is not clear from the polling results; while Gallup does report 
high numbers o f approval for nuclear energy since 1994, other studies show less 
enthusiasm for building new power plants.
There has been a strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Germany since the 1960s, when 
nuclear energy began taking off as an electricity-generating resource. In 2010, even 
before Fukushima, 64 percent of Germans surveyed reported being either opposed or
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strongly opposed to building new nuclear power plants.5 After Fukushima, 90 percent of 
Germans responding to a Globescan survey reported they strongly opposed building new 
reactors and 52 percent surveyed supported the policy o f shutting down all existing 
reactors.6 By again looking at this data alone, it seems there is indeed a correlation 
between public approval and nuclear energy pursuance. The only country o f the three to 
commit to a complete nuclear phase-out, Germany is also the country with the highest 
numbers of citizen opposition to nuclear energy, especially since 2011. As with the US, 
however, data gathered over time suggests less o f  a clear relationship. Polling data from 
the 1970s and 1980s suggests that there was approval for nuclear energy in Germany 
until 1986 when the disaster at Chernobyl reversed approval and opposition, with 
opposition to nuclear energy peaking at just over 80 percent of respondents in June of
n
1986. Also similarly to the US, nuclear energy’s percentage of the overall energy share 
of electricity generation steadily increased during the same time period until a peak in 
2000. Though current high opposition to nuclear energy is simultaneous with a vow to 
abandon nuclear energy altogether, there are likely intervening variables that explain 
Germany’s nuclear energy-180, especially considering high levels o f public opposition to 
nuclear energy have not seemed to matter much in the past.
Prior to the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, public opinion on nuclear energy 
was a difficult variable to capture. Some reports say that in 2006, 40 percent of 
respondents favored nuclear energy, while a 2009 survey conducted by the Prime 
Minister’s Office reported 60 percent o f respondents favor nuclear energy (though the
5 “Large Majorities in US and Five Largest European Countries Favor More Wind Farms and Subsidies for 
Biofuels, but Opinion is Split on Nuclear Power.” PRNewswire. October 13, 2010.
6 “Poll: Germans Support Abandoning Nuclear Power.” The Journal.IE. Accessed September 11, 2013. 
http://www.theioumal.ie/poll-germanv-nuclear-power-644340-Qct2012/.
7 Joppke, Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 147.
PM survey may have skewed the results in favor o f nuclear energy for its own purposes). 
A survey by the OECD conflictingly reports that approval for nuclear energy has not 
been above 45 percent since 1975. The most recent polling data collected from the Asahi 
Shimbun reported that opposition to nuclear energy peaked in 2012 at 70 percent, but has 
steadily declined since then. A 2014 Fuji TV Network poll found that 53 percent of 
respondents were opposed to restarting the country’s reactors.8 Even with conservative 
estimates, at least half of respondents seem to be against nuclear energy, though Japan 
has publicly vowed to restart most o f its reactors and pursue safer nuclear technology. 
Similarly, despite questionable public approval for nuclear energy in the decades 
following World War II (and the atomic devastation of two Japanese cities) nuclear 
energy production steadily increased as new reactors were approved throughout the 
1980s, 1990s, and even into the 2000s.
Based on data from these three case studies comparing patterns o f public approval 
and opposition to nuclear power with nuclear energy pursuance as a percentage of total 
energy generation, the first primary finding of this study is that there seems to be no clear 
correlation between the two variables. In each country, regardless o f variances in public 
approval, nuclear energy generation increased steadily throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s as more reactors were approved, constructed and then began operation. However, 
polling data alone may not capture the full story of citizen participation in the nuclear 
energy issue. It seems that results can vary dramatically based on what organization or 
institution is conducting the opinion poll and in response to the way specific questions are 
phrased. Many o f the institutions conducting polling on nuclear energy opinion prior to
8 Mari Iwata, “Japan Sees Key Role for Nuclear Power.” Wall Street Journal. February 25, 2014.
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Fukushima were contracted to do so on behalf o f  a government, utility company or pro- 
nuclear organization, each with incentives to produce results in favor o f nuclear energy. 
Historically, the pro-nuclear lobby has been generally better funded than the anti-nuclear 
lobby, and were thus better capable of creating a layer of insulation comprised of 
scientists, technicians, academics, and other supportive “expert” figures around nuclear 
energy. For this reason, studying other variables that portray citizen participation (rather 
than just opinion) may be a more fruitful method to capture an accurate picture o f the 
relationship between state decisions to pursue nuclear energy and the society on behalf o f 
whom those decisions are being made. Therefore, this project proceeded to include a 
qualitative analysis of protest activity and voting patterns in each country, two actions 
that are representative of public approval or opposition, with the idea that because these 
two methods o f participation are direct and confrontational, they may have a greater 
impact on state decisions to pursue nuclear energy.
Public Opinion: Nuclear Protest
Similar to the national/local split in public opinion on nuclear energy and building 
more reactors, protest activity in the US has also seemed to have separate focuses at the 
national and local levels. Large-scale demonstrations in New York City and Washington 
D.C. in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which ranged from 200,000 people to 1 million 
people, were organized around the theme of nuclear disarmament rather than solely 
nuclear energy. Twenty-plus years later, in May of 2005, 40,000 demonstrators marched 
past the United Nations building in New York City. Though this demonstration took 
place in the year of the 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings,
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the content o f the demonstration was decidedly anti-war rather than anti-nuclear, a direct 
response to the 2003 American invasion and subsequent presence in Iraq.
Rather than look for effective anti-nuclear citizen demonstrations at the national 
level in the US, this study focuses on protests at the local level in communities where 
reactors have been proposed for construction. The body tasked with regulating the 
nuclear industry and approving new reactors, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
includes a formal mechanism for public input during the reactor application review 
process. Though concerned citizens consistently attend these input meetings to share their 
concerns and often contradictory scientific research9, the NRC has consistently approved 
each reactor application. In fact, the NRC has never not approved a reactor application 
that successfully completed the application procedure; that is, reactors are always 
approved by the NRC given the utility company does not cancel the application during 
the approval process. Therefore, in the US, lobbying the nuclear industry’s regulatory 
body through the formal process of citizen input during the reactor approval process has 
been an ineffectual way to for citizens to exert influence over nuclear energy pursuance.
Rather than work from within the formal system, the anti-nuclear movement in 
the US has been more successful at stopping nuclear plant construction when it can create 
costly barriers for utility companies to finish construction and begin operation. These 
barriers include traditional acts of citizen dissent (protests, sit-ins, even more radical 
actions like destroying property at proposed nuclear sites), legal contestation, 
involvement in civil society organizations, and referendum voting. For example, the first 
nuclear plant was originally proposed at Bodega Bay in California, but through the
9 To be fair, pro-nuclear citizens and civil society organizations also consistently attend these public input 
meetings.
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organized involvement of the Sierra Club and the Northern Californian Association to 
Preserve Bodega Bay, both o f which submitted approval appeals to federal and state 
bodies, the Bodega plant plans were cancelled before substantial money could be spent 
on construction. The proposed Black Fox Plant in Oklahoma was cancelled after 
extended protests and the utility company was overwhelmed by legal action, the cost of 
which to fight in lengthy court battles would have increased the cost o f construction. The 
anti-nuclear group Clamshell Alliance occupied the construction site at the approved 
Montague plant; after $29 million was spent on construction, the Montague plant was 
cancelled 7 years after approval without operation. The Rancho Seco plant in California 
was closed as a result of negative community referendum voting.
In a few instances, citizens have also been successful at closing nuclear plants 
even after they have been built or started operation. The Trojan Plan in Oregon was in 
operation for 16 years before it was closed for good in 1993. Local referendums to close 
the facility had been voted on in 1986, 1990, and 1992, but were defeated each time. This 
defeat came at a cost to Portland General Electric (PGE), which spent $4.5 million on 
positive public relations for the plant during this period.10 In 1992, the plant closed 
because o f safety concerns. PGE inspections later revealed that the utility company 
would have to replace the steam generators in the reactors, a costly and lengthy 
replacement process. The plant never reopened and, in this instance, it remains unclear 
whether it was citizen action that closed the plant or basic economic infeasibility that 
motivated PGE to decommission the plant. In more recent similar instances, Yankee 
Rowe closed early in 1992; the San Onofre reactors 2 and 3 in 2013; Crystal River 3 in
10 “Anti-Nuclear Movement,” The Oregon Encyclopedia o f  Portland State University, Accessed March 30, 
2014, http://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/entrv/view/anti nuclear movement/.
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2013; and Kewaunee in 2013 all closed early because the combined pressure o f decreases 
in electrical demand and falling energy prices made continued operation too expensive 
and unprofitable.
Though citizens have had some luck with protests, civil society organizations and 
legal action, they have been most effective when states intervene in the approval process. 
For example, the Shoreham plant in Long Island was completely built by 1984, but never 
came into operation. After Three Mile Island in 1979, the NRC began enforcing stricter 
guidelines for evacuation plans on utility companies which required the utility company 
to work together with local and state officials to create sound evacuation measures in case 
of an emergency. In the case o f the Shoreham plant, local officials concluded that there 
was no sound way to evacuate citizens from the area surrounding the nuclear plant, and 
then New York governor Mario Cuomo ordered state officials not to approve any 
evacuation plan proposed by the operating utility company. In 1989, the utility company 
agreed to sign over the plant to the state for decommissioning, which would be paid off 
through resident rate hikes in the amount of $6 billion. The more current example o f the 
Indian Point facility, which is facing an NRC relicensing intervention by both the states 
o f New York and Connecticut, demonstrates that citizen action is more effective when 
coupled with the involvement o f states exerting pressure on the NRC.
In addition to these instances o f successful nuclear pursuance reversal, there are 
equal numbers o f unsuccessful citizen lobbying efforts. The same sorts of lobbying, 
demonstrating, and organizational involvement took place at the Seabrook plant and 
Diablo Canyon plant in the 1980s and 1990s, and both o f those plants are currently in 
operation. Ultimately, between 1953 and 2008, o f the 253 nuclear reactors ordered, 48
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percent were cancelled and 11 percent have shut down prematurely.11 However, it is 
difficult to say how many of these blocked plants or early shut-downs are the direct result 
of citizen dissent and how many are the result of economic factors that made nuclear 
investment unattractive to utility companies, though, at times, it was the citizen groups 
who created these economic obstacles themselves. Decreased electrical demand and low 
natural gas prices, however, have also likely been strong deterrents to nuclear investment.
Because the structure o f the Japanese federal regulatory and licensing system is 
similar to that of the US (a structure that reflects the US’s early input into the Japanese 
nuclear industry and the US-led governmental restructuring after WWII), the story of 
Japanese citizen involvement will sound familiar. Anti-nuclear protests in Japan have 
been somewhat limited compared to the US and Germany, though Fukushima in 2011 
galvanized many citizens in previously unseen numbers. Though the regulatory system in 
Japan is similar to that of the US, there are additional forces operating in Japan that 
further limit citizen input into the nuclear debate. The combination of the nuclear village 
and the Iron Triangle of the LDP (back in Parliamentarian majority power), Bureaucracy 
and Industry have created an almost iron-clad system in which nuclear energy has been 
able to grow. Local communities where nuclear plants are proposed, chosen by utility 
companies specifically for their weak civil society organizations and relative poverty, are 
incentivized by subsidies provided by the government, which are really just funds 
channeled through utility companies made from the profit of electricity rates, to buy 
consent. Local protests, when they occurred prior to 2011, were often led by left-wing 
trade associations and, while they may have gained temporary attention, rarely had any 
impact on policy decisions about nuclear energy in Japan. Exceptions to this general rule
11 A1 Gore, Our Choice, (NY: Bloomsbury, 2009).
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include the abandoned Ashihama site in 2000, the cancelled Miyama plant in 2001 and 
the Suzu and Maki plants in 2003. Anti-nuclear civil society organizations have 
historically been under-funded and under-staffed. Legal action has also been ultimately 
unsuccessful. Since the late 1970s, small groups of local residents with support from 
lawyers and scientists filed 14 major lawsuits against the state or power companies. Many 
of these lawsuits sought to shut down operating nuclear power plants by demonstrating 
new research on fault lines, earthquakes, or safety inadequacies. The plaintiffs have not 
won in any of these 14 cases, and even when 2 lower courts ruled in favor o f the 
plaintiffs, a higher court overturned those rulings.12
Over the post-war period, the nuclear industry in Japan had a 57 percent success 
rate with siting approval, though, again, it remains unclear how many o f those cancelled 
plants were the result of citizen intervention or other economic factors.13 In a centralized 
system of regulation and approval where collaboration between the nuclear industry, 
bureaucracy and government is solidly entrenched, there exist few opportunity points 
through which citizens can hope to influence energy policy.
This point about regulating structure leads to two important secondary findings of 
this research, the first of which is that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement may 
prove to be more successful than previous groups at reversing Shinzo Abe and the LDP’s 
plan to restart existing reactors and continue constructing new plants, perhaps by utilizing 
the techniques that have proven successful to the American anti-nuclear movement. The 
approval period for new reactors in Japan tripled from 1970 to 1990, a phenomenon
12 Yuko, et al, “’’Civil Society and the Triple Disasters,” 82.
13 Daniel Aldrich. “Post-Fukushima Nuclear Politics in Japan, Part 3: Empowering Anti-Nuclear 
Sentiment.” Accessed January 31, 2013, The Monkey Cage, http://themonkeycage.org/2013/04/03/post- 
fiikushima-nuclear-politics-in-japan-part-3-empowered-anti-nucIear-sentiment/.
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which indicates increasing difficulties for utilities to gain site approval. This approval 
period before official licensing and construction takes place is the ideal time for citizens 
to reverse the nuclear course, that is, before the utility company has invested so much 
capital that their economic incentive to operate the plant is too high. Though legal 
roadblocks have proven ineffective and anti-nuclear civil society organizations have been 
weak (but are strengthening in membership and funding since 2011) Japanese citizens 
could focus on imposing costly barriers to plant construction. Opposition groups could 
also attempt to solicit local governmental or prefectural intervention on their behalf, 
though this option may be limited if these offices are staffed with LDP politicians and 
bureaucrats who are hesitant to go against pro-nuclear party goals.
The second finding is that centralized nuclear regulation and approval systems 
such as those found in the US and in Japan are more susceptible to the problem of 
regulatory capture while a de-centralized approval and regulation system such as that of 
Germany seems to offer more opportunities for citizen influence. The resemblances 
between the US and Japanese systems should come as no surprise, considering Yasuhiro 
Nakasone’s early visit to the US created the framework for nuclear energy in Japan. 
Initially, both the Atomic Energy Commission in the US and the Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA) under the Ministry o f Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 
Japan were dually tasked with regulating and promoting nuclear energy. This dual 
function created conditions where the line between creating an environment where 
nuclear energy would be safe and where nuclear energy would be attractive to investors 
often became blurry.
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The 1974 US Energy Reorganization separated these two functions between the 
NRC and the Department o f Energy, but by that time, a system and network had already 
formed between regulators and the nuclear industry that reinforced regulatory capture. By 
the time of the development o f the NRC in the mid-1970s, however, most of the reactors 
in operation in the US had already been approved. Though the NRC is independent from 
the responsibility o f nuclear energy promotion, it still receives 90 percent o f its funding 
from industry fees, which compromises its independence.14 This confirms earlier findings 
of James M. Jasper in his work Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United 
States, France and Sweden when he claims that the pro-nuclear movement had far more 
access to resources and political structures such as government agencies and politicians 
than did the anti-nuclear movement and, as a result, anti-nuclear movements had little 
effect of nuclear energy policies in any country.
Furthermore, nearly half of all NRC employees surveyed in 2002 said they feared 
raising safety concerns might undermine their career.15 There have also been isolated 
cases of NRC regulators accepting gifts from or making decisions in favor o f future 
employers prior to leaving the NRC for the private sector.16 Beyond the NRC, the nuclear 
sector is also connected to the legislative process through lobbying efforts and campaign 
contributions. In 2010, the nuclear sector spent $54 million to lobby Congress and 
employed 12 former members of Congress as lobbyists. Some o f the top legislative 
supporters of nuclear energy, such as the Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman
14 Daniel Kaufmann and Veronica Penciakova, “Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: Assessing Regulatory 
Failure in Japan and the United States,” Brookings Institute Brief, April 1, 2014.
15 Kaufmann and Panciakova, “Preventing N uclear M eltdow n.”
16 Ibid.
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and the House Minority Whip, were the largest recipients o f  campaign contributions from 
Exelon, one of the US’s largest nuclear operating companies.
In Japan, NISA was not an independent regulator and was thus even more 
susceptible to outside influence than the NRC. This has, to some extent, been 
acknowledged and an attempt made at correcting this conflict of interest with the creation 
of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in 2012 under the Ministry o f the Environment. 
Prior to 2012, however, METI’s close connections to the nuclear industry were well 
known, and they have been charged with allegations o f distorting information to public 
officials on nuclear energy and orchestrating the defeat o f alternative energy legislation.17 
Regulatory capture is further perpetuated in Japan by the revolving-door cultural practice 
of amakudari. It is not uncommon for the same individuals to participate in the licensing, 
rulemaking and inspections process at different times. In 2010, for example, Torn Ishida
left his post as the former Director General of METI to be hired by the Tokyo Electric
18Power Company (TEPCO) just 4 months later. The problem of regulatory capture is 
compounded in Japan with lax regulatory standards based on outdated risk-assessment 
methodologies as well as a reluctance to punish private sector deception.
In Germany, however, the processes of approval and regulation are divided at 
three levels: the state (Lander) level, the national level, and through the independent 
regulatory process of the European Nuclear Safety Regulation Group established in 2007. 
The licensing authorities are the Lander (usually competent State ministries) where the 
plant is planned to be installed. There are therefore different geographical regulators
17 Kaufmann and Panciakova, “Preventing Nuclear Meltdown.”
18 Kevin Krolicki and Ross Kerber. “Special Report: Fuel Storage, Safety Issues Vexed Japan Plant,” 
Reuters, March 22, 2011, Accessed March 20, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/22/us-japan- 
nuclear-idUSTRE72L2E820110322.
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which are integrated into various federal states. Safety regulations were issued by the 
federal government until 1986 when the Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (MENCSF) was established to take over this purpose. 
In the most recent system, both the Lander and the MENCSF had equal veto power in 
any siting decision. At all times, safety regulations have been executed by the individual 
Lander, and reactor approvals were decided on a case-by-case basis according to the 
specifics of each location. The Lander had full control over water use and the German 
system was notorious for conducting extensive consultations with environmental experts, 
technical engineers, and labor authorities before approving a site for a nuclear plant.19
These differing systems of approval and regulation were institutionalized early on 
in the development of nuclear energy in both the US and Japan. When then LDP Diet 
member Nakasone visited the US and was advised to liberally fund nuclear research and 
development, enshrine the nuclear initiative in law and encourage top scientists and 
engineers to promote nuclear energy, he returned to Japan and set out to do just that. The 
veil of national security allowed nuclear energy to develop in relative secrecy in the US 
for decades following WWII, and by the time of the 1974 Reorganization Act, the 
reinforcing system of regulation, legislation and industry was already in place and most 
of the reactors that would come into operation in the coming decades were already 
approved. This centralized approval and regulation structure allows few opportunities for 
citizens to challenge the approval or extension o f nuclear plants through most forms of 
citizen participation, whether anti-nuclear protests, organizational opposition or legal 
challenges.
19 Alexandre Bredimas and William J. Nuttall, “A Comparison o f International Regulatory Organizations 
and Licensing Procedures for New Nuclear Power Plants,” Judge Business School, University o f  
Cambridge, EPRG Working Paper.
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The German system, in contrast, has been more open to local societal input and 
generally offers more opportunity points of access for citizen participation in the 
licensing process. One may expect just the opposite to be true, that an independent 
regulatory body would be more open, fair and responsive to citizen action and less 
corruptible by power politics. However, it seems that a govemment-led, de-centralized 
system of approval and regulating is generally more sensitive to outside influences on 
initial plant approval decisions. For instance, the plant proposed at Wyhl was protested 
and occupied so intensively by individuals and organizations that the state government 
did agree to negotiations with local opposition groups, though it was ultimately the 
intervention of the Frieburg Administrative Court that shelved the plans for good. 
Similarly, the administrative court o f the state o f North Rhine-Westphalia halted 
construction of the plant at Kalkar in 1986 in response to the state’s anti-nuclear protests. 
While an independent approval and regulating body sounds good in theory, in practice, a 
system where approval rests in the hands of local governments seems to inspire more of a 
response to citizen opposition, given the government officials could theoretically be 
voted out of their jobs come the next election cycle for approving an unpopular nuclear 
plant.
This difference in reactor approval systems explains why German citizens have 
historically been more successful at stopping new reactors or plants at the approval stage. 
While there have been some successes in the US and Japan in terms o f stopping new 
reactors from construction or halting existing reactors, citizen groups alone have been 
largely unsuccessful at stopping the NRC or NISA from approving new reactors and 
plants. The sooner these plants can be halted or delayed, before utility companies invest
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critical sums of money, the better chance citizens have in stopping the plant from 
construction altogether. Without a significant restructuring of this approval process, 
citizens in the US and in Japan will continue to be less likely to halt new nuclear 
construction at the early, critical stages o f the process.
Public Opinion: Voting
This open system of site approval and safety regulation in Germany is further 
enforced by a democratic system of parliamentarian proportional representation and a 
variety o f viable political parties, particularly, a strong anti-nuclear Green Party. The first 
nuclear phase-out was legislated in the 1990s when, following Chernobyl in 1986, the 
German Green Party gained popularity. The Greens were then able to translate that 
growing support into electoral votes and ultimately form a majority coalition with the 
Social Democrats in the German Parliament in 1998, a coalition majority that would 
create the first nuclear phase-out policy. This Red/Green coalition lasted until 2005 when 
the Christian Democrats retuned to majority and reversed the nuclear phase-out policy. In 
2011, during the months immediately following Fukushima, the German CDU/Angela 
Merkel-led government made no mention o f a nuclear phase-out in response to 
Fukushima, only placing a moratorium on nuclear energy until further investigations 
could be made. In fact, it was just a year earlier in 2010 that Parliament had voted to 
actually extend the lives of existing reactors. In March of 2011, however, the CDU 
suffered a historic loss at the hands o f the Green Party in their historic stronghold of 
Badem-Wurtttemberg, giving the Greens their first state premiership. In other state and 
local elections in Germany, the Greens made similar (though not as symbolic) 
representational gains as nuclear energy became an important electoral issue and post-
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Fukushima anti-nuclear sentiment continued to grow. In May, Merkel announced the 
nuclear phase-out policy which garnered high numbers o f public support.
There are a few key characteristics o f the democratic Germany system of 
representation that distinguish it from both the US and Japan. First, it is a Parliamentarian 
style of government with proportional representation rather than a Presidential one, 
distinguishing it from the US’s winner-take-all system. This difference is significant for 
Green Parties, which may be unable to best a dominant party with a majority o f votes but 
may be able to at least reach the threshold for representation in Parliament where it could 
possibly form a coalition, such as the Red/Green coalition formed in the 1990s. The 
American Green Party has not yet achieved even 1 percent o f overall votes in a national 
election, which means it is highly unlikely the party will be able to achieve the majority 
numbers required for a Congressional seat or Presidential Office in the near (or even 
perhaps distant) future. Since the US system is not based on proportional representation, 
electoral majorities are the only chance the Greens have of national representation.
Second, the German system offers a number of viable parties running for any 
given office, at least one o f which is anti-nuclear. This means the Green Party has options 
for forming coalitions with even relatively like-minded parties reasonably close to them 
in the political spectrum. Perhaps more importantly, it means that anti-nuclear voters 
have an incentive to cast their vote for an anti-nuclear “third” party like the Greens 
because there is the legitimate possibility the Green Party could receive enough votes to 
gamer parliamentary representation and subsequently influence nuclear policy. In the 
US’s two-party system, voting for a third party anti-nuclear candidate is not incentivized 
because there is little chance that candidate will achieve the required electoral majority.
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Third-party voters are told they are “throwing away their votes.” Furthermore, within this 
American two-party system, there is no viable anti-nuclear party. In the 2012 presidential 
election, both the Republican and Democratic candidates were pro-nuclear as a part of 
their “all o f the above” strategy to energy. In the end, American voters are left without 
options for using the democratic process o f voting to influence nuclear energy policy.
The Japanese system does resemble the German parliamentarian system in most 
key respects as a hybrid style of proportional and direct representation in the Diet; 
however, Japan’s democratic process has long been hampered by a pattern o f one-party 
dominance since the pro-nuclear LDP’s founding after WWII. In fact, the conservative 
LDP has consistently been in power in Japan since 1955, except for a brief 11-month stint 
in between 1993 and 1994 and for three years before 2009 and 2012, when it was 
returned to power in the most recent general election. There is no lack o f opposition 
parties, such as the Democratic Party o f Japan (DPJ), which gave the LDP its longest run 
as Diet opposition party between 2009-2012; the Social Democratic Party (SDP); the 
neoliberal Your Party (YP); the Japan Communist Party (JCP), the oldest functioning 
party in Japan; or the New Komeito Party, with which the LDP is currently in a coalition. 
Even given the presence o f these multiple parties on ballots, the political machinery of 
the LDP ensures it is a consistent winner. Japanese voters did not even have an anti- 
nuclear Green Party voting option until the Green Wind Party was formed in 2012 in a 
direct response to Fukushima. That is not to say that other parties have not taken an ant- 
nuclear stance since Fukushima, even though opposition to nuclear energy is not a 
consistent part o f their party’s doctrine. The recent 2014 Tokyo gubernatorial election 
saw two candidates run on anti-nuclear platforms, one from the DPJ (interestingly
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enough, backed by a former LDP Prime Minster) and one backed by a JCP/SDP 
cooperation.20 The media slated the election as a referendum on nuclear energy. In the 
end, the pro-nuclear LDP candidate won in a land-slide victory that the LDP hoped 
would signal to opposition parties that a Japanese nuclear phase-out is just not going to 
happen.
So, while Japan has a parliamentarian, proportionally representative style of 
government (like Germany) it has historically been dominated by one pro-nuclear party, 
the LDP, which has a strong connection to and interests in the nuclear industry. Without 
viable anti-nuclear voting options, citizen participation in nuclear policy through the 
direct election o f legislators continues to be limited in Japan. Similarly, the US’s winner- 
take-all presidential system of two-party pro-nuclear dominance also leaves voters with 
few options for electing anti-nuclear representation and subsequently influencing nuclear 
energy policy. Based on this analysis, the third secondary finding of this research is that 
citizens are more capable of influencing nuclear energy policy in a parliamentarian 
system of proportional representation where there are a variety of parties and at least one 
viable anti-nuclear candidate. This type of system is found in Germany, where a Green 
Party parliamentarian coalition in the 1990s legislated the first nuclear phase-out and 
Green Party gains in 2011 state and local elections likely created concern among the 
ruling CDU and precipitated a post-Fukushima nuclear phase-out.
Based on the previous discussion, an additional secondary finding can be 
presented in this section. This research on the relationship between public approval or 
opposition to nuclear energy seems to indicate a generally weak relationship between
20 Strategically speaking, having 2 anti-nuclear candidates in the election was a flawed plan since it split the 
anti-nuclear vote.
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society and state decisions to pursue or not pursue nuclear energy, especially in the US 
and Japan where citizen opportunity structures are limited. Even in Germany, where the 
relationship is strongest and citizens have the best opportunities for input, nuclear policy 
has not always been aligned with public opinion. This observation may initially lead one 
to the realist, state-centric conclusion that states tend to do what they want to preserve 
their own power and pursue their national goals despite domestic constraints. Even the 
CDU’s post-Fukushima nuclear phase-out could just as legitimately be viewed as a move 
to preserve its own power as to respond to its public. However, this research also seems 
to point to a constructivist argument that would explain why the American, German and 
Japanese publics feel differently toward nuclear energy and are therefore either more or 
less accepting of state initiatives to pursue it. The way in which the issue of nuclear 
energy is constructed within a state matters, at least to the extent that states find it easier 
to gain public acceptance of nuclear energy and then actively pursue that energy when it 
is constructed as an imperative or, at the very least, not constructed negatively.
In the US, this “nuclear narrative” is largely absent, though nuclear energy has 
been historically insulated from negative construction, at least at the state level. 
Beginning with President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech in 1953, nuclear energy 
has been largely (though not completely) decoupled from the separate issue of nuclear 
weapons. 10 years later, in 1963, President John F. Kennedy would also speak out in 
favor of nuclear energy in what became known as his “Best of the Above” speech. A 
string of subsequent pro-nuclear presidents further contributed to the positive image of 
nuclear energy. The lone anti-nuclear exception, President Jimmy Carter, had the bad 
luck to be in office during the 1970s energy crises and following the Three Mile Island
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incident in 1979. President Ronald Reagan, in office for Chernobyl in 1986, used the 
nuclear incident as an opportunity to generate Cold War rhetoric aimed at the Soviet 
Union’s poor handling of the disaster and what he perceived to be its unwillingness to be 
forthright about the extent of the damage. No public statement was ever issued that linked 
what happened at Chernobyl with American nuclear energy safety. Though some polling 
reports indicate that public approval for nuclear energy declined precipitously in 1982 in 
response to the Cold War arms build-up, Americans may have been more risk-tolerant of 
nuclear safety issues (weapons or energy) perhaps because o f the Cold War and the US’s 
perceived role as the “leader o f the free world” and counterbalance to what lay behind the 
Iron Curtain.
The following Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations have likewise all 
been pro-nuclear. The official narrative coming from Washington has largely been about 
the employment and economic benefits associated with nuclear energy, while the official 
line coming from the Department o f Energy has played to nuclear energy’s clean, 
environmentally friendly electricity production. I would ultimately argue, however, that 
the nuclear narrative is absent in the US because there have never been any serious 
nuclear accidents comparable to Chernobyl or Fukushima that directly impacted US 
citizens; because most Americans who would be actively anti-nuclear are currently more 
concerned with the environmental impacts o f hydraulic fracturing technology and the 
controversial Keystone Pipeline; because the prevailing narrative in the US right now is 
about the economic recovery; because nuclear energy seems like a topic one has to be 
“qualified” to talk about; and, finally, because o f comparative demographic constraints. 
The US covers almost 4 million square miles with 314 million people. The vast majority
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of reactors in operation are concentrated in the electricity demand-heavy Eastern coast 
and in some southern and mid-western states. People in Montana, Idaho, or Colorado, 
however, may not live within hundreds o f miles of a nuclear reactor and are therefore 
likely to be ambivalent about nuclear energy. When compared with a German population 
of 82 million people within 138,000 square miles and a Japanese population o f 127 
million people within 146,000 square miles, the location of nuclear reactors is important 
to everyone because, effectively, they are in everyone’s back yards. Nuclear energy is 
just not an issue that has been commonly discussed in the US, for whatever reason. To 
offer a personal anecdote, I recently asked my 400-level political science class at Old 
Dominion University if they knew how many nuclear reactors were in operation in the 
US. Guesses ranged from 2 reactors to 300 reactors, indicating to me that they had no 
idea that the number is closer to 100 or that there is a nuclear reactor in the neighboring 
community o f Chesapeake. This prevailing national apathy toward nuclear energy is the 
reason a countervailing “nuclear narrative” has never really had to emerge. As far as the 
US as a state that wants to pursue nuclear energy has been concerned, maintaining this 
status quo by marginalizing references to nuclear energy has been effective enough. In 
other words, if ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
In contrast, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy have always been closely linked 
in Germany, a country that found itself negotiating and adapting to a new self-identity 
after WWII. Following the Second World War, Western Germany was forbidden by the 
Treaty of Brussels from developing nuclear weapons, yet it was allowed to develop 
nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Even though Western Germany was a non­
nuclear power, as the Cold War progressed, nuclear weapons were deployed in Western
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Germany by the United States and other NATO powers under NATO’s “nuclear sharing 
policy” and in Eastern Germany by the Soviet Union. When NATO powers began honing 
their short-range missile systems, Western Germany came to the realization that it would 
serve as a likely battlefield where East meets West should the Cold War reach a point of 
criticality. After the establishment o f the 1957 European Atomic Energy Community, 
Western Germany expressed a desire to develop a weapons program in tandem with 
France and Italy. In 1958, however, Charles de Gaulle became president o f France and 
both Italy and Western Germany were quickly excluded from the nuclear weapons 
project. Therefore, throughout the years o f the Cold War and the nuclear arms race, 
Western Germany found itself in the uncomfortable position of being denied access to 
“self-defense weapons,” and instead relying on NATO forces for protection from its 
USSR neighbor, all with the knowledge that if the nuclear detente between West and East 
deteriorated, its geographic location would on the border between the two powers would 
be a likely spot for militarized action. Essentially, Western Germany was rearmed during 
the Cold War, but not with weapons over which it had much decisive control.
Beyond the national security goals of the state, domestically speaking, there was a 
strong citizen anti-proliferation sentiment developing from the demilitarization campaign. 
As German citizens dealt with the lasting psychological impact o f WWII and the 
Holocaust, this sentiment grew and civil society groups consistently campaigned for a 
nuclear-free Germany. The two opposing forces o f demilitarization/anti proliferation and 
Cold War weapons concerns created an environment where an effective anti-nuclear 
Green party could grow and further shaped the negative narrative about nuclear weapons 
and nuclear energy that had begun with the peace movement. When the Chernobyl
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nuclear disaster transpired in 1986 just 800 miles from Berlin, many o f the worst aspects 
of nuclear technology were confirmed. When the Red/Green coalition in the 1990s 
moved to legislate a nuclear phase-out, it seemed the state now agreed that nuclear 
technology was unsafe. All of these factors— geopolitical location, Cold War tensions, 
the psychological legacy o f WWII, demilitarization, NATO nuclear sharing, 
nonproliferation goals, and Chernobyl— contributed to the creation o f the prevailing 
“negative nuclear narrative” in Germany.
The example o f Germany shows that while states may not necessarily participate 
in the creation of the nuclear narrative (it may be caused by historical, geopolitical or 
international forces) they do have to operate within and are constrained by them. In the 
US, the absence of a strong nuclear narrative works in the favor o f the state, while in 
Germany, the negative nuclear narrative made the post-Fukushima nuclear phase-out 
more feasible, especially given the cost sharing that would fall to rate payers.
In Japan, however, the state actively worked to create a positive nuclear narrative 
among citizens toward nuclear energy separate from that of nuclear weapons. Japan is the 
only country in the world to directly experience the devastation wrought by atomic 
weapons. In this context, it is not difficult to understand citizens’ initial reluctance toward 
accepting nuclear technology o f any kind, even if  it was for peaceful purposes. Part o f 
nuclear power’s success in Japan is owed to Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was as a sailor in 
the Imperial Japanese Navy during WWII and later began his political career as the Diet 
member who visited the US in 1953 and learned about the potential o f peaceful nuclear 
technology. In 1954, at Nakasone’s urging, the government granted the equivalent o f $14 
million dollars to the Agency for Industrial Science and Technology for early-stage
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nuclear research. Nakasone would later rise in the ranks through different positions, most 
notably the Minister of Science in 1959, Minister o f International Trade and Industry in 
1972, and finally, Prime Minister from November 1982 to November 1987. Throughout 
his rise, Nakasone was continually promoting nuclear energy at every legislative level, 
citing a lack of natural resources as the most critical issue Japan faced after WWII.21 He 
was a member o f the first budget committees to specifically allocate money to nuclear 
energy, had a large hand in writing the first Atomic Energy Laws in Japan, and he created 
supra-partisinal nuclear committee dedicated to nuclear energy promotion. Even in late 
March of 2011, after Fukushima, he said in an interview that he still believes nuclear 
energy is the future of power generation.22 Without the early willingness o f Nakasone to 
visit and leam from the US’s peaceful nuclear program and then work within the 
Japanese legislative and financial process to institutionalize energy pursuance, nuclear 
energy may not have been as successful in Japan’s post-war nuclear reluctant society.
Nakasone’s enthusiasm also spurred government initiatives to actively work to 
create a positive nuclear narrative. As mentioned earlier in the case study on Japan, 
nuclear energy was promoted through community festivals, propaganda literature, 
popular culture such as the widely read manga series Astro Boy23, an annual celebration 
o f Nuclear Power Day, and even pro-nuclear science curricula built into the primary and 
secondary educational system. Most importantly, the government effectively linked 
nuclear power with economic recovery after WWII and portrayed nuclear energy as 
imperative for Japan’s energy security and independence. This official message was
2iTakafumi Yoshida, “Interview with Yasuhiro Nakasone: Leam Lessons From Fukushima and Continue to 
Promote Nuclear Energy,” Asahi Shimbun, May 23, 2011, Accessed March 30, 2014, 
http://aiw.asahi.com/article/0311 disaster/opinion/AJ201105232599.
22 Takafumi, “Interview with Yasuhiro Nakasone.”
23 Astro Boy is about a young protagonist named Atom who lives in a nuclear powered “wonder world”.
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promoted relentlessly by the government and the utility companies, and throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, they had the country’s exponential (and, according to some accounts, 
“miraculous”) economic growth to reinforce their message. Without this economic 
growth (and the reactor community subsidies that came with, perhaps) it is unlikely their 
positive portrayal of nuclear energy would have been as accepted as it was, considering it 
was only marginally accepted in the first place and created generally ambiguous feelings 
about nuclear energy among a citizenry that tolerated nuclear technology because it felt it 
was left with little choice.24
Despite early lingering reluctance from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings 
and recent reluctance and public opposition to nuclear energy as a result o f the 
Fukushima disaster, the government has again been able to revive this pro-nuclear 
rhetoric to begin recreating the positive image o f nuclear energy in Japan. Following the 
DPJ majority’s post-Fukushima decision to close the country’s reactors and phase out 
nuclear energy, voters returned the pro-nuclear LDP party to a majority in the 2012 
general election. Similarly, in the recent Tokyo gubernatorial elections (which were 
slated by close followers as a referendum on nuclear energy since it would essentially 
decide control o f one of the largest utility companies in Japan, TEPCO, the utility 
company also responsible for operating the Fukushima Daiichi reactor) voters chose the 
LDP candidate in a land-slide victory.
Can these electoral victories be accepted as general approval for nuclear energy? 
The answer is not so simple. Throughout the tenuous DPJ Diet majority period from 
2009-2012, most people assumed that it would only be a matter o f time before the LDP
24 The French government was successful at a similar campaign, promoting the slogan, “no coal, no oil, no 
gas, no choice.”
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flexed its political-machine muscle and regained control o f the Upper and Lower Houses 
of the Diet, which they did in December of 2012. This was no small-scale victory, either. 
The LDP took 114 of the 242 House of Councillors seats and 294 of the 480 House of 
Representatives seats, sealing a solid majority win. After the bungled DPJ response to 
Fukushima and 3 new DPJ Prime Ministers in as many years, the LDP’s victory was 
almost expected; however, this victory cannot be linked solely to the issue of nuclear 
energy. The LDP has always been a party known for strong economic performance. It 
was the LDP, after all, that led Japan through two decades of unprecedented growth in 
the 1960s and 70s. When LDP party leader Shinzo Abe used his economic plan that came 
to known as “Abenomics” as a general platform for the 2012 election, the likely scenario 
is that the hope of an economic upswing trumped voter concerns over nuclear energy, 
which Abe again promoted as part of a solid economic recovery and energy 
independence plan. Abe furthermore linked nuclear energy to energy independence from 
imports, a theme which resonated with voters who were paying triple the regular utility 
rates since 2011. As luck would have it for Abe and the LDP, and in a situation eerily 
similar to the one in which the same party found itself promoting nuclear energy after 
WWII, Abenomics seemed to initially work when, in February o f 2013, deflation 
reversed and the Nikkei stock exchange grew for the first time in decades. If economic 
improvement trends continue, it is likely that the LDP will also continue to enjoy 
unchallenged majorities and will proceed with its nuclear restart plan.
By again returning to the positive narrative o f nuclear energy’s pivotal role in 
economic growth and energy independence, the LDP has again been able to persuade a 
society that is reluctant (at best) about nuclear energy to return them to majority power
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with full cognizance of the return to nuclear that electoral decision would bring. Rather 
than assume that the Japanese society is openly accepting of nuclear energy, it is more 
likely the LDP was able to rely on and re-galvanize a well-established “positive nuclear 
narrative” that positively linked the economy (an issue most voters care deeply about) 
with nuclear energy (an issue most voters are skeptical, ambivalent or increasingly 
negative about). In this case, the state actively participated in the formation of a nuclear 
narrative that ran directly counter to the one that would have likely developed naturally 
after the atomic bombings in WWII. The state also used Japan’s unfortunate geopolitical 
lack of resources to further establish nuclear energy as an imperative part o f security. 
Lastly, by successfully linking nuclear energy with economic growth and then delivering 
on promised growth, the state established and then used this positive nuclear narrative to 
pursue the nuclear policy initiatives it wanted to pursue all along.
To summarize, the primary finding of this section in relation to the study’s 
original hypothesis is that the relationship between public opinion and nuclear pursuance 
seems to be weak. However, solely comparing opinion polling information and nuclear 
pursuance does not tell the entire story of citizen participation in nuclear energy 
pursuance. Further analysis of protest activity and voting patterns is a better way to leam 
to what extent citizens are willing to act on anti- or pro nuclear sentiments and to what 
extent those actions are effective. This analysis revealed four secondary findings, the first 
of which is that anti-nuclear citizen involvement is most successful when it can pose 
costly or legal barriers to early nuclear constmction or it can involve the intervention of 
states on its behalf. Second, citizens are best able to pose these barriers in de-centralized, 
govemment-led reactor approval and safety regulation systems, like in Germany.
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Conversely, citizens are least likely to be able to pose costly barriers to construction in a 
centralized system where the reactor approval and safety regulation body is independent 
(like in the US and Japan) and where the problem of regulatory capture developed early 
within regulating bodies that were dually tasked with regulation and promotion. Third, 
citizens are most likely to be able to influence nuclear pursuance through voting in a 
system of proportional representation where there are numerous viable parties, at least 
one of which is anti-nuclear. Lastly, while the realist argument seems to explain state 
pursuance of nuclear energy even when confronted with citizen opposition to nuclear 
energy, a constructivist analysis reveals that states do have to work within prevailing 
“nuclear narratives.” These narratives are created through a variety o f state and non-state 
influences, but are most successful at gaining citizen acceptance (or tolerance) o f nuclear 
energy if they effectively link nuclear energy with economic success and energy 
independence.
The simple fact that states employ agencies that actively promote nuclear energy 
seems to point to the importance of public acceptance when crafting policies to pursue 
nuclear energy. While one would expect this in a strong democracy, the degree to which 
citizens have influence over the state varies widely among democratic nations. Even 
within these 3 case studies, all o f which are classified as strong democracies, there is a 
variance in citizen influence over nuclear energy pursuance. Some o f these factors are 
difficult, if not impossible to change, such as the structure of approval and regulating 
systems or the representative style of governments. However, post-Fukushima 
antinuclear movements will be most effective if  they can create barriers to increase the 
cost o f pursuing nuclear energy, especially compared to other available forms of energy.
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Nuclear Disasters: Three Mile Island, 1979
By solely comparing nuclear output as a percentage o f electrical energy generated 
before and after 1979, the clearest conclusion is that Three Mile Island had little effect on 
nuclear pursuance in the US, Germany or Japan. All three countries increased nuclear 
output throughout the 1980s as reactors approved in the 1960s and 1970s came online 
and began generating energy. If nuclear pursuance is measured by new reactors approved, 
then Three Mile Island had a negative effect only in the US, which approved no new 
reactors after 1978 until 2012. Germany continued approving new reactors until 1982, 
and actually revamped nuclear approval process in the late 1970s to limit opportunity for 
public approval. It is difficult to draw a clear relationship between reactor approvals in 
Germany after Three Mile Island, however, because the last group of reactors were 
approved in 1982 (after Three Mile Island) but before Chernobyl in 1986. Japan, a 
relative latecomer to nuclear development compared to the US or Germany, approved 
new reactors every decade into the 1990s. This reactionary decline in new reactors in the 
US, however, is not likely explainable by safety concerns or by negative shifts in public 
approval. Rather, utility companies were not applying for new reactor licenses due to the 
increased costs of operating a nuclear facility under tighter safety regulations.
The Three Mile Island incident did spur citizen action in the US and Germany. 
The anti-nuclear American Green Party was founded in 1984, though this party has 
ultimately had little influence on national nuclear energy policy considering 
representatives hold no national or state-level offices. In Germany, the incident at Three 
Mile Island further galvanized an already significant anti-nuclear movement. The Green 
Party o f Western Germany was founded in 1980 (and would later merge with the same
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party in Eastern Germany after reunification) and would grow throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, eventually forming a majority coalition in Parliament and instituting anti-nuclear 
policy. Similarly, the last group of reactors was approved in Germany in 1982. However, 
it is difficult to say what direct influence Three Mile Island had on these party formations 
or whether they would have formed anyway without the Three Mile Island incident. 
Ultimately, the most significant impact of Three Mile Island was an increase the 
operating cost of nuclear plants resulting from tighter safety regulations, an increase 
which few utility companies were motivated to pay in the US.
Chernobyl, 1986
Of the three case studies, the Chernobyl disaster appears to have had the greatest 
impact on German nuclear energy pursuance, though the effects would not be 
immediately noticeable by looking at nuclear output numbers of reactor approvals alone. 
The number of reactors in operation peaked in the 1980s and 1990s as new reactors came 
online and older reactors approved in the 1960s were still in operation. Accordingly, 
nuclear pursuance defined by nuclear energy output as a percentage of electrical energy 
total was also high in the 80s and 90s, though it would not peak until 2000. By 1990, 
every reactor that would generate nuclear energy had already begun doing so with the last 
reactor approval happening in 1982.
However, Chernobyl added weight to an increasingly significant anti-nuclear 
movement in Germany in the late 1980s. The membership and support o f the anti-nuclear 
Green Party increased, and the number o f seats won in local elections increased from 0 in 
1980 to 42 in 1987 and propelled the party to its first year o f parliamentarian 
representation in 1998. Chernobyl also unified a national movement against nuclear
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energy and, within the context o f the Cold War, further shaped the negative nuclear 
narrative that was pervasive in Germany at the time. O f course, it is difficult to say 
whether the nuclear phase-out of the 1990s would have occurred without Chernobyl, 
though it may be accurate to say the Green Party would have been unlikely to reach the 
electoral threshold and have the opportunity to form a coalition without the anti-nuclear 
inspiration o f Chernobyl. In the long-term, however, the fervor of Chernobyl would seem 
to be forgotten as the CDU reversed the nuclear phase-out policy in 2005.
In the US, the Chernobyl disaster was linked with the Cold War more than it was 
with concerns over nuclear energy generation, which increased throughout the 1980s and, 
even though no new reactors were approved and built, older reactors were relicensed for 
continued operation. According to one set o f polling data, public opinion for nuclear 
energy shifted in the US in 1982 rather than in 1986 as a result of the arms buildup rather 
than Chernobyl. Japan continued approving new reactors throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, thus steadily increasing its nuclear generation. It would not be until 25 years later 
that the course of Japanese nuclear pursuance would see any interruption.
Fukushima, 2011
The 2011 Fukushima disaster had significant impacts in both Germany and Japan, 
though these effects may only prove to be for the short-term in Japan. In 2012, the US 
approved the first new reactor since 1978 and President Obama publicly stated that, 
though the US sympathizes with the people of Japan, nuclear energy would remain a part 
of the US electrical energy mix. In Germany, after a brief moratorium on nuclear energy, 
Chancellor Angel Merkel announced Germany would again institute a nuclear phase-out 
that would be completed by 2022 and begin a transition to renewable energy. It is unclear
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whether this policy was related to concerns about nuclear safety or to electoral worries 
after significant Green Party wins in the immediate month following Fukushima. The 
nuclear phase-out may most accurately be explained by Germany’s access to other 
resources and its already well-established renewable energy sector. In fact, one may be 
able to assume that a nuclear phase-out was likely inevitable in Germany, and the 2010 
policy of extending the lives o f existing reactors for an additional 10 years was merely a 
stop-gap measure before allowing renewable sources to compensate for the electricity 
from future decommissioned, aging reactors. Regardless of the motivation, the 
Fukushima disaster provided the impetus for Germany to institute a long-term policy that 
is unlikely to be reversed even if the CDU loses majority in future elections considering 
the CDU is the least likely possible party to institute a nuclear phase-out in the first 
place.25
In Japan, it is yet unclear if the effects o f Fukushima will only prove to be short­
term in regard to nuclear energy pursuance. Though Japan would eventually shut down 
all of its nuclear plants by 2012 for safety inspections, reactors under construction 
continued after 2011 and the goal of the LDP-led Japanese government is to restart all 
reactors that adhere to new safety guidelines. Given Japan’s lack o f natural resource 
endowments and expensive trading options, it finds itself in a situation unlike that o f the 
US or Germany. Even with increased operating costs related to required safety design 
improvements, it may still prove to be less expensive for Japan to pursue nuclear energy. 
Also, given the history of lax regulating standards and outdated risk-assessment 
methodologies, it may be that safety-related costs do not significantly increase, though it
25 Consequently, Angela Merkel and the CDU had their best election results in the 2013 German Federal 
Election since 1990.
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is unclear to what extent the newly formed Nuclear Regulation Authority will break from 
the negligent patterns of its predecessor, NISA.
This study’s original hypothesis was that nuclear accidents would have a negative 
impact on state decision to pursue nuclear energy. It appears the relationship between 
disasters and state decisions to pursue nuclear energy is weak. Post-Fukushima nuclear 
energy policy remained positive in the US. Immediate nuclear energy policy in Japan did 
become negative as the country slowly shut down all o f its reactors, but that may only 
prove to be a short-term response as there is a current campaign that shows all signs o f 
success to restart those reactors and to build new ones. Germany presented the only 
instance of a negative post-Fukushima nuclear energy policy response, though it is 
unclear to what extent Fukushima created that policy or if a nuclear phase-out was 
inevitable and Fukushima only hastened its implementation.
The secondary findings of this section are that, first, domestic nuclear disasters 
may only have short-term impacts on decisions to pursue nuclear energy. In the US, no 
new reactors were approved after 1978, but increasing oil prices in the 2000s brought 
rumors of a “nuclear renaissance” in the US that may have begun with the first new 
reactor approval and construction in 2012. Though the Chernobyl disaster did not occur 
within Germany, Chernobyl was only 800 miles from Berlin, roughly the same distance 
from Middletown, PA, to Atlanta, GA. Considering the close geographic proximity, 
Western Germany would share in the consequences o f the Chernobyl disaster. Even 
though Chernobyl mobilized voters to bring the Green Party to parliament and institute a 
nuclear phase-out policy, that policy would later be reversed in 2005. Similarly, though 
Japan immediately closed its existing reactors, the plan is for an eventual restart.
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Germany’s anti-nuclear response to Fukushima seems to be the outlying case in this 
study, and may be explainable with the idea that an anti-nuclear policy was already 
inevitable by 2011.
Secondly, nuclear disasters stimulate anti-nuclear movements by giving citizens 
evidence that nuclear technology may be unsafe, though increased opposition may not 
necessarily translate into policy change. The early development o f the Green Parties in 
the US and Germany occurred after Three Mile Island, and the most recent Green Party 
in Japan similarly developed after Fukushima. This party development is a natural, 
democratic outgrowth of anti-nuclear sentiments. To what extent those movements are 
able to ultimately influence nuclear energy policy, however, is then either limited or 
enabled by the systemic structures in which they are operating, as discussed in the 
previous section. Even if nuclear disasters increase public opposition to nuclear energy, 
there is no guarantee that opposition will result in policy change.
Access to Other Resources
O f all variables tested, consideration of a state’s access to other resources seems 
to offer the clearest explanatory power for nuclear pursuance. Fully capturing this aspect 
of state decisions to pursue or not pursue nuclear energy requires analyzing both current 
endowments o f natural resources and the potential for future access to those resources as 
well as a country’s current trading relationships and projected trading relationships with 
respect to energy resource price. The original hypothesis is that countries that possess 
endowments o f natural resources will be less likely to pursue nuclear energy and 
countries that lack natural resource endowments will be less likely to pursue nuclear 
energy. Additionally, countries that are capable o f  obtaining electrical energy generating
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resources from reliable trading partners at competitively affordable prices will be less 
likely to pursue nuclear energy. This variable attempts to capture current decisions about 
nuclear energy given other possible energy options as well as the projected future for 
nuclear energy in each case given these options.
The first primary conclusion of this section is that if countries possess natural 
endowments o f energy generating natural resources, they will be less likely to pursue 
nuclear energy. Of the three cases, the US has the greatest endowment of natural 
resources. The US has always possessed vast coal reserves, upon which it has historically 
relied most heavily for electricity generation. It has only been in the past two years that 
coal consumption for electricity has decreased to proportions almost equal to natural gas 
used for electricity. New hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technologies have 
granted access to reserves of oil and natural gas which were previously unreachable with 
existing extraction methods. By utilizing these new technologies, the US is predicted to 
be a natural gas net exporter by 2018. Already, natural gas imports from Canada have 
decreased and exports to Mexico have increased. Oil production has also increased, but 
the US uses relatively small amounts of oil to produce electricity. Such a large amount of 
available natural gas has reduced the price o f natural gas in the US to the cheapest in the 
21st century.
Previous analysis reveals that when natural gas prices decrease, so do applications 
for new nuclear reactors. Even though this study has characterized the US as a nuclear- 
pursuing country based on its first approved application for a new reactor in 2012 and 
consistent nuclear energy generation, future projections reveal that, without significantly 
more new reactors, nuclear energy generation will steadily decrease as aging reactors
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from the 1960s and 1970s reach their decommissioning point. Already, 70 plants have 
applied for and been granted reactor life extensions, but those extensions will not 
continue indefinitely. It is currently impossible to know for sure how long reactors can 
operate safely since this generation constitutes the first wave of reactor extensions. 
Without new reactors to replace decommissioned ones, nuclear energy pursuance will 
inevitable decrease. However, if historical trends are any indication, continued low 
natural gas prices will discourage investment in nuclear energy since both the natural gas 
will be inexpensive and natural gas electricity generation plants are cheaper to build than 
nuclear or coal plants. The Energy Information Administration predicts that both nuclear 
and coal reliance will decrease in the future as natural gas use increases 16 percent by 
2017.26
The increased construction and operating costs o f nuclear plants and a natural 
endowment o f inexpensive coal that can be used for electricity largely explains the lack 
of reactor applications in the US since 1978. Even without new reactors, the US has still 
consistently relied on nuclear energy for 20 percent of its overall electricity generation, a 
percentage share that places it among the biggest consumers of nuclear energy in the 
world. These deterrent operating costs have not decreased, and when coupled with natural 
gas abundance and historically low natural gas prices, nuclear reliance will continue to 
decrease. This phenomenon is already observable in the early closures o f 4 fully 
functional and legally approved nuclear plants in 2013. In the US, it seems the market has 
largely made the decision about the future o f nuclear for the state. With access to an 
abundance of other, cheaper options, it will be difficult to attract investment in nuclear
26 “AEO 2014 Early Release Overview,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated December 16, 
2013, Accessed April 1, 2014. http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/early_elecgen.cfm.
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energy from utility companies, even if  the state wanted to. Given these domestic options, 
the state also has little incentive to subsidize nuclear energy when it could instead invest 
in the country’s potentially profitable future as a natural gas exporter.
The US is also the most geographically fortunate o f these three cases. Both o f its 
neighbors, Canada and Mexico, possess natural resources of their own and are both 
engaged with the US in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Additionally, the 
currently pending Keystone Pipeline would create further interdependence between the 
US and Canada and increase the two’s energy cooperation.
Germany is not as fortunate, as natural gas prices are consistently higher in 
European and Asian markets than the Henry Hub North American spot price. Given 
Russia is the world’s largest natural gas exporter, it would seem that Germany would 
have energy options; however, reliance on Russia, a country increasingly becoming a 
political pariah, is problematic at best. Luckily, Norway is the fourth largest exporter of 
natural gas in the world and German agreements with Canada (and talks underway with 
the US) also seem to indicate that it will continue to have access to natural gas without 
the politically problematic reliance on Russia, even if it is at higher prices. In a stroke of 
foresight, Germany has long been working to counter this problem by developing the 
world’s leading renewable energy resource sector. The 2000 Renewable Energy Act 
incentivized corporate and individual investment in renewable energy technology and 
grid support. Now, Germany is among the leading countries in the world for solar, wind 
and biomass resources. The rolling electrical blackouts that many predicted would come 
after Germany began turning off their nuclear plants never materialized as the country 
increased its reliance on these renewable resources. The likely scenario is that German
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leaders knew the infrastructure capability already existed to compensate for nuclear when 
it announced the nuclear phase-out in 2011. Even with renewed citizen opposition to 
nuclear energy, people would have likely been more upset about regular electrical 
outages that could have come from closing nuclear plants. For this reason, the nuclear 
phase-out is largely explainable by looking to German’s long-term plans to only use 
nuclear as a bridging resource until renewable infrastructure was robust. Even though 
Fukushima accelerated this plan, leaders had to know that phasing out nuclear energy 
would have resulted in electrical shortages given the backlash widespread outages would 
have caused. Ultimately, though Germany has few natural resources o f its own compared 
to the US, it does have abundant current and future trading options, even if  resources are 
priced marginally higher than in the US. Additionally, Germany has created its own 
abundance o f resources by developing the technology to harness renewable sources such 
as sun and wind power. Given these options, continuing to rely on increasingly unpopular 
nuclear energy would have been illogical for Merkel and the CDU, especially two years 
out from a national election.
With no natural resource endowments to speak of, Japan imports roughly 85 
percent o f its overall energy resources. Japan has many regional trading partners, but 
most are located far from the Northeast Asian island nation and transportation increases 
already elevated Asian market prices. Even though it is one of the most energy efficient 
countries in the world, it is also the most energy reliant, and with a national debt that 
currently tops 230 percent of GDP, importing expensive energy resources is not an ideal 
component o f Abe’s plan for economic growth. This explains Japan’s continued 
pursuance of nuclear energy since WWII as well as the country’s incentive to again
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return to nuclear energy, even after Fukushima. Even though the Fukushima disaster will 
likely increase the operating cost of nuclear plants in Japan, nuclear energy is still a more 
affordable option than continuing to import 85 percent of energy resources. A second 
motivating factor for Japan is the desire to continue exporting nuclear reactor technology, 
an industry in which it has long excelled but has seen decreased profits since Fukushima. 
Their campaign to create “the world’s safest nuclear energy technology” is no doubt to 
convince Japanese citizens as well as future buyers. Though this may only be a marginal 
concern, increasing security tensions in the region between China and Japan may also be 
a motivating factor for Japan to increase its energy independence.
To summarize the findings o f this study, it seems that few factors influence 
decisions to pursue nuclear energy as directly as to what extent countries have other 
energy options. Closed opportunity structures in the US and Japan have and will likely 
continue to limit citizen participation in the process o f nuclear policy decision making. 
Similarly, nuclear disasters have been shown to have little lasting, long-term impact on 
state decisions about nuclear energy unless they result in added costs that make nuclear 
investment more expensive than other energy options. The US will begin to very 
gradually phase out nuclear energy, a move partly due to the increased availability of 
natural gas and partly because of market considerations, though not necessarily as a 
response to Fukushima. Germany will also continue their nuclear phase-out, though at a 
much faster pace as it moves increasingly toward renewable energy sources. For the 
Germans, Fukushima did not necessarily force a reversal of nuclear energy policy; rather, 
it simply hastened a move away from nuclear that had already become inevitable. Lastly, 
the future of Japanese energy is as o f yet unclear, though a complete restart o f their
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nuclear sector would not surprise many. Given its limited resources, limited options, and 




This concluding chapter will first examine the energy outlooks for the United 
States, Germany and Japan based on future projections o f electricity demand, available 
supply and other geopolitical and economic factors. Second, this project will conclude by 
widening the scope to other countries that are currently pursuing nuclear energy, 
specifically, Russia, China and Ukraine. These three countries offer an opportunity to test 
the conclusions o f this study in countries that do not possess all o f the control variables 
found in the US, Germany and Japan; that is, they are not all democratic, Western, 
economically developed countries, but they are actively pursuing nuclear energy agendas. 
Lastly, this concluding chapter will end with final comments on what I consider this 
project’s most significant findings and their broader applicability to the world o f energy 
geopolitics.
Energy Outlooks: The United States, Germany and Japan
One of the longest established trends in energy is the increasing role o f the power 
sector.1 The most recent BP Energy Outlook predicts that, in 2012, 42 percent o f primary 
energy was converted into electricity, up from 30 percent in 1965. In addition, by 2035, 
that share will increase to 46 percent2. The power sector is the one place in the global 
energy market that all resources compete. Therefore, as electrical energy demand 
increases globally, the interplay of availability and price o f a variety o f resources will
1 “BP Energy Outlook: 2035,” British Petroleum, Released January 2014.
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf7Energv-economies/Energy- 
Outlook/Energy Outlook 2035 booklet.pdf.
2 Ibid.
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dominate the energy conversation. Coal is projected to remain the primary energy- 
generating resource through 2035 when it is overtaken by natural gas. Projections also 
anticipate that renewable sources outpace nuclear as a source of power generation by 
2028 and show no sign of approaching a limit to their market share.3
Overall electricity demand has decreased in the US since 2008, but is projected to 
rise as the American economy recovers. By 2040, projections place natural gas at 35 
percent of total electrical generation in the US and coal at 32 percent.4 Legislation passed 
at the beginning of 2013 to incentivize renewable energy investment is also expected to 
increase the market share of renewable resources such as solar and wind. Nuclear 
generation is projected to decrease in the short term as many plants continue early 
closures due to unprofitable economic conditions for nuclear energy when confronted 
with low market prices o f natural gas. However, after 2025, natural gas prices will likely 
increase as production stabilizes; as a result, nuclear generation is expected to again 
increase through increased capacity generation at existing plants. By 2040, that output is 
again anticipated to decrease with scheduled nuclear plant closures. As the US moves to 
become a net energy exporter, the private sector will likely emphasize investment in 
natural gas extraction and exporting capacity and the public sector will likely further 
incentivize investment in natural gas rather than nuclear energy.
These projections supplied by British Petroleum and the US Energy Information 
Administration are really just guesses, even though they are educated guesses.
3 Ibid.
4 “AEO2014 Early Release Overview.” Energy Information Administration. Last Updated December 16, 
2013. Accessed March 23, 2014. http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/earlv production.cftn?src^Analvsis- 
b3.
2 0 2
Sometimes, if not most of the time, however, energy forecasting goes wildly wrong.5 
Even so, based on this research, it is plausible to assume that coal will continue to 
provide a significant amount o f baseload electricity in the US considering the abundant 
supply of the resource and established infrastructure to generate coal into electrical 
power. Furthermore, it is also likely that natural gas prices will remain low until demand 
begins to approach supply, at which time natural gas prices will increase. This research 
has also shown that applications for nuclear reactors and nuclear output are correlated 
with the price of natural gas; that is, when prices are low, nuclear pursuance is also low, 
but when prices are high, there is renewed interest in nuclear energy. If and when this 
point is reached, the current existing reactors in the US may or may not still be operable 
(not shut down due to previously unfavorable economic conditions) to make up the 
difference in a market where the price o f natural gas is higher. Beyond this gas/nuclear 
equilibrium point, which the US will likely reach in the next 10 years, it is difficult to say 
whether nuclear pursuance will continue or will reverse course as other forms o f energy 
become too inexpensive for nuclear to compete.
The energy outlook for the US appears secure, but one of its biggest challenge 
will be gaining acceptance of the controversial hydraulic fracturing process from citizen 
populations where drilling is taking place. In a story very similar to that o f  nuclear 
construction plants, energy drilling companies stress the incentives o f employment 
opportunities and general increases in local wealth that such industry brings, but many 
citizens and environmental groups remain opposed. This opposition is evidenced, for 
example, with the problematic constmction o f the Keystone Pipeline from Canada to the
5 Steve Yetiv and Lowell Field, “Why Energy Forecasting Goes Wildly Wrong,” Journal o f  Energy 
Security, October 2013.
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Gulf Coast, the current phase of which is still bound in legal wrangling and faces 
opposition from multiple local governments, citizens and some US Congress members.
Germany is scheduled to have completed its nuclear phase-out that began in 2011 
with the closure o f its 8 oldest plants and increased with legislation that incentivized 
investment in renewable technology. A thriving German economy indicates that demand 
for electrical power is unlikely to decrease in the future and may even increase with 
renewed industrial production. New coal-fired power plants in Germany are predicted to 
continue placing coal as a cornerstone of the German electrical power supply in the 
medium-term while renewable infrastructure develops. New legislation has moved to 
phase out subsidies for coal production but the recent wave of new coal plants represent 
the biggest investment in coal energy sine the post-war reconstruction. These plants will 
have an operating lifetime until 20506. The Nord Stream Pipeline has diversified 
Germany’s already robust supply and storage infrastructure for natural gas. The current 
system can support a certain amount o f future loss in nuclear-generated capacity, but the 
energy transition has come at increasing costs to consumers. The cost o f transmission and 
redistribution infrastructure as well as research and development in new renewable 
technology has thus far been largely assumed by rate payers (though the industrial sector 
is largely exempt from these costs) and has increased significantly in the past 3 years. 
Increasing electrical bills and burdens on individual households have sparked a debate in 
Germany about the overall cost of the energy transformation. While the short and
6 “Energy Policies o f  IEA Countries, Germany: 2013,” International Energy Agency, Released January 
2013.
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medium-term projection for increasing renewable energy reliance in Germany is positive, 
the long-term outlook is still uncertain.7
Japan has been feeling the effects o f Fukushima since 2011 and will continue to 
find dealing with its energy resources problematic. Electrical demand has been low in 
Japan since the economic downturn in the 1990s, and even further decreased after 
Fukushima in 2011. However, the promising economic recovery plan of Shinzo Abe may 
indicate an uptick in industrial electricity demand. Coal imports to the general Asian 
market have doubled since 2000, mainly from Australia, China and India. The Asian 
market for coal has generally expanded rapidly in the past decade and is now roughly 4 
times the size o f the European market.8 Supply o f coal is still greater than demand, which 
has maintained a stable price, but increasing coal usage will not further Japan’s clean 
energy goals set forth in the Kyoto Protocol. Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) imports also 
increased significantly into Japan after 2011, but with a stable variety o f regional supply 
options, increasing reliance on LNG should not pose a problem. The plan to restart the 
nuclear reactors in Japan gives all indications o f progression, but that restart is still only a 
future possibility, not an inevitability. While importing almost all o f their energy 
resources has been expensive in the short-term, Japan’s primary long-term challenge will 
be balancing their need for resources with the needs o f a growing Asian market in 
general. To deal with their domestic lack of energy resources, countermeasures have been 
taken which include developing a greater domestic supply of renewable energy, 
diversifying supply sources, independently conducting overseas development, and
7 Ibid.
8 Atsuo Sagawa, “Outlook for International Coal Market, 2014,” 414th Regular Report Presentation to the 
Fossil Fuels and Electric Power Industry Institute, December 20, 2013.
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strengthening companies as players.9 South Korea has also initiated similar measures to 
increase their energy supply security and China has long been investing in African 
natural resources. These combined actions may increase the competition and hoarding of 
resources, destabilizing the regional and international energy markets.
Widening the Scope
General demand for electrical power is expected to increase in the coming 
decades, though much of that demand will move from OECD countries to developing, 
non-OECD countries. Accordingly, nuclear power capacity is steadily increasing 
worldwide with over 60 new reactors scheduled for construction in 13 countries, 120 new 
reactors are planned, and, by some estimates, 320 are proposed.10 Most of the new 
reactors will be in the Asian region in countries with rapidly growing economies and 
increased energy demand. After Fukushima, the OECD’s International Energy Agency 
projected a 60 percent increase in nuclear capacity in the world, a decrease from the 
previous year’s 90 percent projection but a sizable increase nonetheless. In addition to 
new reactors, there has also been a general move to increase the operating capacity and to 
extend the operating lives of existing reactors in countries with established nuclear 
programs such as Finland. In the following section, I will briefly examine 3 cases where 
nuclear energy is expected to grow: Russia, China and Ukraine. These 3 cases offer an 
opportunity to test the various conclusions o f this study in non-OECD countries that do 
not necessarily possess all the characteristics (democracy, economic development) that 
determined this project’s initial case studies.
9 Masakuza Toyoda, “Energy Security in North Asia,” Report from The Institute o f  Energy Economics, 
Japan, March 2014.
10 “Plans for New Reactors Worldwide,” World Nuclear Association, Last Updated March 2013, Accessed  




Russia is the world’s largest supplier o f natural gas, providing the European 
Union alone with 27 percent o f its total natural gas imports11. In addition to the world’s 
largest natural gas reserves, Russia is also the largest oil supplier outside o f OPEC. 
Despite these abundant endowments of natural resources, Russia is actively pursuing 
increased nuclear energy capacity with new reactors and expansion of existing plants. In 
2010, the Russian government approved a program to create a new reactor technology 
program to the nuclear industry based on fast reactors. This program envisions nuclear 
energy providing up to 50 percent o f Russian energy by 2050.12 Based on this 
information, Russia provides an ideal case in which to test the theory that countries with 
greater endowments o f natural resources will be less likely to pursue nuclear energy. 
Though one may assume that Russia offers a case in which this conclusion about nuclear 
energy and other resources is proven wrong, a closer examination reveals that this theory 
may need more refinement to incorporate considerations o f natural gas prices and export 
capability.
Russia is currently faced with rapidly rising electricity demand after decades of 
economic stagnation. Resource supply to meet this increasing demand, however, is 
surprisingly constrained, especially considering Russia’s vast supply of natural gas. The 
explanation lies in the Russian national gas company Gazprom’s economic incentive to 
export Russian gas to its Western European neighbors at much higher prices and make 
five times the profits than by utilizing the same gas domestically for electricity. Russia 
currently delivers natural gas to Europe through 12 pipelines, one of which goes directly




through the Baltic Sea to Germany. As demand for natural gas has increased in Western 
Europe, so has the motivation to sell it at the resulting higher prices. Because there is an 
already established transportation infrastructure in place and an established market to 
which to sell, Gazprom plans to half its supply o f natural gas to Russian electrical energy 
utilities by 2020.13 Russia also has been known to use its exports o f natural gas to Europe 
as an energy weapon for political control, most recently increasing the price o f natural 
gas to Ukraine by 40 percent as a response to mounting strains between the two countries 
of Russia’s March 2014 takeover of Crimea.14 This increase is a direct reversal o f the 
natural gas discount policy the two countries had agreed on just months earlier when 
relations between Ukraine and Russia were friendlier. This prospective economic payoff 
and tenuous political control from selling natural gas to Europe rather than consume it 
explains the Russian motivation to increase domestic nuclear energy. However, this 
Russian plan may backfire if Europe is able to find other supplies of natural gas that 
would give it independence from Russia, a supply that may just come from the US 
natural gas boom. Though Russia is the world’s largest natural gas exporter, the US has 
risen to become the world’s largest producer o f natural gas, though it does not currently 
have the infrastructure for mass exports that Russia has in its pipeline system. This lack 
of export infrastructure explains the uniquely low gas prices in the US market compared 
to the Asian or European market—without many regional options to sell the glut of 
natural gas (Canada has its own) US companies have been selling within a supply-heavy 
domestic market. As this infrastructure continues to develop, however, the US State
13 “Nuclear Power in Russia,” World Nuclear Association, Last Updated March 2014, Accessed April 3, 
2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Countrv-Profiles/Countries-Q-S/Russia—Nuclear-Power/.




Department has already incorporated American supplies o f natural gas into its diplomacy 
policy to give Europe options for natural gas besides Russia. This may have two future 
consequences for nuclear energy is the US and Russia. First, as US natural gas becomes 
more competitive in a demand-heavy international market, prices will increase and, as 
this study has shown, nuclear energy pursuance also increases with natural gas prices. 
This will account for a medium-term increased reliance on nuclear energy within the next 
decade, though the long-term consequences are difficult to discern. Even if  Europe turns 
to the US for natural gas to such an extent that it significantly damages Russian exports, 
there will likely always be other countries that will be willing to import natural gas from 
Russia, especially at special trade agreement prices. Russia is likely unworried about 
damage to its natural gas sector, and increasing nuclear energy to satisfy domestic 
demand will remain part of their energy strategy, regardless o f what happens in the 
coming months with Ukraine and the rest o f Europe. Consequently, Russia is also a 
leading exporter of nuclear technology, an industry from which it sees great profits and 
devotes much research and development monies.
To return to the original theory this brief discussion of Russia was supposed to 
test, does a greater endowment of other natural resources necessarily equal a decreased 
pursuance of nuclear energy? This analysis seems to suggest that may only be true when 
the prices of those other natural resources are relatively low. The incentive will be for 
nationalized or privatized energy companies to sell resources at prices that are higher in 
international markets than in the domestic market. If that results in subsequent increases 
in the price o f that resource in the domestic market, then nuclear energy will again 
become competitive. This condition explains the future forecast for nuclear energy in the
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US: as export infrastructure grows and demand for US natural gas increases, so will the 
domestic price of natural gas. Given this increased natural gas price, utility companies 
may find that investment in nuclear energy either by building new reactors or restarting 
old ones may again be comparatively profitable. The greatest explanatory factor, then, 
may not lie with access to other resources in countries where resources are abundant but 
in the relative price of those resources compared to nuclear energy on the global market. 
As renewable technology, investment and generated energy increase in the coming 
decades, domestic supplies o f solar or wind energy may further alter this relationship that 
pits the power of resource abundance against the dependence of resource scarcity.
China
Public opinion and citizen dissent may not seem like a fitting variable to examine 
in China, considering its status as an authoritative regime that naturally limits public 
input into state decisions. Recent citizen dissent activities in China, however, and a 
generally increasing pattern of social mobilization through social networking sites may 
suggest that citizen opposition to nuclear energy could gain a foothold in this one-party 
regime. The world’s second largest economy and one o f the fastest growing economies, 
Chinese electrical energy demand has increased exponentially in the past two decades. In 
addition to massive investment in Africa and other parts o f Asia, China also plans to 
increase its nuclear capacity four-fold by 2020 to counter a serious problem with 
pollution from coal-fired plants, which generate 80 percent o f  its electrical energy.15
In 2013, approximately 2000 residents o f Jiangmen protested the building o f a 
uranium processing plant that would have provided China with half of its nuclear fuel
15 Charlie Zhu, “Public Trust Crisis Threatens China’s Nuclear Power Ambitions,” Reuters, July 18, 2013, 
Accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/Q7/18/us-china-nuclear-protests- 
idUSBRE96H 1BT20130718.
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needs. Concerned with issues such as pollution and food safety, many local organizations 
also became involved. It was the official concern expressed by neighboring cities of 
Hong Kong and Macau, however, which finally inspired Jiangmen authorities to shelve 
plans for the uranium plant, though many local citizens report skepticism that the facility 
will not eventually be built, anyway, citing a lack o f governmental credibility and 
responsibility to the people.16 These protests come at a time when civil society is 
becoming increasingly organized in China, a fact that President Xi Jingping has 
acknowledge by saying the future survival o f the Communist Party o f China rests on 
attaining public approval.
The conclusions o f this study in relation to public opinion and nuclear energy 
were that citizens are more successful at stopping nuclear pursuance when they had 
access to a variety of democratic opportunity structures, such as proportionally 
representative government and multiple viable-party voting options that include an anti- 
nuclear party. These options do not exist for Chinese citizens, who are left with only 
organization into protest movements and involvement o f civil society organizations as 
tools to create costly roadblocks to facility construction. In this case, however, the theory 
that citizens are most successful at stopping nuclear pursuance when they can involve 
other governmental bodies (in this case, other cities) on their behalf holds true.
The integration of bureaucracy and industry in China, which is characteristic of a 
one-party regime, is not dissimilar to the close ties between industry and the LDP in 
Japan. This study has shown that Japanese citizens have been largely unsuccessful at 
slowing the government’s pursuit of nuclear energy, and if public dissent has little effect
16 Minnie Chan, “Jiangmen Uranium Plant Scrapped After Thousands Take Part in Protests,” South China 
Morning Post, July 14, 2013, Accessed April 4 , 2014.
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1281748/iiangmen-uranium -plant-scraDPed-after-protest.
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in Japan, a country the world considers a democratic nation, then it is unlikely citizens 
will have much of an effect on Chinese nuclear pursuance, either, though to what extent 
the Chinese Communist Party will have to satisfy increasing citizen demands to hold on 
to power is a developing issue. Examining other pro-nuclear energy, nondemocratic 
countries would offer some insight into this decision-making process in the context of 
nondemocratic governmental systems. Iran, for example, certainly has political and 
national interests vested in pursuing a “peaceful” nuclear energy program, even at great 
personal cost. Future studies could expand the findings o f this study, especially those 
related to citizen participation, to countries without democratic government that are still 
marginally accountable to its citizens.
Ukraine
This study began with the hypothesis that nuclear disasters anywhere impact state 
decisions to pursue nuclear energy. The course o f research revealed this relationship 
between disasters and anti-nuclear policies to be weak , though it does seem that there is 
an anti-nuclear reactionary phase in countries where nuclear disasters occur, even if  the 
there is a subsequent, eventual return to nuclear pursuance. This theory is supported by 
the scholarly literature which was discussing this “rebound hypothesis,” at least in terms 
of public opinion trends, in 1994.17 Since the Chernobyl incident took place in current 
day Ukraine, it poses an interesting case to briefly examine in the context o f this 
hypothesis.
Original Ukrainian nuclear energy was obviously tied to Russian technology. 
Even after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, however, Ukraine/USSR continued operation
17 See: Eugene A. Rosa and Riley Dunlap, “Nuclear Power: Three Decades of Public Opinion,” Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 58:2 (1994), 295-324.
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of nuclear reactors, operation which remained relatively stable even after independence 
from the collapsing Soviet Union. 2011 energy forecasts included an increased demand in 
electricity, and the Ukrainian government created policies to emphasize the role nuclear 
energy would play creating this electrical energy supply. By 2030, the hope is that half of 
the electricity supply in Ukraine will come from nuclear generation.18
This example of Ukraine seems to suggest that, in the long-run nuclear disasters 
have little impact on state decision to pursue nuclear energy, in the long or short term. 
The worst nuclear disaster in history happened within the borders o f present day Ukraine, 
and it is still actively pursuing a nuclear energy program. The United States, Germany 
and Japan would suggest similar support for the same argument. The lone outlier to this 
conclusion is Germany’s decision to move away from nuclear energy after Fukushima, 
but that nuclear phase-out policy is a decision that was merely hastened rather than 
created by the Fukushima disaster. There are, however, a handful o f cases countries that 
have banned nuclear energy, some since Fukushima. Italy, for example, has never had 
nuclear energy capacity and both Spain and Switzerland voted to phase out nuclear 
energy following Fukushima. Though an examination of these cases is beyond the scope 
of this study, future projects could offer analysis that would reveal the motivation behind 
these decisions to moves away from nuclear energy, perhaps in comparison with the 
German decision to do the same.
Final Comments
The intent of this research project was to create an educated guess as to the future 
viability of nuclear energy as a resource of the future. That future seems to vary by
18 “Nuclear Power in Ukraine,” World Nuclear Association, Last Updated March 2014, Accessed April 3, 
2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Countrv-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/Ukraine/.
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country, and upon a host of other factors: availability o f other resources, price of 
competing resources, an accepting civil society, and even, in some cases, clean energy 
goals. The gamut o f current levels o f nuclear energy pursuance ranges from a complete 
phase-out, to reductions in nuclear reliance, to the construction of many new future 
reactors. As electricity demand becomes relatively stable in developed countries, the need 
for initially expensive nuclear energy will decrease, especially as other energy options, 
such as renewable sources, become more viable and states become more committed to 
future clean energy goals. Among developing countries, however, the race to diversify 
energy supply is on as electricity demand will only increase. For countries without 
reliable and affordable access to resources, nuclear energy still represents one path to a 
degree of energy independence, especially as competition for resources becomes 
increasingly heated.
This project ultimately concludes, first, that the future o f nuclear energy is 
uncertain in the short-term and somewhat dismal in the long-term. The preceding 
chapters illustrate that when faced with other, equally affordable energy options, states 
can rarely be expected to invest in initially expensive nuclear energy. A future expansion 
of this project may choose to comparatively engage states’ various market structures with 
the hypothesis that the stronger the free market, the less likely a state will be to pursue 
nuclear, while a stronger state presence in the market may provide a more hospitable 
environment for nuclear investment. This may at least partly explain the expansion of 
nuclear power in places like China or the United Arab Emirates, in addition to limited 
citizen-input structures. Expected future electrical demand also seems to be a consistently 
important factor, evidenced by the growth of nuclear energy in primarily developing
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countries that are expecting future growth and the waning of nuclear energy in some 
developed countries where electrical demand has stabilized or even begun to decrease.
The course of reaching this conclusion about nuclear energy’s future also 
generated knowledge that I did not initially seek out but has proven to be vital in 
formulating this study’s primary conclusions. Among these are that, first, the structure of 
a state’s licensing and regulating body can significantly hasten or impede the process of 
approving new reactors as well as the continued operation o f those reactors. Centralized 
approval systems like those found in Japan and the US are more susceptible to the 
problem of regulatory capture where there are close ties between the nuclear commission 
and the nuclear industry. These ties create a system in which it is easier to gain initial 
approval for new reactors and more likely that safety regulations will be lax and therefore 
in financial favor o f the nuclear industry at the expense of overall safety. De-centralized 
systems, like those found in Germany, where individual Lander have final approval over 
new reactors and work in accordance with the state regulating and approval body as well 
as the European Commission for Nuclear Energy, tend to exhibit fewer symptoms of 
regulatory capture and allow citizens greater access to the nuclear policy decision-making 
process.
Secondly, democratic systems of proportional representation likewise offer 
citizens the opportunity to influence nuclear energy pursuance through the democratic 
process o f voting. In systems of multi-party representations where there are multiple 
party options and at least anti-nuclear party, there is a greater chance that an anti-nuclear 
party will gain a voting threshold for legislative representation and can even form a 
coalition with similar parties to initiate anti-nuclear policy. In two-party, pro-nuclear
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states (the US), or states with a history of pro-nuclear one-party dominance (Japan), 
citizens’ opportunity to elect anti-nuclear representation is limited. Both of these points 
represent a greater argument about citizen opportunity structures, or systems in which 
citizens are more likely to influence state nuclear decisions. In a de-centralized approval 
system, citizen protests are more successful as local legislators are concerned with the 
next election season. The result is increased willingness to hear citizen demands or 
concerns, and though there is no guarantee o f a response, it is more likely than in a 
centralized system that may be beholden to the nuclear industry. Future projects should 
not neglect an examination of these opportunity structures, though it may be that citizens 
will have less influence over nuclear pursuance in the future simply because most nuclear 
expansion is occurring in non-democratic countries.
Finally, the discussion of the “nuclear narrative” offered here is, as far as I am 
aware, something entirely new in academic studies of nuclear energy. The pervasiveness 
o f the state-centric political theory o f realism is largely due to a significant body of 
historical evidence that supports it. States do often make decisions that, while at times 
unpopular domestically or internationally, seem to be primarily about preserving their 
own survival and power. Many could argue that state decisions about pursuing or not 
pursuing nuclear energy are also a product of this line o f reasoning, whether it is a party 
trying to preserve their political power or a state trying to ensure it has access to enough 
energy resources. However, these decisions cannot be made in a vacuum, for if  a country 
claims to be democratic, it has to exhibit some amount o f concern for the welfare o f its 
people and some responsiveness to the will of the people, if  for no other reason than to 
prevent a coup d ’etat. Therefore, to varying degrees, states are forced to operate within
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issue narratives that prevail in a country, in this case, the narrative about nuclear energy. 
States can actively participate in the creation of these narratives, have little control over 
these narratives, or leave well-enough alone in the absence o f  a narrative.
For example, this project has previously discussed the ways in which the Japanese 
state attempted to create and control citizens’ sentiments about nuclear energy; that is, the 
state actively worked to create the perception that nuclear energy was intrinsically linked 
to economic growth and energy independence, a perception that eventually became an 
ideological norm. Within this narrative, it became much easier for the state to gain 
approval for nuclear reactors placed in citizen’s backyards, though the subsidy money 
that poured into reactor communities likely did not hurt, either. In Germany, the 
prevailing narrative about nuclear energy was largely shaped by outside forces such as 
the Cold War, nuclear weapons, unfortunate geopolitical positioning, and a strong de­
militarized sentiment. Had leaders even wanted to actively create a positive image of 
nuclear energy, the persistent link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons would 
have been difficult to overcome given the regional political climate o f the Cold War. By 
way of contrast, the nuclear narrative is largely absent in the US, though films engaging 
energy issues such as Pandora’s Promise or Promised Land  have become more popular 
in the last decade. Examining the construction and content o f these “nuclear narratives” 
will reveal much about states’ resolve (or desperation) to pursue nuclear energy. By also 
determining where nuclear-promotion funds are coming from, future studies can also 
determine the extent to which states are linked (or beholden) to the nuclear industry. 
Lastly, the extent to which citizens react to the forces creating these nuclear narratives 
and the ways in which these narratives do or do not become ideological norms can lead to
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a greater understanding of how citizens self-identify as political participants. In other 
words, the success or failure of these narratives, especially when states actively expend 
time and money to create them, will be significant, though perhaps only in democratic 
countries where citizen consent matters.
The initial goal of this project was simply to offer an educated guess as to the 
future viability o f nuclear energy in a world market o f competing electrical power 
sources such as coal, natural gas, and emerging renewable technologies. Among these 
resources, nuclear energy poses an interesting case to study for two primary reasons. 
First, nuclear technology possesses an immense capacity for use in good and evil, not just 
in terms of the “weapons versus energy” dichotomy, but even within its operation as a 
peaceful energy source. In this respect, the Henry Wadsworth Longfellow poem about a 
little girl with a curl on her forehead comes to mind, for when this girl was good, she was 
very good; however, when she was bad, she was horrid.19 Nuclear energy similarly has 
the capacity for efficient and clean energy generation, but the other side o f that coin 
depicts scenes of reactor meltdowns, radiation leakages, contamination and disaster with 
which the world is all too familiar based on reporting from Chernobyl and Fukushima. 
Nuclear energy has also been depicted in popular culture perhaps more than any other 
form of energy, in manga series such as Astro Boy, in films such as The China Syndrome 
(1979), Barefoot Gen (1986) and Chernobyl Diaries (2012); satirized in television shows 
such as The Simpsons; and in poems and popular literature such as The Crazy Iris (1984). 
In this way, nuclear energy has a sort o f  “personality” that other forms o f energy do not 
have, a personality that is further explore in this project through a discussion of what I
19 Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, “There Was a Little Girl.”
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term the “nuclear narrative” and how that personification of risk influences states’ 
abilities to pursue nuclear energy.
Secondly, nuclear energy is a rare resource that can be produced domestically and 
in abundance while simultaneously allowing states to further their clean energy goals. We 
currently live in a world o f energy yins and yangs, a world of competing interests that 
push against each other to form a tentative status quo. Preserving the environment, 
reducing pollution, and protecting citizens’ quality o f life have all become popular policy 
goals, especially in Western countries. In tension with those goals is the global 
economy’s need for more and more energy resources. As developed countries strive to 
maintain their economies and developing countries inevitably continue to grow, there will 
be fewer and fewer resources to go around. While renewable technologies based on solar, 
wind, and hydrothermal sources are increasing in popularity and attracting increased 
investment, these sources are still decades from being capable o f replacing traditional 
fossil fuels. Excluding the needed enriched uranium, nuclear energy also offers states a 
degree of energy security and independence in a world o f resource “haves and have- 
nots.” If our future is to be characterized by resource competition and  clean energy goals, 
then the role nuclear energy— a clean, domestic resource— will play in that future will 
only become increasingly important.
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